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This thesis is a critical comparison of the accounts of religious belief proposed by 
William James and Søren Kierkegaard. Both James and Kierkegaard greatly emphasize 
the subjective aspects of religious belief. In view of this fact, surprisingly little 
comparative work has been done in this area. I contribute to this literature in two ways. 
Firstly, I make a brief assessment of what James knew of Kierkegaard’s work. 
Secondly, I draw four comparisons between Kierkegaard and James. In Chapter One I 
examine the claim that Kierkegaard proposes a pragmatist account of faith of the kind 
that James sets out in his essay The Will To Believe. I argue that this claim rests on a 
misunderstanding of Kierkegaard’s argument that to have faith is to take a risk. In the 
following chapter I discuss James’s and Kierkegaard’s views on formal proofs for the 
existence of God. Both philosophers reject the notion that faith can be based on such 
proofs. I distinguish between their positions, and argue in favour of Kierkegaard’s. In 
the third chapter I compare Kierkegaard’s and James’s accounts of religious experience. 
James views religious experiences as a special kind of evidence for the existence of 
God. For Kierkegaard it is a mistake to view religious experiences as evidence. Such 
experiences should be understood in relation to the concept of religious authority. In the 
final chapter I examine Kierkegaard’s conception of faith as a life-view. I argue that for 
Kierkegaard a life-view is a fundamental perspective on one’s existence. I compare this 
conception with James’s concept of philosophical temperament and in relation to his 
discussion of the sick soul.   iii 
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Introduction 
 
1) Why Compare Kierkegaard with James? 
Anybody setting out to make a comparative study of what Kierkegaard and James have 
to say about religious belief will soon entertain three concerns about the project. The 
first concern is whether there is good reason to compare the two philosophers at all. It is 
true that both men involved themselves deeply with philosophical issues of religious 
belief. But they are hardly alone in having done so. Moreover there are other candidates 
for philosophers with whom we might usefully compare either Kierkegaard or James. 
For example we might compare Kierkegaard with his philosophical bête noire Hegel, or 
with Socrates, for whom Kierkegaard often expresses his approval. Likewise it would 
make good sense to compare James with fellow pragmatist Dewey, or with Peirce, from 
whom James claimed to have borrowed important insights. The case for comparing 
Kierkegaard with James is less obvious. One of the reasons it is less obvious – and this 
is the second concern – is that Kierkegaard and James did not read each other’s works. 
Kierkegaard was not exposed at all to the works of James. The Dane died in 1855, when 
the American was just thirteen years old. James, for his part, wasn’t much interested in 
Kierkegaard, even in his later life. Furthermore, the fact that Kierkegaard and James did 
not read each other may go some way to explaining the third concern, which is that 
there is relatively little comparative literature on the two. Just three authors have penned 
long comparative studies of Kierkegaard and James in English. Thomas Gilmartin’s 
work is an unpublished doctoral dissertation completed in 1974.
1 In the same year C. 
Stephen Evans completed a doctoral study entitled Subjective Justifications of Religious 
Belief: A comparative Study of Kant, Kierkegaard, and James.
2 However, as the title 
perhaps suggests, the primary focus of this work is the development of a justification of 
religious belief. There are few comparative remarks on Kierkegaard and James, and 
these appear in a short section after the principal arguments of the thesis have been set 
out. This lack of comparative content is reflected in the fact that when the thesis was 
published the title was altered, and the work was more accurately billed as an historical 
                                                 
1 Gilmartin, T. (1974) Soul Sickness: A Comparison of William James and Søren Kierkegaard, PhD 
thesis, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California. 
2 Evans, C.S. (1974) Subjective Justifications of Religious Belief: A Comparative Study of Kant, 
Kierkegaard, and James, PhD thesis, Yale University.   2 
and critical study.
3 More recently, Paul F. Sands has authored a doctoral thesis 
comparing the views of Kierkegaard, James and Newman on the justification of 
religious belief.
4 This work forms the basis of his book on the same subject.
5 But the 
brevity of this survey makes it clear that there is little long comparative literature on 
Kierkegaard and James. And noticing this lack inevitably ushers in the disconcerting 
suspicion that there may be little of substance to say on the matter, or that everything of 
substance has already been said. Moreover, although we may only suspect that there is 
nothing much to say, it is absolutely certain that there is little secondary material to 
work with. 
  Nonetheless, there are good reasons to compare Kierkegaard with James and we 
can begin to appreciate those reasons by addressing the three concerns I have just 
outlined. The fact that few detailed comparisons of Kierkegaard and James have been 
made does not establish that there is nothing much to say on the matter. Rather, it means 
that there is an opportunity to undertake original research in this area; there is a gap in 
the literature in which to file a contribution. Similarly, the fact that Kierkegaard and 
James were not acquainted with each other’s works does not imply that there are no 
grounds on which to compare their philosophical accounts of religious belief. Since 
James didn’t read Kierkegaard there isn’t a great deal to say about the influence of the 
latter on the former. However, this in no way prevents us from comparing the 
arguments of the two philosophers. The point of making such a comparison is not to 
establish how far one thinker influenced the other. Rather, the point is to see how deep 
any apparent affinities between the arguments of Kierkegaard and James actually go, 
and to evaluate the relative strengths of their arguments where they differ. Kierkegaard 
and James are good candidates for a comparative project of this kind precisely because 
it is not obvious how much philosophical ground they have in common. There 
undoubtedly are some points of common interest that will strike any reader of 
Kierkegaard and James. Examples of these common interests include their vehement 
objection to Hegel, their rejection of the notion that faith can be grounded in formal 
                                                 
3 Evans, C.S. (1982) Subjectivity and Religious Belief: An Historical, Critical Study, Pennsylvania: 
University Press of America. 
4 Sands, P. F. (2001) A Christian Appraisal of the Justification of Religious Faith in Søren Kierkegaard, 
John Henry Newman, and William James, PhD thesis, Religion Dept., Baylor University.  
5 Sands, P.F. (2003) The Justification of Religious Faith in Søren Kierkegaard, John Henry Newman, and 
William James, New Jersey: Gorgias Press. 
   3 
proofs for the existence of God, and their description of religious belief as a form of 
lived passionate commitment rather than a conviction in a scholarly thesis. Furthermore, 
while there is no highly developed comparative literature on Kierkegaard and James, 
some philosophers have taken the view that there are certain basic affinities between 
Kierkegaard and James. My interest in comparing Kierkegaard with James lies in 
rooting out whether apparent similarities between Kierkegaard and James are actual 
similarities.  
  Of the comparisons that have been drawn between Kierkegaard and James we 
can distinguish in a rough but useful way between what we might call constructive 
identifications and destructive identifications.
6 By the former I mean arguments in 
which it is claimed that Kierkegaard and James take fundamentally similar 
philosophical views. An  example of this kind of argument can be found in Karl-Otto 
Apel, who writes: ‘In his essay The Will to Believe, William James introduced 
Kierkegaard’s central concern – the individual’s subjective interest in fundamentally 
unprovable and therefore existentially relevant truth – into the context of the community 
of scientific experimenters, proposing such as the limit of this community.’
7 This is a 
highly compressed remark; and because it is so compressed it is also rather puzzling. 
We should like to know, for example, what is meant by an ‘unprovable truth’ and why 
such truth must be ‘existentially relevant.’ What is perfectly clear, however, is that for 
Apel, James does not merely share some loose affinity with Kierkegaard. Rather, in The 
Will to Believe at least, James is taking a philosophical view profoundly similar to the 
one held by Kierkegaard. 
We can contrast the kind of view held by Apel with a different, destructive 
identification of Kierkegaard and James. By a destructive identification I mean that 
Kierkegaard and James are not held to make identical arguments, but are, nonetheless, 
both accused of ending up in the same sinking philosophical boat. An example of this 
kind of argument can be found in William Alston, who writes:  
 
                                                 
6 In the following I am not suggesting that only these two kinds of comparison are possible. Furthermore 
the distinction between these two kinds of comparison is not hard and fast, but a matter of emphasis. 
Nonetheless I have employed the distinction here because it usefully reflects an important trend in the 
comparative literature on Kierkegaard and James. 
7 Apel, K-O. (1981) Charles S Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism, trans. J.M. Krois, Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 4.   4 
‘Consider the position of James in The Will to Believe, or the more extreme position of 
Kierkegaard, according to both of whom believing in God is somehow justifiable, even 
though no adequate reasons can be presented either for or against the proposition that 
God exists. (That is, even though we cannot discover adequate reasons in support of the 
proposition that God exists, we can discover adequate reasons for the proposition that it 
may be justifiable to believe that God exists.)’
8 
 
Alston doesn’t think that James and Kierkegaard make exactly the same arguments, and 
not only because the latter is ‘more extreme’ than the former. He notes that ‘James says 
that we are going to take some position on this problem without having adequate 
reasons for it in any event’, whereas Kierkegaard’s strategy is to present religious belief 
as ‘the only possible stance for one who resolutely faces the facts of the human 
situation.’
9 Nonetheless Alston worries that if we accept what (in his view) either 
Kierkegaard or James have to say, then it is difficult to know what considerations are 
relevant to coming to a belief in God. ‘Perhaps if we have abandoned the attempt to 
show that the proposition in true or false and are still trying to decide whether it is all 
right to believe it, then anything goes.’ He goes on to conclude, ‘it might be quite 
pertinent, if not conclusive, in this sort of context to deny that theistic belief is 
justifiable, on the grounds that it involves acquiescing in a regression to an infantile 
mode of thought.’
10 According to this view, then, the arguments of Kierkegaard and 
James do not stand shoulder to shoulder, but nonetheless the two men are sufficiently 
close that it is possible to tar them with the same critical brush. 
  My view is that neither of these kinds of comparison is quite on the money. 
Kierkegaard’s and James’s accounts of religious belief may look similar in certain 
respects. Their antagonism to Hegel, rejection of formal proofs for the existence of God, 
and denial that religious belief is primarily an intellectual conviction are all shared. But 
there are essential differences in their philosophical positions. The view that 
Kierkegaard and James give fundamentally similar accounts of religious belief is not 
correct. And because their views are fundamentally dissimilar and not just seemingly 
dissimilar, it is not correct or instructive to claim that they make similar kinds of 
                                                 
8 Alston, W. (1966) “Psychoanalytic Theory and Theistic Belief” in J. Hick (ed.) Faith and the 
Philosophers, London: Macmillan, 100. 
9 Alston, ibid., 100. 
10 Alston, ibid., 101.   5 
philosophical blunders. My purpose, then, is to fill the gap in the literature I have 
identified, not with more comparisons of the kind I have reviewed, but with a careful 
elaboration of the differences between Kierkegaard and James and an appraisal of their 
arguments. 
 
2) Kierkegaard’s influence on James 
Having acknowledged that there is little to say about Kierkegaard’s influence on James 
I must also acknowledge that there is nonetheless something to say about it. James was 
no Kierkegaard scholar, but he was to some extent acquainted with Kierkegaard’s 
thought. This is witnessed by the fact that James cites Kierkegaard in three well-known 
works.
11 Chronologically, the first citation occurs in chapter six of Pragmatism (1907), 
where James makes it clear he is borrowing an insight from Kierkegaard but withholds 
the latter’s name: ‘We live forwards, a Danish thinker has said, but we understand 
backwards. The present sheds a backward light on the world’s previous processes.’
12 
James’s second citation of Kierkegaard occurs in A Pluralistic Universe (1909), and 
strongly resembles the first. ‘We live forward, we understand backward, said a danish 
(sic) writer; and to understand life by concepts is to arrest its movement […].’
13 James 
borrows the same insight for a third time in his Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912). 
Referring to Harald Høffding’s paper A Philosophical Confession, James writes:
14 
 
‘In Professor Höffding’s (sic) massive little article in The Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific Methods, he quotes a saying of Kierkegaard’s to the effect 
that we live forwards, but we understand backwards. Understanding backwards is, it 
must be confessed, a very frequent weakness of philosophers, both of the rationalistic 
and of the ordinary empiricist type.’
15 
 
                                                 
11 Gilmartin claims that James’s only reference to the work of Kierkegaard occurs in his Essays in 
Radical Empiricism. Gilmartin is mistaken, for he has missed James’s references to Kierkegaard in 
Pragmatism and A Pluralistic Universe. Gilmartin, op. cit., 2. 
12 James, W. (1995a) Pragmatism, New York: Dover Publications, Inc, 86. James also makes a slightly 
cryptic use of the distinction between living forwards and understanding backwards in the final chapter of 
Pragmatism. There he notes of one of his interlocutors ‘But he believes himself to face backwards.’ Ibid., 
108. 
13 James, W. (1996b) A Pluralistic Universe, London: University of Nebraska Press, 244. 
14 Høffding, H. (1905a) “A Philosophical Confession,” The Journal of Philosophy Psychology and 
Scientific Methods II, no. 4: 85-92. Hereafter Confession. 
15 James, W. (1996a) Essays in Radical Empiricism, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 238.   6 
Arguably, this passage is slightly more encouraging than the first two because here 
James at least cites Kierkegaard by name. However, it is also clear that he is dealing 
with Kierkegaard at second hand, through a reading of Høffding’s paper. Høffding says 
little else about Kierkegaard in his paper, merely noting that, ‘In my youth the influence 
of the Danish philosopher and religious thinker, Sören (sic) Kierkegaard, was decisive 
for me.’
16 And to this he adds only the compressed yet sweeping observation that, ‘He 
[Kierkegaard] waged a passionate war against speculation, with strong accentuation of 
the conditions of thought and the value of the single, real, personal life.’
17 Clearly, then, 
James could not have gleaned a detailed understanding of Kierkegaard from Høffding’s 
Philosophical Confession. 
Nevertheless, James may have learnt more about Kierkegaard from Høffding 
than at first meets the eye. Høffding, a professor at the University of Copenhagen, 
certainly was more knowledgeable about Kierkegaard than his 1905 article suggests. In 
the 1860’s Høffding had been acquainted with Kierkegaard’s brother Peter Christian 
Kierkegaard, and had been a friend of, and university student with, Peter Christian’s son 
Paul.
18 Moreover, Høffding made a serious study of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, 
resulting, in 1892, in the publication of his book on the subject.
19 Over a decade later, in 
October 1904, Høffding visited Harvard at the invitation of James.
20 
21At Harvard 
Høffding gave a lecture to James’s students, which James attended.
22 The ‘massive little 
article’ that James refers to in Essays in Radical Empiricism contains what Høffding 
himself calls the ‘essential content’ of that lecture.
23 It is likely, then, that in his lecture 
to James’s students, Høffding made the same brief references to Kierkegaard that he 
                                                 
16 Confession, op. cit., 90. 
17 Confession, op. cit., 90. 
18 Poole, R. (1993) Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 285-286. 
19 Høffding, H. (1892) Kierkegaard som Filosof, Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
20That James extended the invitation to Høffding is recorded by James’s son Henry in his The Letters of 
William James. James, W. (1920b) The Letters of William James edited by his son, Henry James Volume 
2, London: Longman, Green & co., 216.  
21 A reference to Høffding in James’s lecture notes shows that James had been aware of the work of 
Høffding since at least 1891. In James’s Notes for Philosophy 20a: Psychological Seminary (1891-1892) 
there is a reference to Høffding’s book Outlines of Psychology (1891). James, W. (1988) Manuscript 
Lectures, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 210. Høffding, H. (1891) Outlines of Psychology, trans. 
M. E. Lowndes, London: Macmillan. 
22 There are two pieces of evidence for the assertion that James attended Høffding’s lecture. Firstly, in a 
letter to Ferdinand Schiller James recounts an anecdote that Høffding had recounted during the lecture. 
See The Letters of William James, op. cit., 216. Secondly, James made some notes relating to Høffding’s 
lecture. See Manuscript Lectures, op. cit., 330. 
23 Confession, op. cit., 85.   7 
made in his published ‘philosophical confession’. But it is also possible that, on the 
occasion of his visit to Harvard, Høffding and James may have discussed Kierkegaard 
in greater detail. James certainly ‘took to him [Høffding] immensely’,
24 and was 
sufficiently impressed with the latter’s work to arrange the translation into English of 
one of his books, The Problems of Philosophy (1905).
25 
 26 James penned a 
characteristically generous preface to the translation, but makes no reference to 
Kierkegaard there. We cannot know what James and Høffding discussed at Harvard, but 
at the very least it is certain that James had an opportunity to draw directly on 
Høffding’s knowledge of Kierkegaard’s intellectual milieu in Copenhagen, his family 
and his philosophy. 
The fact remains, however, that nowhere in Pragmatism, or in A Pluralistic 
Universe, or in Essays on Radical Empiricism, or, indeed, anywhere else in his 
published works, does James develop any detailed thoughts on Kierkegaard. Even in his 
lecture notes James does not refer to Kierkegaard by name, merely referring once to the 
now familiar distinction between living forwards and understanding backwards, and 
without expanding on the observation.
27 Moreover, the philosophical connection 
between James and Kierkegaard looks even more flimsy when we note that Kierkegaard 
himself did not claim credit for the observation that we live forwards and understand 
backwards. In his early work From the Papers of One Still Living, Kierkegaard 
attributes the observation to Carl Daub.
28  Alastair Hannay has noted that Kierkegaard’s 
attribution is inaccurate. The distinction was in fact made by Fr. Baader in his Lectures 
on Speculative Dogmatics.
29 In Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard attributes to 
Daub the related and rather interesting idea that the historian is a prophet in reverse.
30 
Whether Daub or Baader or both commanded Kierkegaard’s thoughts is not clear.
31 But 
in any case Kierkegaard does not explicate the work of either of these men. He simply 
made his own use of the distinction between living forwards and understanding 
                                                 
24 The Letters of William James, op. cit., 216. 
25 Høffding, H. (1905b) The Problems of Philosophy, trans. G.M. Fisher, New York: Macmillan.  
26 In his preface to Høffding’s The Problems of Philosophy James tells us that he arranged for its 
translation into English. He also tells us that he ‘carefully revised’ the translation himself. Ibid., v, xiv. 
27 Manuscript Lectures, op.cit., 363. 
28 Kierkegaard, S. (1990a) Early Polemical Writings, trans. J. Watkin, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 78. 
29 Hannay, A. (2003) Kierkegaard: A Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 454. 
30 Kierkegaard, S. (1985) Philosophical Fragments / Johannes Climacus, ed. and trans. H.V. Hong and 
E.H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 80. 
31In Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard refers to Baader in same paragraph as Daub. Ibid., 80.   8 
backwards.
32 To understand what Kierkegaard means when he engages the distinction 
between living forwards and understanding backwards, then, we must place his use of 
that distinction in the context of the work in which he uses it. But James simply did not 
do this. James merely borrowed for his own purposes ‘Kierkegaard’s’ distinction 
between living forwards and understanding backwards, just as Kierkegaard had 
borrowed the same distinction for his purposes. Accordingly, James’s scant references 
to Kierkegaard don’t suggest any profound influence of the latter on the former. For this 
reason I don’t think we can claim, as Gilmartin does, that ‘James himself recognized an 
affinity with Kierkegaard.’
33 The very best we can do is to say that on three occasions at 
least, James drew on a philosophical insight he found in Høffding’s rendition of 
Kierkegaard. Consequently David F. Swenson, one of the first Kierkegaard scholars 
based in the United States, was correct to warn against the idea that we could learn 
anything useful about Kierkegaard from James’s references to him.  In an article first 
published in 1916 he insists on the following, ‘[…] I warn the reader that Kierkegaard 
resists a facile classification, and that one cannot, without danger of misunderstanding, 
transfer impressions derived from a study of James or Bergson, unmodified, to the 
interpretation of this most profound and original thinker.’
34 
 
3) Philosophical Comparisons and Biographical Comparisons 
The lives of Kierkegaard and James did not cross. Nonetheless it is important to address 
what bearing biographical studies should have on our understanding of their works. 
There is, as Steven M. Emmanuel has pointed out, ‘a long and respected tradition in 
Kierkegaard studies which is straightforwardly biographical in orientation.’
35 
36 The 
                                                 
32 In his Journals Kierkegaard discusses the distinction between living forwards and understanding 
backwards in relation to his own philosophical preoccupations and without attributing the distinction to 
any particular author. I take this as further evidence that Kierkegaard was not interested in reconstructing 
or championing the thoughts of Baader or Daub, but in using the distinction as a vehicle for his own 
thinking. See Journal entries 1025 (1838) and 1030 (1843). Kierkegaard, S. (1967) Søren Kierkegaard’s 
Journals and Papers Volume 1, A E, ed. and trans. H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
33 Gilmartin, op. cit., 2. 
34 Swenson, D. F. (1970) “The Anti-intellectualism of Kierkegaard,” in L.A. Lawson (ed.) Kierkegaard’s 
Presence in Contemporary American Life: Essays from Various Disciplines, Metuchen: The Scarecrow 
Press, Inc., 23. 
35 Emmanuel, S.M. (1996) Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation, Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 3. 
36 Recent examples of work of this kind include the following: 
Garff, J. (2005) Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, trans. B.H. Kirmmse, New Jersey: Princeton 
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same can be said of James scholarship, where the path was first forged in 1935 by Ralph 
Barton Perry’s The Thought and Character of William James.
37 
38 Gilmartin has a foot 
in each of these scholarly traditions when he claims that ‘their [Kierkegaard’s and 
James’s] biographies are essential to understanding their works.’
39 But Gilmartin also 
seeks to unite these two traditions in a very provocative way, arguing that similarities 
between the philosophical arguments of Kierkegaard and James can be explained by 
reference to shared features of their biographies. Gilmartin’s views seem to me 
unwarranted and I shall discuss them briefly, with a view to elaborating my own 
position. 
  Two central tenets of Gilmartin’s case are that Kierkegaard and James both 
experienced psychological traumas, and that their philosophical works are a response to 
those traumas. It is because both men ‘wrote out of suffering’
40 in this way that our 
understanding of their works must be grounded in an understanding of their lives. 
Gilmartin further speculates that Kierkegaard and James both suffered from the same 
psychological complaint, depression. He draws from this the conclusion that similarities 
between the philosophical arguments of Kierkegaard and James can be explained by 
reference to their shared experience of depression. ‘The resemblance of their sufferings 
explains the resemblance between their solutions.’
41  
  Gilmartin’s case is, it seems to me, wildly speculative. It is one thing to 
recognise that both Kierkegaard and James were sometimes somewhat depressed and 
quite another to conclude firstly that both men suffered from some psychological 
illness, secondly, that they suffered from the same illness and, thirdly, that that illness 
was clinical depression. Moreover I see no reason to think that diagnosing someone 
with clinical depression would ‘explain’ their philosophical writings. 
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There are certain interesting parallels between the lives of Kierkegaard and 
James. For example, there is some evidence that both Kierkegaard and James 
considered themselves to be gloomy souls. In his journals Kierkegaard writes many 
times of his experiences of melancholy. In 1848, for example, he wrote, ‘The same 
thing has happened to me again that has happened so often before. While I am 
submerged in the deepest suffering of melancholy, some thought or other becomes so 
knotted up that I cannot disentangle it, and since it is connected with my own life I 
suffer incredibly.’
42 Similarly, in a famous and thinly veiled autobiographical passage in 
the Varieties of Religious Experience James records his experience of having a ‘general 
depression of spirits’ and a ‘horrible fear of my own existence.’
43 Certainly some of 
their contemporaries also thought that Kierkegaard and James were more than averagely 
downhearted. Kierkegaard’s former fiancée Regine Schlegel (née Olsen) told Raphael 
Meyer that ‘Kierkegaard suffered frightfully from melancholia; many a time he sat by 
her [Regine] and wept.’
44 Likewise, John Jay Chapman wrote that ‘There was, in spite 
of his playfulness, a deep sadness about James. You felt that he had just stepped out of 
this sadness in order to meet you, and was to go back into it the moment you left him.’
45 
Furthermore there are some famous and very engaging passages in Kierkegaard 
and in James that do encourage us to think of their philosophical works as responses to 
deeply felt personal issues. In a well known journal entry for 1
st August 1835 
Kierkegaard wonders whether pursuing his studies might ‘banish a certain restlessness’ 
that he suffers from. And he goes on to worry about not only what kind of a life he 
should lead, but how his philosophical work should relate to the conduct of his life. 
 
‘And what use here would it be if I were to discover a so-called objective truth, or if I 
worked my way through all the philosophers’ systems and were able to call them all to 
account on request, point out inconsistencies in every single circle? And what use here 
would it be to be able to work out a theory of the state, and put all the pieces from so 
                                                 
42 Kierkegaard, S. (1951) The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. and trans. A. Dru, London: Oxford 
University Press, 259. The journal entry is number 807.  
43 James, W.  (1982a) The Varieties of Religious Experience, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 161. 
44 Kirmmse, B.H. (1996) Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, trans. 
B.H. Kirmmse and V.R. Laursen, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 40. 
45 Simon, L. (ed.) (1996) William James Remembered, London: University of Nebraska Press, 56.    11 
many places into one whole, construct a world which, again, I myself did not inhabit but 
merely held up for others to see?’
46 
 
In a similar vein, James sometimes discusses philosophical problems in strikingly 
personal terms. He worries, for example, that certain scholarly pursuits are, in some 
important sense, out of kilter with his constitution. ‘Today I touched rock bottom, and 
perceive plainly that I must face the choice with open eyes: shall I frankly throw the 
moral business overboard, as one unsuited to my innate aptitudes, or shall I follow it, 
and it alone, making everything else merely stuff for it? I will give the latter alternative 
a fair trial...’.
47 At other times James describes his philosophical problems as private 
emergencies. 
 
 ‘I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier’s 
second Essais and see no reason why his definition of free will – “the sustaining of a 
thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts” – need be the definition 
of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present – until next year – that it is no 
illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.’
48  
 
Here James makes it clear that the philosophical problem of free will is not for him an 
abstract issue. It is an issue that weighs heavily on James’s understanding of his own 
life. He proposes to solve the problem of free will by committing his life in a certain 
way, conducting his affairs upon the assumption that free will is not an illusion. 
  Nonetheless in spite of the parallels between the biographies of Kierkegaard and 
James I have mentioned, I don’t think we should make as much of them as Gilmartin 
would have us make. For one thing, in the biographical parallels I have reviewed, there 
are important differences as well as similarities. Kierkegaard’s worries about how his 
philosophical endeavours should tie up with the conduct of his life are quite different to 
those expressed by James. More important, however, is the fact that Gilmartin’s 
approach is not only speculative but unhelpfully reductive, resting, as it does, on the 
assumption that the meaning of Kierkegaard’s works and James’s works was somehow 
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dictated by their respective psychoses. This is not to deny that there isn’t any place for 
biographical considerations in Kierkegaard scholarship or in James scholarship. The 
works of Kierkegaard and James can be usefully contextualized by reference to their 
lives, times and unpublished writings. But to contextualize works in this way is not to 
‘explain’ them. Moreover it is important to give due attention to the distinction between 
material they chose to publish and material they chose to keep private, even if we are 
not obliged to respect that distinction.  
 
4) James, Kierkegaard and Philosophical Style 
It is commonly acknowledged that Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms and ‘literary’ 
styles raise important issues of interpretation. But there are also interpretive issues 
raised by James’s writing style, which is, in its way, every bit as remarkable as 
Kierkegaard’s. As Ruf has noted, ‘[n]early everyone who writes about James feels 
compelled to comment on the manner of his writing.’
49 Partly this is because James is 
often a wonderfully engaging but maddeningly imprecise writer. But it is also partly 
because there are in many of James’s works, a great assortment of voices. This is 
perhaps most obvious in The Varieties of Religious Experience, in which James 
reproduces many first person accounts of religious life and encounters. But James’s 
multiple voices are not always documentary. Sometimes, for example, James acts as a 
ventriloquist for philosophical points of view he wants to bring within the orbit of his 
argument. Furthermore, multiple voices are by no means the only stylistic trick which 
James employs. As Ruf rightly points out, James also gives his reader ‘laments, satires, 
hymns, meditations, exhortations, narratives and much else[…].’
50 
  Part of the explanation of James’s style lies in the fact that many of his writings 
are popular lectures. James was acutely aware that popular talks require a less technical 
style. In the opening chapter of Pragmatism, for example, James complains, ‘I have 
heard friends and colleagues try to popularize philosophy in this very hall, but they soon 
grew dry, then technical, and the results were only partially encouraging.’
51 James 
himself was keen to avoid becoming dry and technical because much of his income 
depended on public engagements of this kind. But although this may explain the non-
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technical quality of much of James’s prose, I don’t think this warrants our ignoring his 
stylistic invention or writing it off as a rhetorical blemish on an otherwise neat 
philosophical page. As James famously argues in Varieties, an explanation of the origin 
of something is not the same as a judgement on its value. This is not to say that we need 
develop a theory of James’s style. Rather, it is only to acknowledge that we need to be 
attentive to ways in which James advances his arguments. And this is something we can 
do on a piecemeal basis. 
  Unlike James, some of Kierkegaard’s thoughts are distributed among a number 
of pseudonyms, while others appear under his own name. Anybody who reads 
Kierkegaard must wonder at the significance of this. One approach to this issue has 
been to ask how far the pseudonymous writings express Kierkegaard’s own views. Paul 
Sands, for example, asks ‘does Johannes Climacus speak for Kierkegaard?’
52 The point 
of this question, I take it, is to establish how far the views expressed by the pseudonym 
Johannes Climacus approximate to the views actually held by Kierkegaard. In one sense 
this appears misguided, since what Kierkegaard ‘really thought’ is expressed by the 
totality of his works, including the pseudonymous ones. But this objection won’t suffice 
since it rests on the assumption that Kierkegaard held a view simply because he 
expressed it. Since Kierkegaard is at pains to avoid being identified with his 
pseudonyms this hardly seems reasonable. That is not to say that views expressed by the 
pseudonyms never coincide with those of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s insistence that the 
pseudonyms be taken seriously does not imply that there can be no agreement in views 
between himself and his creations. But to ask how far the pseudonyms agree with or 
contest the views of Kierkegaard is only part of the story. What we must also ask is 
what role the pseudonyms play in Kierkegaard’s thinking. That issue is, I think, best 
addressed by looking at what each of the pseudonyms actually says. I do not propose, 
therefore, to construct a general theory of Kierkegaard’s writing strategy in advance of 
actually reading Kierkegaard. My practice when reading Kierkegaard will be to address 
the significance of Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms and of his own name in the light 
of what is said in the work I am considering. 
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5) Design and Argument 
The two lengthy comparative studies of Kierkegaard and James that have been 
published are organized in a similar fashion. Both Evans and Sands set out long critical 
synoptic chapters about Kierkegaard and James in turn, before adding a comparative 
appraisal in a later chapter. There are two advantages to this system. Firstly, it separates 
out the business of interpreting Kierkegaard and James from the business of comparing 
them, thereby facilitating a clear presentation of both the interpretation and the 
comparison. Secondly, the comparative remarks are well-founded in the sense that they 
are supported by the lengthy discussions of Kierkegaard and James that precede them. 
But there are also disadvantages. Chief amongst these is that the comparative work, 
when it comes, is rather remote from the interpretive work upon which it is notionally 
based. To put it bluntly, it is hard to make a compelling comparative case when the nuts, 
bolts and minutiae of the argument are printed tens or even hundreds of pages away. 
Conversely, comparing aspects of Kierkegaard and James within each chapter facilitates 
a much more immediate depiction of the philosophical exchange that transpires between 
them. And this allows a more detailed and more nuanced comparative account to 
emerge. This leaves us with the difficulty that the interpretive and comparative aspects 
of the study are not so cleanly separated as they are in the system adopted by Evans and 
Sands. But I do not think we should make too much of this. Insofar as it is a problem it 
is one that can be resolved locally by the careful structuring of individual chapters. For 
these reasons I have elected not to place my interpretive claims in separate chapters 
from my comparative remarks. My strategy in each chapter will be to compare 
particular arguments in Kierkegaard and James. 
In the first chapter I discuss claims made by Emmanuel and Sands regarding 
similarities between Kierkegaard’s doctrine of subjective truth and James’s argument in 
the essay The Will to Believe. Both Emmanuel and Sands agree that, for Kierkegaard, to 
adopt a religious belief is to take an epistemic risk. That is to say that one doesn’t know 
that God exists, but one is prepared to risk believing a falsehood. Emmanuel argues that 
Kierkegaard offers a pragmatic defence of this kind of risk-taking, similar to the case 
that James makes in The Will to Believe. Sands argues that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on 
epistemic risk-taking in relation to religious beliefs is unwarranted and self-defeating. 
James’s account of religious belief avoids both of these errors. Against both Emmanuel   15 
and Sands I argue that Kierkegaard does not think that in order to have a religious belief 
one must take an epistemic risk. And for this reason the comparisons that both 
Emmanuel and Sands draw between Kierkegaard and James are inappropriate. 
One important reason why we might mistakenly think that Kierkegaard 
advocates epistemic risk-taking is that he vehemently opposes the view that it is 
possible to demonstrate the existence of God. James also held that it is not possible 
formally to demonstrate the existence of God. In the second chapter I examine whether 
Kierkegaard and James oppose demonstrations for the existence of God for similar 
reasons. I argue that their positions are only superficially similar. The root of their 
dissimilarity lies in their different understandings of religious concepts. For James, 
religious concepts fail to capture the visceral quality of religious experiences. And for 
this reason conceptual proofs for the existence of God are never compelling in the way 
that personal religious experiences are. For Kierkegaard, religious concepts are not poor 
reproductions of religious experiences. His argument is that if we understand religious 
concepts correctly we shall see that it makes no sense to try to demonstrate whether or 
not God exists. Having distinguished Kierkegaard’s position from James’s, I argue that 
the former’s position is better than the latter’s. 
Although James does not think that it is possible to compose a compelling 
formal proof for the existence of God, he does think that faith can be supported by a 
certain kind of evidence. As I noted above, James argues that personal encounters with 
God – such as mystical visions and dreams – can serve to ground the faith of the person 
who experiences them. Kierkegaard does not hold that mystical visions or revelations 
can ground religious belief. In the third chapter I compare the arguments of Kierkegaard 
and James on this matter. I argue that Kierkegaard’s view is that to treat the occurrence 
of such visions as evidence for the existence of the divine is to misunderstand them. I 
also argue in favour of Kierkegaard’s position. 
In the final chapter I consider Kierkegaard’s proposal that religious belief is a 
‘life-view.’ I characterise Kierkegaard’s notion of a life-view as a fundamental 
perspective by means of which people understand themselves and their lives. I compare 
this conception with two aspects of James’s thought. Firstly, in Pragmatism James 
draws attention to the fact that people have a ‘dumb sense’ of what life means. In The 
Varieties of Religious Experience James argues that the melancholy suffered by   16 
‘divided selves’ can be cured by adopting a religious perspective on life. I argue that 
Kierkegaard’s notion of a life-view is different from both of James’s proposals. 
 17 
Chapter 1 
Kierkegaard, James, Gambling and God 
 
Introduction 
Few detailed comparisons have been made between Kierkegaard’s account of religious 
belief and James’s account of religious belief. Steven M. Emmanuel and Paul F. Sands 
are notable for having taken up this challenge.
1 
2 Emmanuel argues that Kierkegaard 
makes a pragmatist argument, broadly of the kind that James develops in his essay The 
Will to Believe. In common with Emmanuel, Sands argues that Kierkegaard and James 
give accounts of religious belief that are similar in important respects. But rather than 
concluding, as Emmanuel does, that Kierkegaard is broadly a Jamesian pragmatist, 
Sands argues that Kierkegaard is not pragmatic enough. Sands thinks that Kierkegaard’s 
account of religious belief is not viable, and that James can show us where Kierkegaard 
goes wrong. Furthermore, according to Sands, ‘James is able to incorporate the 
strengths of Kierkegaard’s justification of religious faith without succumbing to its 
weaknesses.’
3 
In this chapter I evaluate the claims of Emmanuel and Sands. I argue that 
Emmanuel and Sands misunderstand Kierkegaard’s conception of faith, and in 
particular his claim that faith is risky. Emmanuel and Sands argue that for Kierkegaard 
faith is risky because we cannot demonstrate the objective truth of Christianity. 
According to this interpretation of Kierkegaard, to have faith is to believe that 
Christianity is objectively true in spite of the fact that we cannot know that it is 
objectively true. Against this view I argue that Kierkegaard does not advocate epistemic 
risk-taking of this kind. Rather, Kierkegaard doesn’t think that it makes sense to ask 
whether Christianity is objectively true. And for this reason having faith does not boil 
down to gambling that Christianity is objectively true even though we cannot know 
whether it is objectively true. 
I also argue that because Emmanuel and Sands have misunderstood 
Kierkegaard’s conception of faith, the comparisons that they draw between Kierkegaard 
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and James are misleading. Emmanuel argues that Kierkegaard provides a Jamesian 
pragmatic justification for epistemic risk-taking. According to Emmanuel, 
Kierkegaard’s argument is that if we cannot know that Christianity is true we can at 
least find good practical reasons for believing that it is true. I counter this interpretation 
by pointing out that no such pragmatic argument is to be found in Kierkegaard. 
Kierkegaard doesn’t think that to have faith is to take an epistemic risk; and accordingly 
he doesn’t seek to justify faith by showing that there are sound practical reasons for 
engaging in this kind of risk taking. Contrary to Emmanuel, Sands thinks that it is a 
mistake to read Kierkegaard ‘as if he were a full-blown pragmatist.’
4 Moreover, 
according to Sands, James improves upon Kierkegaard’s position precisely by providing 
a pragmatic justification for epistemic risk-taking. But against Sands I argue that far 
from improving upon Kierkegaard’s position, James’s arguments are irrelevant. 
Kierkegaard doesn’t think that Christians take an epistemic risk, and accordingly it 
follows that he has no need to justify epistemic risk-taking on pragmatic or any other 
grounds. 
I begin by sketching the interpretations of Kierkegaard’s conception of faith 
offered by Emmanuel and Sands. I then show that both Emmanuel and Sands 
misunderstand Kierkegaard’s claim that faith is risky. Thirdly, I criticize the 
comparisons that Emmanuel and Sands draw between Kierkegaard and James. I 
conclude by remarking that I have identified in Emmanuel and Sands a 
misinterpretation of Kierkegaard’s conception of faith, but have not set out a defence of 
Kierkegaard’s conception. 
 
1) Emmanuel on Climacus, Risk and Faith 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus sometimes characterizes religious belief 
as a ‘venture.’ Emmanuel understands Climacus’ claim to mean that faith, ‘[…] is a 
venture in the sense that the decision to believe must be taken without objective 
assurances. In faith, the believer stakes his entire existence on the mere possibility of an 
eternal happiness.’
5 According to this reading of Climacus, then, Christians know only 
that Christianity is possibly true; but they nonetheless choose to believe that it is 
actually true. To believe that something is true when we have no relevant ‘objective 
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assurances’ that it is true is to risk believing a falsehood. Consequently, Christian faith 
is a venture in the sense that it requires the faithful to believe that Christianity is true in 
spite of the possibility that it is not. In what follows I shall briefly elucidate this 
conception of faith, and also sketch Emmanuel’s reasons for attributing it to Climacus. 
  Emmanuel’s view that having faith entails the risk of believing a falsehood 
stems from his analysis of what Climacus has to say about the impossibility of 
objectively proving the truth of Christianity. The reason Climacus thinks that there can 
be no objective proof for the truth of Christianity has to do with what Christians believe. 
Christians believe that Christ is both man and God. Climacus famously remarks that the 
idea that Christ is both man and God is, in some important sense, ‘absurd’ and 
‘paradoxical.’ Some commentators have taken Climacus to mean that the idea that 
Christ is both man and God is a formal contradiction.  One cannot be a man and a God, 
since to be a man is precisely not to be a God, and vice versa. The notion that Christ is 
both man and God, then, appears to be ‘absurd’ in the sense that it is a contradiction in 
terms. Furthermore if Christ is a contradiction in terms then he, and therefore 
Christianity, are, from a formal point of view, impossible. And what is formally 
impossible cannot be shown to be objectively true. But Emmanuel argues against this 
interpretation of Climacus’ remarks on the absurdity of Christ, noting that if Christ is a 
contradiction in terms then what Christians believe is strictly nonsensical. Nonetheless, 
Emmanuel does not ignore or explain away what Climacus has to say about the absurd 
and paradoxical nature of Christ. Emmanuel’s solution is to interpret these remarks 
differently, arguing that Christ is not absurd in the sense that he is a contradiction in 
terms, but rather in the sense that he is ‘beyond the reach of our cognitive resources.’
6 
Emmanuel writes: ‘The terms paradox and absurd are thus introduced [by Climacus] as 
a conceptual means of indicating that God’s appearance in the temporal order 
transcends the possibilities of human knowledge, and that it cannot be grasped at a 
purely intellectual level.’
7 Explaining the sense in which Christ lies beyond the compass 
of our ‘cognitive resources’ Emmanuel writes: 
 
‘A paradox in the sense of a logical contradiction occurs within the sphere of reason; it 
is a point at which reason collides with itself and is thereby brought to a standstill. But 
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Kierkegaard’s paradox occurs outside the sphere of reason, it is a point at which reason 
collides with something foreign to itself, something other.’
8 
 
 From a human perspective, then, Christ is ‘absurd’ not because the very idea of him is a 
contradiction in terms that confounds our logic, but because he is, in some important 
sense, altogether beyond our cognition. 
Nonetheless, according to Emmanuel, the fact that Christ is ‘absurd’ in this 
sense does not mean that it is unreasonable to believe that Christianity is true. Rather, it 
simply means that we should not look for objective guarantees for the truth of 
Christianity. Emmanuel notes, ‘Kierkegaard’s strategy is clearly not to demonstrate the 
impossibility of accepting the truth of Christianity, but the impossibility of 
appropriating that truth on purely objective or intellectual terms.’
9 Furthermore, the 
impossibility of establishing the truth of Christianity by means of objective enquiry 
means that each of us must reach a personal decision whether to accept that Christianity 
is true. Emmanuel writes: 
 
‘Revelation is not a logical contradiction but a mystery which claims to hold the 
solution to the riddle of human existence. It does not present itself as an object for 
scientific scrutiny, but as the point of departure for a new life. It does this by foreclosing 
on the objective way, by forcing the individual into himself, into the realm of 
subjectivity, where the decision must be made.’
10 
 
Regardless of whether we choose to turn our lives around in accordance with 
Christian scripture or not, we cannot know whether Christianity is objectively true. 
Whether Christianity is objectively true remains a question that cannot be answered by 
rational argument, for Christ is always ‘beyond’ the compass of our cognitive skills. 
Emmanuel argues that Climacus does not seek to resolve or overcome the problem of 
whether Christianity is objectively true. Rather, Climacus advances a pragmatic 
argument to the effect that although we cannot know whether Christianity is objectively 
true there are sufficient practical reasons to make belief in Christianity a rational course 
of action. I shall look at this argument later. For now, however, I want only to draw 
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attention to the fact that Emmanuel thinks that because we cannot know whether 
Christianity is objectively true, those who believe that it is true risk believing a 
falsehood. There may be pragmatic reasons for believing in Christ, but these pragmatic 
reasons do not guarantee the truth of what we believe. Emmanuel concludes that we 
have a choice between withholding our judgement about the truth of Christianity, 
thereby avoiding the risk of believing a falsehood, or we can believe in Christianity and 
run the risk that what we believe is untrue. Emmanuel attributes this dilemma to 
Climacus in the following way:  
 
‘In the Fragments, he [Climacus] explains that belief and doubt are not “two kinds of 
knowledge that can be defined in continuity with each other, for … they are opposite 
passions.” To the skeptical mind, it is better to risk the loss of truth than to be in error. 
And so the skeptic wills to remain in a state of suspended belief. (isotheneia, epochē). 
The believer, on the other hand, thinks it is better to risk the chance of being in error 
than to suffer the loss of truth.’
11 
 
To summarise Emmanuel’s reading of Climacus, then, we cannot know whether 
Christianity is true because Christ lies beyond the compass of our ability to reason. And 
because we cannot know whether Christianity is true we must each of us make a 
personal decision between having faith and not having faith. To have faith is to turn 
one’s life around in accordance with scripture in spite of the fact that we cannot know 
whether Christianity is true.  Those who do not believe in Christianity do not run the 
risk of believing a falsehood, but they will miss out on eternal life and happiness if 
Christianity does turn out to be true. As we shall see, Sands also attributes to Climacus 
the view that one must either risk believing a falsehood or forgo the possibility of 
attaining eternal life. But Sand’s reasons for attributing this view to Climacus are 
different to those given by Emmanuel. For this reason I shall briefly review Sands’ 
argument. 
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1.1) Sands on Climacus, Risk and Faith 
In common with Emmanuel, Sands notes that for Climacus Christ is an absolute 
paradox. Also in common with Emmanuel, Sands argues that because Christ is an 
absolute paradox he is ‘beyond’ the scope of our ability to reason. ‘Climacus never tires 
of emphasizing that the incarnation is opaque to human understanding.’
12 Christ is 
‘rationally impenetrable’
13, and this has the important consequence that he – and by 
extension Christianity – is incomprehensible. Furthermore, because it is not possible to 
comprehend Christianity, it is not possible to make a reasoned judgement about whether 
Christianity is true. It follows that from a rational point of view it is uncertain whether 
Christianity is true or false. 
  Sands argues that this radical uncertainty about the truthfulness of Christianity is 
at the heart of Climacus’ conception of Christian faith. Climacus elucidates this 
conception of Christian faith by comparing it to Socratic faith. Socrates did not know 
whether there is eternal life, but nonetheless believed that there is eternal life. 
Accordingly, Socrates knowingly risked believing a falsehood. Sands comments that 
‘Socratic faith ventures in the face of objective uncertainty.’
14 But a Christian not only 
does not know whether Christianity is true, but also cannot comprehend what he or she 
believes. Sands explains: ‘Faith sensu eminentiori – Christian faith – differs from 
Socratic faith in that it goes beyond embracing the objectively uncertain. It ventures 
everything on the basis of an objective absurdity, namely, the rationally impenetrable 
paradox of the incarnation.’
15 
In spite of this difference between Socratic and Christian faith, however, it is 
clear that they nonetheless have something important in common, namely an element of 
risk. Practitioners of Socratic faith and practitioners of Christian faith do not know 
whether their beliefs are true, and therefore run the risk that their beliefs are false. 
Furthermore, Climacus thinks that risk of error is a defining feature of religious belief. 
‘Since Climacus repudiates every effort to establish religious faith on a foundation of 
evidence, it comes as no surprise that the riskiness of faith is prominently featured in his 
writings.’
16 People who practice Christian faith knowingly accept the risk of error by 
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choosing to believe something that might be false. Sands notes that, ‘Here [in faith] is a 
“resolve” and a will to believe that amounts to a willingness to run the risk of error.’
17 
Resolving to run the risk of error does not of course remove that risk. But, according to 
Sands, Climacus thinks that faith is maintained not by eradicating risk but by remaining 
keenly aware of the risk that one is taking. ‘Climacus goes on to say that one can only 
remain in faith by keeping alive the feeling of risk associated with objective 
uncertainty.’
18 Keeping alive the ‘feeling of risk’ that Climacus refers to cannot be 
accomplished by disinterested reflection on uncertainty. It can only be achieved by 
passionate commitment to actual risk taking. And greater risks require greater 
passionate commitment. Glossing Climacus’ position, Sands writes: ‘The operative rule 
is the more objectively certain a truth, the less passion one has for the truth; conversely, 
the more objectively uncertain a truth, the more intense the passion. Since faith is a 
passion, it follows that objective uncertainty actually promotes faith.’
19 
It is by applying this ‘operative rule’ that Climacus establishes the most 
important differences between Socratic faith and Christian faith. Both Christians and 
people practicing Socratic faith run the risk that what they believe to be true is actually 
false. People practicing Socratic faith can comprehend what it is that they believe to be 
true. But Christians cannot comprehend Christianity, and therefore do not understand 
what it is that they believe to be true. Christian faith is therefore more risky than 
Socratic faith. For not only is it uncertain whether it is true, it is also incomprehensible. 
Since Christian faith is more risky than Socratic faith, it requires greater passion to be a 
Christian than it does to be a practitioner of Socratic faith. Accordingly, ‘[I]n 
comparison with this “risk” of faith, Socratic venturing “resembles Greek 
nonchalance.”’
20 
Like Emmanuel, Sands concludes that for Climacus we have a choice between 
withholding our judgement about the truth of Christianity, thereby avoiding the risk of 
believing a falsehood, or believing in Christianity and thereby running the risk that what 
we believe is untrue. Sands summarises his case in the following way: 
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‘When Climacus says that belief is “an act of freedom, an expression of will,” he must 
be interpreted to mean that, unlike the skeptic, the believer is willing to risk error. 
Similarly, when he says that belief is a resolution rather than a conclusion, he is 
contrasting the decisiveness of the believer with the cautiousness of sceptics who 
“restrained” themselves through dialectical arguments lest they embrace error.’
21 
 
1.2) Emmanuel and Sands on Risk and Faith  
There are important differences between Emmanuel and Sands. Most notably Sands 
seems to think that for Climacus Christianity is incomprehensible, a conclusion that 
Emmanuel seeks to avoid. Nonetheless it is also clear that both Emmanuel and Sands 
think that Climacus proposes a conception of faith according to which, ‘[…] the 
individual must risk decision with no assurance that the right choice will be made.’
22 
Emmanuel and Sands both think that Climacus reasons that because it is not possible - 
and indeed undesirable - to prove the objective truth of Christianity it follows that to 
believe in Christianity is to risk believing something that may be objectively untrue. 
Furthermore, Emmanuel and Sands also both think that for Climacus whether we are 
prepared to believe in Christianity boils down to whether we are prepared to risk being 
duped. Indeed, Sands’ formulation of this argument could hardly be any closer to 
Emmanuel’s:  
 
‘Skeptics resolve to withhold belief out of fear of being deceived. They may thus be 
said to choose doubt. Believers, on the other hand, resolve to risk error, and may thus be 
said to choose belief.’
23 
 
We must decide whether it is better to believe in Christianity and thereby risk believing 
a falsehood, or to refuse to draw any conclusions about the truth or falsity of 
Christianity and thereby risk losing out on eternal salvation. According to this 
conception of faith, then, Christianity is not so much a national lottery as a spiritual 
lottery; and the accompanying slogan is not ‘it could be you’ but rather, ‘it could be 
true.’ 
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2) Climacus on Risk and Faith 
It is undeniable that Climacus often remarks that to have faith is to take a risk. 
Furthermore it is also undeniable that Climacus often claims that the truth of 
Christianity is objectively uncertain. He asserts, for example, the following: ‘Without 
risk, no faith. Faith is the contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and 
the objective uncertainty.’
24 But although it is undeniable that Climacus remarks that 
faith is risky and that the truth of Christianity is objectively uncertain, I don’t think that 
these remarks can be understood in the way that Emmanuel and Sands propose. They 
argue that if, as Climacus suggests, the truth of Christianity is objectively uncertain, 
then it follows that faith is risky in the sense that one must believe something that one 
knows may be objectively untrue. But a careful examination of Climacus’ remarks 
shows that he does not think it makes any sense to enquire into the objective truth of 
Christianity. And if that is the case the proposals of Emmanuel and Sands cannot stand. 
For if there is no sense in asking whether Christianity is objectively true it also cannot 
make sense to assert that Christians must run the risk of believing something that may 
be objectively untrue. Accordingly Climacus is actually opposed to the view that 
Emmanuel and Sands attribute to him. This does not mean that we must explain away 
Climacus’ assertion that faith is risky. But it does mean that the kind of risk Climacus 
associates with Christian faith is not at all like the racy jolt of adrenaline one might 
experience at a gaming table. For Climacus, faith is risky because it requires a personal 
commitment to live and understand one’s life from a Christian point of view. Taking a 
Christian stand with regard to oneself and the world opens the possibility of various 
kinds of conflict. It requires, for example, rigorous ‘self-examination’ in order to 
determine whether one really understands one’s life in Christian categories, or whether 
one is deluded about this in some way. And this is risky not only in the sense that one 
may find oneself falling short of the Christian stand one thought one was taking, but 
also in the sense that self-examination of this kind may require that one overturns 
certain deep-seated ways of relating to oneself and to the world. To have faith, then, is 
to risk turning one’s life around. And this means that the risk involved pertains not to 
whether or not Christianity will turn out to be objectively true, but to how one stands 
subjectively in relation to Christianity. 
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  In what follows, then, I advance a description of Climacus’ case with a view to 
showing two things. Firstly, that Climacus doesn’t think that there is any sense in asking 
whether Christianity is objectively true. And secondly, that Climacus thinks faith is 
risky because it requires that one leads a Christian life, not because Christians may have 
been duped regarding the objective truth of what they believe. 
 
2.1) Subjective Enquiry and Objective Enquiry 
In order to see why it is that Climacus thinks there is no sense in asking whether 
Christianity is objectively true, we first need to understand what he means by objective 
enquiry. Climacus’ discussion is most informative when he differentiates between 
objective enquiry and subjective enquiry. Accordingly I shall start by looking at this 
distinction. Climacus’ distinction between objective and subjective enquiry rests on the 
observation that in order to enquire into truth in an objective fashion we must abstract 
from our personal point of view. Climacus writes: 
 
‘For the existing spirit qua existing spirit, the question about truth persists, because the 
abstract answer is only for that abstractum which an existing spirit becomes by 
abstracting from himself qua existing, which he can only do momentarily, although at 
such moments he still pays his debt to existence by existing nevertheless. Consequently, 
it is an existing spirit who asks about truth, presumably because he wants to exist in it, 
but in any case the questioner is conscious of being an existing individual human 
being.’
25 
 
It is important to note that Climacus is not making the claim that objective knowledge is 
impossible because we are all stuck with our own profoundly personal outlook on life.  
And neither is Climacus arguing for a solipsistic conception of truth according to which 
what counts as true is whatever seems to each of us to be true. Rather, Climacus is 
making the uncontroversial point that we can make claims about what is objectively true 
only by leaving aside our personal concerns and conducting our enquiries in a 
disinterested fashion. Furthermore, Climacus is also drawing attention to the fact that 
leaving aside one’s personal concerns is a particular kind of research strategy. We do 
not arrive at a disinterested point of view by default, but must work towards it by 
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actively excluding our specifically personal interests. This strategy is not arbitrary, for it 
underwrites the validity of objective truth claims. To claim that something is objectively 
true is to claim that its truth is not grounded on any personal interest. As Climacus 
explains in a much cited passage: 
 
‘The way to objective truth goes away from the subject, and while the subject and 
subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent and that is precisely 
its objective validity, because the interest, just like the decision, is subjectivity.’
26 
 
By choosing to exclude any strictly personal concerns from our research, then, we can 
make claims that purport to be objectively true. But, importantly, Climacus does not 
conclude from this that we should always exclude personal concerns from our enquiries 
into truth. Nor does he conclude that we can only talk about truth in relation to objective 
research. Rather, Climacus is concerned to elucidate the important differences between 
talking about truth in the context of objective enquiry and talking about truth in the 
context of a strictly personal or subjective enquiry
27. As Climacus points out, a great 
deal of his discussion is an attempt to ‘clarify the divergence of objective and subjective 
reflection […]’
28  
  What is immediately apparent from Climacus’ remarks on the difference 
between subjective enquiry and objective enquiry is that there is - in Climacus’ own 
parlance - a qualitative difference between these two ways of pursuing truth. That is to 
say that objective enquiry is different in kind from subjective enquiry. Subjective 
enquiry is not a more or less adequate approximation of objective enquiry or vice versa. 
And accordingly talk about truth in the context of objective research amounts to 
something different in kind from talk about truth in the context of subjective research. 
Climacus makes this point by adumbrating the difference between objective truth and 
subjective truth in the following way: 
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‘To objective reflection, truth becomes something objective, an object, and the point is 
to disregard the subject. To subjective reflection, truth becomes appropriation, 
inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to immerse oneself, existing, in subjectivity.’
29 
 
We are, I think, entitled to be somewhat thrown by Climacus’ engagingly suggestive but 
unhelpfully vague claim that to reflect subjectively is to ‘immerse oneself, existing, in 
subjectivity.’  But the important point here is that Climacus is indicating something of 
the way that talk about truth in the context of objective enquiry – ‘truth becomes 
something objective’ – is completely different to talk about truth in the context of 
subjective enquiry - ‘truth becomes appropriation, inwardness.’ Climacus expands on 
this difference between objective truth and subjective truth in the following somewhat 
figurative passage.  
 
‘When subjectivity is truth, the definition of truth must also contain in itself an 
expression of the antithesis to objectivity, a memento of that fork in the road, and this 
expression will at the same time indicate the resilience of the inwardness. Here is such a 
definition of truth: An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the 
most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person. 
At the point where the road swings off (and where that is cannot be stated objectively, 
since it is precisely subjectivity), objective knowledge is suspended. Objectively he has 
only uncertainty, but this is precisely what intensifies the infinite passion of inwardness, 
and truth is precisely a daring venture of choosing the objective uncertainty with the 
passion of the infinite.’
30 
 
Climacus’ suggestion that there is a ‘fork in the road’ between subjective truth and 
objective truth is, I think, related to his earlier observation that objective enquiry is a 
research strategy that we may or may not elect to execute. Climacus’ claim is simply 
that we must choose between enquiring in an objective fashion or a subjective fashion. 
For the disinterested stance characteristic of objective enquiry is achieved by excluding 
the personal, interested stance characteristic of subjective enquiry, and vice versa. 
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Climacus underscores the mutual exclusivity of the two kinds of enquiry by noting that 
once we are committed to subjective enquiry ‘objective knowledge is suspended.’ If we 
are enquiring into truth by means of subjective reflection then we must leave aside 
disinterested objective enquiry and any claims to objective knowledge. 
  This last point is particularly important if we are to avoid misunderstanding 
Climacus’ claim that subjective truth is ‘an objective uncertainty, held fast through 
appropriation with the most passionate inwardness […]’
31 We might take Climacus to 
mean by this that something is ‘subjectively true’ if we know it may not be true but are 
prepared to believe it anyway. If that were Climacus’ meaning then subjective truth 
would be something like a gambler’s ‘gut instinct’ with regard to the future outcome of 
some gaming event. But this reading leaves aside Climacus’ careful differentiation 
between objective truth and subjective truth. A gambler chooses to back one of several 
possible objective outcomes. Accordingly the truth or falsity of his or her ‘gut’ belief is 
established when the actual objective outcome is known. But this means that a 
gambler’s gut instinct cannot be an example of subjective truth. For, as we have seen, 
Climacus holds that objective enquiry bears no relevance to subjective enquiry and its 
attendant truth claims. The Gambler doesn’t leave objective enquiry behind, but merely 
tries to anticipate the outcome of an objective enquiry. 
We might still wonder why Climacus insists that subjective truth involves the 
passionate appropriation of an objective uncertainty. But the answer to that lies in 
Climacus’ obsession with drawing out the dialectical relations between concepts. When 
Climacus says that subjective truth is the passionate appropriation of an objective 
uncertainty he is showing us two sides of the same conceptual coin. Considered from 
the point of view of objective enquiry no certainty can be attached to subjective truths. 
That is why Climacus says of a person who has a subjective truth that ‘objectively he 
has only uncertainty’.
32 The reason that no objective certainty can be attached to 
subjective truths is not that subjective truth is somehow unreliable. Rather, objective 
enquiry simply stands on a completely different footing to subjective enquiry. Objective 
enquiry is valid only insofar as it abstracts from all purely personal concerns. But, of 
course, what is characteristic of subjective enquiries and their attendant truth claims is 
that they are personal. From the point of view of objective enquiry, then, all that one can 
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say about subjective truths is that their truth or falsity is ‘uncertain’ in the sense that 
objective enquiry has no purchase on the issue. Considered from the point of view of 
subjective enquiry, truth is not the result of a disinterested enquiry, but of a personal 
interest. And it is for this reason that Climacus describes subjective truth as a passionate 
appropriation. When Climacus tells us that subjective truth is the passionate 
appropriation of something that is objectively uncertain he is simply placing the 
objective and subjective aspects together in one formulation. But his meaning can be 
just as well expressed in two formulations: Considered objectively, a subjective truth 
cannot be said to be either true or false. And what one believes to be subjectively true 
one believes by virtue of passion and not by virtue of disinterested, objective enquiry. 
So far, then, I have argued that Climacus makes a qualitative distinction between 
subjective truth and objective truth. What remains to be seen is why it is that Climacus 
thinks the notion of objective truth has no application with regard to Christianity. 
 
2.2) Subjective Truth and Essential Knowledge 
If, as Climacus argues, there is a qualitative difference between subjective enquiry and 
objective enquiry, it is natural to ask in what kinds of situations it is legitimate to apply 
these approaches. For, on the face of it at least, it seems that subjective enquiry must 
often be a disastrously inappropriate method of investigation. Nobody would want a 
marine engineer to suspend his or her capacity for objective knowledge before deciding 
whether to issue a certificate of seaworthiness. Furthermore, it is hard to know in what 
sense a subjectively oriented ship inspector would be dealing in truth at all. The safety 
of the ship is an objective engineering proposition, and to say whether the ship is fit to 
sail is to assess the truth of that proposition. But the subjectively oriented inspector’s 
evaluation would have nothing to do with engineering, only with his or her strictly 
personal convictions. And since his or her evaluation of the ship’s seaworthiness 
couldn’t bear on the veracity of the matter in any relevant way, it seems at best odd and 
at worse wilfully perverse to insist that he or she is dealing in truth claims at all. 
However, it is clear that Climacus would not object to the idea that the 
seaworthiness of ships is not a suitable candidate for subjective enquiry. And he also 
would not object to the idea that there are many areas of enquiry where subjective 
investigation is inappropriate. For Climacus recognizes that there are certain areas of 
scholarship – mathematics and historical research, for example – where it can only   31 
make sense to talk about truth in relation to objective enquiry. What is interesting about 
Climacus’ discussion, however, is that more often than not he puts the boot on the other 
foot. That is to say that Climacus spends a great deal of time pointing out not where 
subjective enquiry is inappropriate but where objective enquiry is inappropriate. We are 
perhaps generally more inclined to be sensitive to the unhelpful encroachment of strictly 
personal concerns into areas of objective enquiry than we are to the unhelpful 
encroachment of strictly objective concerns into areas of subjective enquiry. But 
Climacus warns that inappropriate objective enquiry is just as misleading as 
inappropriate subjective enquiry. And, for Climacus, objective enquiry is inappropriate 
when we are dealing with what he calls ‘essential knowledge.’ By essential knowledge 
Climacus means ethical and religious knowledge. 
Climacus connects ‘essential’ ethical and religious knowledge to subjective 
enquiry in the following way: 
  
‘All essential knowing pertains to existence, or only the knowing whose relation to 
existence is essential knowing. Essentially viewed, the knowing that does not inwardly 
in the reflection of inwardness pertain to existence is accidental knowing, and its degree 
and scope, essentially viewed, are a matter of indifference. That essential knowing is 
essentially related to existence […] means that the knowledge is related to the knower, 
who is an existing person, and that all essential knowing is therefore essentially related 
to existence and to existing. Therefore, only ethical and ethical-religious knowledge is 
essential knowing. But all ethical and ethical-religious knowing is essentially a relating 
to the existing of the knower.’
33 
 
Like much of Climacus’ discussion of subjective enquiry and subjective truth, this is a 
disappointingly thorny way of putting things. Nonetheless I think we can make perfectly 
good sense of it if we bear in mind Climacus’ remarks on the validity of objective truth 
and of subjective truth. We saw earlier that Climacus argues that objective truth claims 
are valid insofar as they are not based on strictly personal reflection. In the passage 
above Climacus elaborates on this point by noting that there is a sense in which 
objective truth claims are only ‘accidentally’ related to the person who affirms them. 
Climacus’ claim here is not that it is only by chance that we come to know what is 
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objectively true. His point is that by definition true objective claims are true regardless 
of who articulates them. But this is not the case with regard to subjective truth claims. 
Subjective truth claims occur in the context of subjective enquiry. And subjective 
enquiry is personal in the sense that it is conducted from the interested first person 
perspective. To say that something is subjectively true, then, is to express a personal 
conviction. Consequently subjective truth claims are not ‘indifferent’ in the sense that 
they are not true regardless of who articulates them. To claim that something is 
subjectively true is to say something about oneself; and when it comes to saying 
something about oneself we are all, so to speak, on our own and cannot substitute for 
one another. Climacus makes this point by noting that subjective truth claims are 
essentially related to the person who makes them. What Climacus calls ‘essential 
knowledge’, then, is the kind of knowledge that belongs to subjective enquiry and 
which is articulated by subjective truth claims. Climacus concludes – admittedly with 
alarming brevity – that ethical and religious knowledge are examples of such ‘essential 
knowledge’, because ‘all ethical and ethical-religious knowing is essentially a relating 
to the existing of the knower.’ That is to say that ethical convictions and religious 
convictions are personal. My neighbour and I may share the same religious conviction, 
but we cannot hold that conviction on behalf of each other. If my neighbour decides not 
to observe his religious belief for a week I cannot agree to cover his shift for him. 
Similarly, James sometimes notes with refreshing honesty that he enjoys taking ‘moral 
holidays’.
34 But clearly even if James had booked a holiday from his moral convictions 
well in advance, no arrangements could be made to cover his absence. 
  We have seen, then, that for Climacus religious knowledge is something that 
properly falls into the domain of subjective enquiry. In one sense the connection 
between religious truth claims and subjective enquiry seems obvious. Religious belief is 
something that we must each make up our mind about. One is either a Christian or else 
one is not; and, furthermore, one cannot be a Christian or an atheist by proxy. But it is 
important to notice that the fact that one cannot be a Christian by proxy need not imply 
that Christianity falls within the compass of subjective enquiry rather than objective 
enquiry. For example, someone may argue that even if our religious convictions must be 
personal and cannot be held by proxy it remains the case that Christianity is either 
objectively true or objectively untrue. Climacus would not agree with this proposal. His 
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claim is that when we consider the truth of Christianity all objective truth claims are 
suspended or left behind at the fork in the road. The best way to appreciate Climacus’ 
thinking on this issue is to revisit his claims about the ‘absurd’ nature of Christianity. 
As Emmanuel and Sands point out, Climacus claims that Christianity is absurd 
because Christ is both man and God, temporal and eternal. But although Christ is 
marked by his absurdity, it is also his absurd nature that renders him, in an important 
sense, hidden. As Climacus explains: 
 
‘What, then, is the absurd? The absurd is that the eternal truth has come into existence 
in time, that God has come into existence, has been born, has grown up, etc., has come 
into existence exactly as an individual human being, indistinguishable from any other 
human being, inasmuch as all immediate recognizability is pre-Socratic paganism and 
from the Jewish point of view is idolatry.’
35 
 
Insofar as he is a man it is possible to recognize Christ’s humanity. But the same does 
not hold true for his divinity, which cannot be observed and can only be believed. It is 
important to note, however, that the reason that the divinity of Christ is something that 
can only be believed is not that we lack the expertise or wherewithal to make the 
relevant objective observations. In other words Climacus’ point is not that when Christ 
was on earth he was ‘indistinguishable from any other human being’ because relevant 
objective tests had not been developed to detect and demonstrate his divinity. Climacus’ 
point is that it belongs to the specifically Christian concept of God that he is not an 
object that can be observed. This is not the case with all concepts of God. As Climacus 
notes, ‘All paganism consists in this, that God is related directly to a human being, as 
the remarkably striking to the amazed.’
36 The pseudonym’s point here, I take it, is that 
pagan gods are understood in terms that also apply to humanity. In other words, it is 
possible to relate to pagan gods ‘directly’ in the sense that they are fundamentally like 
people – albeit extraordinary people. And since they are akin to extraordinary people we 
stand in a relation of amazement to them: rather in the way that I might be in awe of the 
achievements of a fine sprinter, or of an exceptionally gifted spin bowler. Moreover, 
relating ‘directly’ to pagan gods in this way is fundamentally a way of observing them. 
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To relate ‘directly’ to pagan gods is to observe how extraordinary they are, humanly 
speaking. But the Christian claim is that there is a qualitative difference between 
humans and God. As Climacus notes: ‘But the absolute paradox, precisely because it is 
absolute, can be related only to the absolute difference by which a human being differs 
from God; it cannot be related to relative bickering between one human being and 
another about whether one is a little smarter than the other.’
37 To think that Christ’s 
divinity is shown by his human talents, then, is a mistake. For looking at Christ’s human 
talents will only tell us about his humanity. Christ’s divinity is mysterious or hidden in 
the sense that it is not shown in anything that we can observe about him as a man.  
   It is for this reason that Climacus strongly opposes the view that the divinity of 
Christ can be demonstrated by any kind of objective enquiry into his life on earth. 
Climacus explains himself in the following way: 
 
‘Inasmuch as the absurd contains the element of coming into existence, the road of 
approximation will also be that which confuses the absurd fact of coming into existence, 
which is the object of faith, with a simple historical fact, and then seeks historical 
certainty for that which is absurd precisely because it contains the contradiction that 
something that can become historical only in direct opposition to all human 
understanding has become historical. This contradiction is the absurd, which can only 
be believed.’
38 
 
When Climacus says that ‘the absurd contains the element of coming into existence’, I 
take it that he means that Christ is a paradox because he is both temporal and eternal. In 
other words, as God he is eternal, but as a man he ‘comes into existence’ and lives a 
temporal life on earth. The claim that Christ lived on earth seems promising in the sense 
that it suggests that it is possible, in principle, to look for objective evidence of his 
existence. If we could prove that it is objectively true that Christ did live on earth, then 
we would have an objective ground on which to base our faith in him. But, of course, 
this strategy loses sight of Christ’s paradoxical nature. For the life of Christ is no 
ordinary historical fact. And the reason that it is no ordinary historical fact is precisely 
because he is human and divine, temporal and eternal. It simply makes no sense to look 
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for evidence for the existence of a ‘person’ who is both temporal and eternal. 
Furthermore, if we were to demonstrate the existence of a person who fits the 
description of Christ’s human aspects, then we still would not have demonstrated the 
existence of Christ qua Christ. For it remains the case that we have only demonstrated 
the existence of a person; we have not demonstrated the existence of a person who is 
also, and at the same time, God. 
  For Climacus, then, in Christianity there can be no ‘direct’ relation to God in the 
sense that it is impossible to objectively observe Christ qua Christ. But, importantly, for 
Climacus this is not a failing. For Christian faith does not consist of objective 
knowledge about Christ. As Climacus notes, ‘Objectively there is no truth; an objective 
knowledge about the truth or truths of Christianity is precisely untruth.’
39 In other 
words, it is precisely because Christ is a paradox, and his divinity is hidden and cannot 
be observed, that objective knowledge about God is irrelevant. In relation to 
Christianity the important question is whether one is personally able and willing to 
accept that Christ is both man and God. As Climacus explains: 
 
‘Suppose that Christianity does not at all want to be understood; suppose that, in order 
to express this and to prevent anyone, misguided, from taking the road of objectivity, it 
has proclaimed itself to be the paradox. Suppose that it wants to be only for existing 
persons and essentially for persons existing in inwardness, in the inwardness of faith, 
which cannot be expressed more definitely than this: it is the absurd, adhered to firmly 
with the passion of the infinite.’
40 
 
  We are now able to appreciate why it is that Climacus doesn’t think it makes any 
sense to enquire into the objective truth of Christianity, and also to appreciate the sense 
in which he thinks that faith is risky. We have seen that Climacus argues that 
Christianity is constituted in such a way that objective enquiry cannot establish its truth 
in any relevant sense. To make a disinterested study of Christ is, precisely, to remain 
blind to Christ’s divinity. Christianity is not something that can be known objectively, 
but only subjectively. To say that Christianity is subjectively true is to say that one 
believes in the divinity of Christ. This is not a speculation about an objective state of 
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affairs, for subjective truth is different in kind from objective truth. On the contrary, to 
say that one believes in the divinity of Christ is not to speculate but to commit oneself to 
a point of view. And it is this commitment that Climacus associates with risk. For the 
point of view in question is not an intellectual position but a commitment to love Christ, 
worship him and live one’s life in accordance with his will. The kind of risk involved in 
faith, then, has nothing to do with believing something that one thinks may be false. 
Rather, it is more analogous to the kind of risk that we take when we fall in love. 
 
3) Risk, Faith and Pragmatism 
At this point it will be useful to briefly state the differences between my description of 
Climacus’ argument and the descriptions proposed by Emmanuel and Sands. As I 
argued in section 1, Emmanuel and Sands both attribute to Climacus the view that faith 
involves taking an epistemic risk. Christianity is either objectively true or objectively 
false. We cannot know whether it is objectively true or false either because, as 
Emmanuel suggests, this knowledge is beyond the compass of our cognitive abilities, or 
because, as Sands suggests, Christianity is incomprehensible. As a result if we choose to 
believe that Christianity is true we risk believing a falsehood. 
Against this interpretation I have argued that Climacus does not claim that in 
order to have faith one must believe something that one knows might be false. Climacus 
does not think that it makes sense to enquire whether Christianity is objectively true. 
And because it does not make sense to ask whether Christianity is objectively true it 
also does not make sense to claim that Christians must believe something which they 
know may be false. Christianity does not involve taking an epistemic risk of this kind. 
Christian faith is risky in the sense that it requires that one lives according to one’s 
Christian convictions. 
Having argued against the account of risk proposed by Emmanuel and Sands I 
now want to examine the implications of my criticisms for their comparisons between 
Climacus and James. I shall argue that their comparisons are wide of the mark. 
Emmanuel takes the view that Climacus offers a Jamesian pragmatic justification for 
taking the epistemic risk required by Christian faith. Against this I shall argue that 
because Climacus does not think that to have faith one must take an epistemic risk he 
does not provide any justification for taking such a risk. Sands argues that because 
Climacus thinks we should not attempt to prove the objective truth of Christianity he   37 
thereby makes Christian faith unnecessarily risky. James provides a superior account of 
faith because he argues that although we can be justified in having faith without first 
having established the objective truth of what we believe we should nonetheless 
continue to enquire into the objective truth of what we do believe. Moreover we should 
be prepared to alter our beliefs in accordance with the results of this enquiry. Against 
this I counter that Climacus doesn’t rule out objective enquiry into the truth of 
Christianity because he wishes to preserve the ‘risky’ quality of faith. Climacus rules 
out objective enquiry into the truth of Christianity because he thinks that it is irrelevant 
to the conduct of Christian faith. Accordingly the kind of ‘risk management’ policy 
proposed by James is irrelevant to Climacus’ conception of faith.  
 
3.1) Emmanuel, Climacus, and The Will to Believe 
Emmanuel’s argument is that for Climacus, Christ is ‘beyond’ the scope of our ability to 
reason. And because Christ is ‘beyond’ the compass of our reasoning skills we cannot 
know whether Christianity is objectively true or false. But if we cannot know whether 
Christianity is objectively true or false, how can Christian faith be justified? Emmanuel 
argues that Climacus argues for a pragmatic justification of Christian faith, broadly of 
the kind that James develops in his essay The Will to Believe. 
  In The Will to Believe, James famously argues that when we are confronted by a 
‘genuine’ option between two hypotheses we are entitled to settle the option according 
to the promptings of our ‘passional’ nature. Emmanuel argues that for Climacus the 
choice between believing in Christ and not believing in Christ is a ‘genuine option’ of 
this kind. In order to illustrate his case, Emmanuel asks us to consider a woman who is 
lost in a cave. The lost woman comes across an exit, but does not know whether it leads 
to the surface or further into the underground system. Running short on lantern fuel, the 
caver must decide whether to take the exit or remain where she is. The woman’s 
situation has three features that, taken together, constitute a Jamesian ‘genuine option.’ 
Firstly, she has a choice between two hypotheses – that the exit leads to the surface and 
that the exit does not lead to the surface – both of which are ‘live’ in the sense that they 
both strike her as reasonable. Secondly, her choice is ‘momentous’ in the sense that it 
has very high stakes. The choice she makes will determine whether she lives or dies. 
Finally, her choice is ‘forced’ in the sense that failing to choose between taking the exit 
and not taking the exit is the practical equivalent of deciding not to take the exit.   38 
Following James, Emmanuel reasons that it would not be rational for the caver to 
suspend her judgement about what to do on the grounds that she does not have enough 
evidence to make an informed choice. For if she suspends her judgement she will do 
nothing and will thereby be condemned to remain in the cave until she, like her lantern, 
expires. Accordingly, ‘Strict adherence to the evidentialist rule of thinking would be no 
less than suicidal.’
41 The caver must choose whether to take the exit or not in spite of 
having no relevant evidence to inform that choice. However, this does not imply that 
there are no rational considerations that are relevant to the lost woman’s choice. For 
although she cannot know whether the exit leads to the surface or deeper into the cave 
system, she can consider whether it is in her best interest to believe that the exit does 
lead to the surface or to believe that it does not. Emmanuel writes: 
 
‘The pragmatist view assumes that rational agents always pursue their interests 
whenever this is feasible. Moreover, it assumes that in certain practical situations where 
cognitive reason cannot decide an issue one way or the other, and where a decision is 
nevertheless forced, there must be some recourse to a procedure of rational deliberation 
which assures us that there is a warrant for the course of action we take.’
42 
 
Clearly it is in the woman’s best interest to escape from the cave rather than to die there. 
So her choice will be rational if it maximises her chance of escape and irrational if it 
does not. Emmanuel reasons as follows: ‘Because we affirm that prompt rescue is a 
more desirable end than perishing (or being trapped in the bowels of a cave for an 
indefinite period of time), and because we affirm the general principle that an act is 
rational if it conduces to desirable ends (and irrational if it gives rise to undesirable 
ones), then in this case we must affirm that the belief that p [the exit leads to the 
surface] would indeed be rational.’
43 The upshot of James’s argument, then, is that 
when we are confronted by a genuine option that cannot be settled by theoretical 
reflection we need not conclude that the only course of action is to suspend our 
judgement. Rather, we can analyse how it is in our interest to act in relation to the 
choice that confronts us, and, furthermore, it is rational to act on the basis of that 
analysis. 
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  Emmanuel believes that, for Climacus, the situation of the would-be Christian is 
analogous to that of the lost caver. We cannot know whether Christianity is objectively 
true; but we must choose between the hypothesis that it is true and the hypothesis that it 
is not true. This choice is ‘live’ insofar as both hypotheses – that Christianity is 
objectively true, and that Christianity is not objectively true - are reasonable. It is 
‘momentous’ because the stakes are nothing less than eternal life. And it is ‘forced’ 
because failing or refusing to choose between the hypotheses is the practical equivalent 
of choosing the hypothesis that Christianity is not true. Emmanuel summarises his case 
in the following way: 
 
‘As I read Kierkegaard, the absolute paradox lies in the fact that ordinary human 
standards of truth and knowledge are inadequate to assess the possibility of revelation. 
God lies beyond the reach of our cognitive resources. In this way, the paradox clears 
logical space for faith by showing that theoretical reason is incapable of deciding the 
issue one way or the other. But where theoretical reason cannot decide the option 
between belief and unbelief, and where eternal happiness hangs in the balance, the 
venture to believe may be validated on practical grounds.’
44 
 
According to this analysis the choice between believing that Christianity is true and that 
Christianity is not true is not so much a choice between propositions as it is a choice 
between courses of action. Just as the caver must decide what it is in her best interests to 
do, the would-be Christian must decide what it is in his or her best interest to believe. 
Emmanuel explains: 
 
‘The rationality of belief is usually determined by examining the relation of belief to the 
evidence in its support, while the rationality of actions is usually determined by 
reference to the actual or expected consequences. But for Kierkegaard, as for James, 
belief choices are actions, and so the criteria of rationality that apply to actions apply to 
beliefs as well. Thus he affirms that, as a rational being, he must believe despite the 
insufficiency of evidence. As a genuine option, the decision to believe in Christianity is 
properly decidable in the realm of interest and passion.’
45 
                                                 
44 Emmanuel, ibid., 50. 
45 Emmanuel, ibid., 57.   40 
 
However, Emmanuel recognises that in order to become a Christian one must do more 
than simply recognize where one’s best interests lie. ‘To overcome paradox,’ Claims 
Emmanuel, ‘one must do more than recognize the practical value of believing. What is 
required is an act (or attitude) of repentance.’
46 But this recognition in no way impacts 
on Emmanuel’s insistence that Climacus is peddling a Jamesian pragmatist conception 
of faith. ‘But nothing that has been said here [about repentance] diminishes the fact that 
Christianity presents the existing individual with a genuine option, or that it may be 
rational to accept the verdict of revelation and seek salvation through faith.’
47 
To summarise, then, we can say that according to Emmanuel, Climacus argues 
that faith is an informed gamble. We cannot know that Christianity is true; but we are, 
nonetheless, entitled to guess whether it is or is not true, provided our guess reflects our 
best practical interests. According to this view, then, Climacus defends a ‘pragmatist 
faith’ that ‘does not avoid risk, but provides a practical justification for taking risks in 
view of the actual or expected consequences.’
48 
 
3.2) Assessment of Emmanuel’s Argument 
Before addressing the question of whether Emmanuel is right to claim that Climacus 
defends a ‘pragmatist faith’ it will be useful to discuss in more detail the meaning of 
Emmanuel’s argument. For on the face of it there are at least two ways in which we 
might interpret Emmanuel’s case. Emmanuel may simply be claiming that when we are 
confronted by a Jamesian ‘genuine option’ we are entitled to settle that option without 
waiting to gather more evidence about which hypothesis is correct. However, 
Emmanuel may be arguing that when we are confronted by a genuine option it is more 
rational to believe that one of the hypotheses is true and less rational to believe that the 
alternative hypothesis is true. Emmanuel argues, for example, that it is rational for the 
caver to believe that the exit leads to the surface, and that it is rational for Climacus to 
believe that Christianity is true. But does he thereby mean to imply that it would be less 
rational for the caver to believe that the exit does not lead to the surface and that it 
would be less rational for Climacus to believe that Christianity is not true? 
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  There is reason to think that Emmanuel does not mean to imply that when we 
are confronted by a genuine option it is more rational to believe one hypothesis rather 
than the other. The reason is that Emmanuel distinguishes between his argument and the 
kind of wager argument proposed by Pascal. Pascal argues that although we cannot 
know whether Christianity is true, it is in our best interest to believe that it is true. So, 
for Pascal, although we cannot know whether Christianity is true or false it is not 
equally rational to believe either of these hypotheses. It is more rational to believe that 
Christianity is true. Emmanuel argues that Climacus’ argument is not like Pascal’s. ‘He 
[Climacus] does not argue that it must be rational to accept Christianity, despite the 
insufficiency of evidence, on the grounds that the resulting sacrifice of worldly pleasure 
is but a finite loss, whereas eternal happiness represents and infinite gain.’
49 
Nonetheless, Emmanuel sometimes does express his argument in terms that 
suggest it is more rational to wager on the side of Christian faith than against it. For 
example he writes the following: ‘Because we affirm that an eternal happiness is more 
desirable than eternal lostness, and because we affirm the principle that an act is rational 
if it conduces to desirable ends (and irrational if it gives rise to undesirable ones), we 
must affirm that belief in Christianity is in fact rational on practical grounds.’
50 Since 
eternal happiness is on offer only from Christianity and not from atheism this argument 
would seem to stack up in favour of believing that Christianity is true rather than it is 
not true.  
  The difficulty of understanding Emmanuel’s position might be explained in two 
ways. Firstly, it has been much debated whether James meant his argument in The Will 
to Believe to be a defence of one’s right to settle the option between religious belief and 
unbelief or a recommendation that one ought to adopt a religious belief.
51 I don’t intend 
to enter that debate here. My point is simply that Emmanuel is not clear about where he 
stands on this issue. The second explanation relates to Emmanuel’s choice of analogy. 
Emmanuel thinks that the situation of the lost caver is analogous to that of the would-be 
Christian. But there is at least one important difference between these two scenarios. If 
the lost caver decides not to take the exit then she is definitely going to die. But should 
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the would-be Christian opt instead for atheism then – according to Emmanuel’s own 
analysis - he or she only might miss out on eternal happiness. For if Christianity is not 
true then there is no eternal life to miss out on. So it appears that the lost caver really 
only has one rational course of action, which is to take the exit; but the situation of the 
would-be Christian is much less clear-cut. 
  However, regardless of whether we take Emmanuel to be arguing that we have a 
right to adopt a religious belief or that we should adopt a religious belief, his argument 
fails for the same reason. For Emmanuel’s claim is that Climacus thinks that in the 
absence of proof for the objective truth of Christianity, faith in Christianity can be 
justified on pragmatic grounds. Pragmatic arguments do not remove the risk that what 
we choose to believe is true is actually not true. Rather, they provide a way of 
negotiating that risk in an informed manner. But, as I have argued above, Climacus does 
not think that Christianity is either objectively true or objectively untrue. And if this is 
the case then the choice between religious belief and unbelief is not a gamble on 
whether Christianity really is objectively true or not. Furthermore if the choice between 
religious belief and unbelief is not a gamble of this kind, then there is no risk to 
pragmatically manage. We don’t have to guess whether Christianity is objectively true, 
not because we know that it is or that it isn’t, but because it makes no sense to say that it 
objectively true or that it isn’t. Since we don’t have to guess whether Christianity is 
objectively true we don’t have to pragmatically manage the risk of guessing the wrong 
way. 
 
3.3) Sands, James and Informed Gambling on God 
Sands gives short shrift to Emmanuel’s suggestion that Climacus argues for a 
pragmatist conception of faith.
52 However, what Sands does not reject is the notion that 
for Kierkegaard the choice between religious belief and unbelief is a gamble. In this 
respect religious beliefs are quite different to beliefs about empirical states of affairs, for 
which we do commonly seek at least some assurance that they are correct. We secure 
that assurance by conducting relevant objective research, and we proportion the 
confidence we have in our beliefs according to the amount of evidence in favour of the 
beliefs in question. For Climacus, however, faith is a gamble precisely because it is not 
based on evidence derived from objective enquiry. Rather, faith is grounded in 
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subjective passion. According to Sands, Climacus severs the link between religious 
belief and evidence in order to preserve the link between religious faith and subjective 
passion. The more uncertain it is that something is objectively true the more passion it 
requires to maintain the belief that it is true. If there can be no evidence for the objective 
truth of Christianity then it is completely uncertain whether Christianity is objectively 
true. Accordingly to have faith in Christianity is to be passionately committed to the 
view that Christianity is objectively true in spite of the fact that one knows it is 
completely uncertain whether Christianity really is objectively true.  
Sands thinks that one advantage of distinguishing between religious and 
empirical beliefs in this way is that it means that people can get on with the business of 
conducting their faith without first having to conduct complex and perhaps interminable 
research into the existence of God. However, Sands argues that the problem with 
distinguishing religious beliefs from empirical beliefs in this way is that it makes it 
difficult to differentiate genuine faith from lunacy. For grounding religious belief 
merely in subjective passion licences us to worship anything that takes our fancy. Sands 
writes: ‘If the quest for evidence is disavowed, then reason has no criterion for 
distinguishing truth from lunacy. Worshipping a dog is on a par with worshipping 
Christ.’
53 The advantage of Climacus’ position – that the faithful need not wait for 
proofs before practicing their devotion – is cancelled by the drawback that it cannot 
guarantee the truth of what is believed. And since Climacus has no means to guarantee 
the truth of a religious belief, he also has no means by which to adjudicate between the 
truth claims of different religions. Lovers of Christ may have their God and lovers of 
dogs may have theirs, but lovers of freewheeling relativism, it seems, will do best to 
love Climacus. 
Sands argues that the solution to this difficulty can be found in James. Sands 
thinks that there is a deep affinity between Kierkegaard and James insofar as both men 
argue that we have a right to adopt a religious belief without having first attained 
conclusive evidence in support of that belief. ‘No less than Kierkegaard, James liberates 
religious faith to venture beyond the warrants of evidence.’
54 However, James differs 
from Kierkegaard in at least one important respect. ‘James does not distinguish sharply 
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between religious faith and evidentially based faith […]’
55 So although James argues 
that it is permissible to adopt a religious belief without having objective evidence in 
support of that belief, he does not hold that such evidence is irrelevant. Accordingly we 
should keep an eye out for evidence that supports or falsifies the religious belief we 
have adopted. 
Sands argues that James’s position retains what is attractive about Climacus’ 
position whilst steering clear of the relativism into which it collapses. James allows that 
we can commit to a religious belief without first having conclusive evidence for the 
objective truth of that belief. And because we don’t have conclusive evidence for the 
objective truth of our belief, it is objectively uncertain whether that belief is true. This 
means that holding a religious belief is a risky business that requires the kind of 
passionate commitment that is appropriate to faith. However, unlike Climacus, James 
does not sever the link between religious beliefs and evidence completely. And for this 
reason we are not free to hold a religious belief simply because we want to hold it. We 
can only hold a religious belief if there is no evidence that decisively counts against it. 
Moreover, we should keep an eye out for relevant evidence and be prepared to revise 
our religious belief in the light of new discoveries. 
 
3.4) Assessment of Sands’ Argument 
The key problem with Sands’ position is that it hinges on a misunderstanding of 
Climacus’ view of the relation between religious belief and evidence. Sands thinks that 
Climacus removes the connection between belief and evidence in order to make faith 
maximally risky. According to this analysis, Climacus thinks that faith is a passion and 
that passion is encouraged by uncertainty over the objective truth of the object of one’s 
faith. Furthermore, this has the uncomfortable consequence that one may believe 
something to be objectively true that is, in fact, objectively false. But Climacus simply 
doesn’t argue that faith involves a risk of this kind at all. As we saw above, Climacus 
doesn’t think it makes sense to say that Christianity is objectively true or that it is 
objectively false. Consequently, objective enquiry into the truth of Christianity is both 
irrelevant and misleading. Clearly, then, Climacus does not reject the notion that there 
can be evidence for the objective truth of Christianity on the grounds that he thinks that 
this will make Christian faith into a more risky and therefore more exciting and 
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‘passionate’ wager. Rather, he rejects such evidence on the grounds that it cannot make 
any relevant contribution to our decision whether or not to have faith. 
  Sands’ suggestion that James improves upon Kierkegaard’s position rests upon 
the same misunderstanding of Climacus’ position. Sands takes it that, for Kierkegaard, 
to have faith is to gamble that Christianity is objectively true when it may be objectively 
false. James improves on this position by allowing that we should continue to monitor 
evidence for the objective truth or falsity of Christianity even after we have placed our 
bet. In other words, for James, we can take some of the risk out of our gamble by 
continuing to investigate whether our religious belief is objectively true or objectively 
false. But, of course, Climacus doesn’t think that Christianity is objectively true or 
objectively false. And for this reason he doesn’t think that faith is a gamble of the kind 
that Sands attributes to him. As a result James’ position, though clearly different to 
Kierkegaard’s, doesn’t improve on the Dane’s position in the way that Sands’ thinks. 
For Sands’ claim is that James is a more responsible gambler than Kierkegaard. But 
Kierkegaard is not advocating gambling at all.  
 
4) Conclusion  
I have argued that Emmanuel and Sands both attribute to Climacus the view that in 
order to have faith one must believe something that one knows may not be objectively 
true. I have countered that Climacus makes no such claim. Climacus argues that it does 
not make sense to ask whether or not Christianity is objectively true. Accordingly it 
makes no sense to claim that for Climacus in order to have faith one must risk believing 
something that is objectively false. 
  I also argued that because Emmanuel and Sands have misunderstood 
Kierkegaard, the comparisons that they draw between Kierkegaard and James are 
misleading. Emmanuel argues that for Climacus the question of whether or not to 
believe in God has the form of a Jamesian ‘genuine option.’ Christianity is either 
objectively true or objectively untrue and we must decide which hypothesis to back. But 
Climacus cannot be proposing an argument of this kind simply because he does not 
think it makes sense to say that Christianity is objectively true or objectively untrue. 
Sands argues that Climacus goes too far in weakening the requirement to have evidence 
in support of one’s religious belief. To believe in God without any evidence for the 
existence of God is to take a risk, and that risk motivates the ‘feeling of uncertainty’   46 
characteristic of faith. But, again, this argument hinges on a misunderstanding of 
Climacus’ claim that faith is risky. For Climacus a Christian is not uncertain whether 
what he or she believes is true; a Christian risks committing his or her life to the love of 
Christ. 
  Finally, it is I think worth remarking on the scope of my argument, and in 
particular to distinguish between what I have sought to show and what I have not sought 
to show. My argument has been that Emmanuel and Sands both misunderstand 
Climacus’ concept of faith in the same way, and that this misunderstanding undermines 
their comparisons between Climacus and James. I have not examined the interpretations 
of James set out by Emmanuel and Sands. Neither have I given a defence of Climacus’ 
concept of faith. It would no doubt be interesting to do both of these things. They are, 
however, strictly superfluous to my case. My task has been only to point out 
misunderstandings of Climacus’ argument, not to argue in addition that Climacus is 
right. Furthermore, the fact that Emmanuel and Sands misunderstand Climacus is 
enough to throw into doubt their comparisons between Climacus and James. If it were 
shown in addition that they have misunderstood James in some way this would only 
lead us to the conclusion we have already reached; namely that Climacus and James 
cannot be compared in the ways that Emmanuel and Sands think they can. Finally, 
somebody might object that I have discussed Climacus’ conception of faith, but have 
not discussed whether this is Kierkegaard’s conception of faith. However for the 
purposes of this chapter there is no need for me to enter this debate. For Emmanuel and 
Sands both hold that Climacus’ expresses the views of Kierkegaard. Accordingly my 
criticisms of their readings of Climacus are also criticisms of their readings of 
Kierkegaard.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Proofs, Feelings, Philosophy 
 
“Whether God exists or not is not the problem,” 
       Reb Yasri admitted, scandalizing his audience. 
           “If I believe God exists, it does not prove He does. 
                     “Not believing so in no way proves that He does not. […]” 
(Edmond Jabès The Book of Resemblances)
1 
 
Introduction 
On the face of it there is, as Jabès’ Reb Yasri illustrates, something engagingly 
scandalous about claiming that nothing important can be achieved by trying to 
demonstrate the existence of God. For there does seem to be plenty of room to doubt 
that God exists. Of course some people claim that God does exist; but this claim doesn’t 
seem quite as reliable as, say, the claim that my grandmother exists. After all, God 
never drops in on us in the way that our relatives drop by for a cup of tea. And because 
there is room to doubt whether God exists this seems to imply that we should try to 
prove the issue one way or the other. For if we had only ever heard about some very 
distant relation, we should do well to find out if she really exists before putting on the 
kettle and attending to the cakes. Dismissing this kind of enquiry into the existence of 
distant relatives and of God seems either sloppy or plain shocking. Nonetheless, both 
Kierkegaard and James sympathize with the notion that nothing important can be 
achieved by trying to prove the existence of God. Indeed, Kierkegaard doesn’t think that 
we could even prove the existence of a relative. But it is with Kierkegaard’s and 
James’s views on proofs for the existence of God that I shall be concerned with in this 
chapter. 
There is a marked difference in tone between the way in which Kierkegaard and 
James express their views on this subject. James begins his eighteenth lecture in 
Varieties by asking whether philosophy can prove the existence of God. But before 
                                                 
1 Jabès, E. (1992) The Book of Resemblances 3: The Ineffaceable The Unperceived, trans. R. Waldrop, 
Hanover: University Press of New England, 22.   48 
proceeding to make his arguments, he spends a few paragraphs speculating on what he 
thinks his audience expects to hear. Reflecting on his theme James notes: ‘I have 
undermined the authority of mysticism, you say, and the next thing I shall probably do 
is seek to discredit that of philosophy.’
2 Continuing this thought on the following page, 
James confesses: ‘To a certain extent I have to admit that you guess rightly.’
3 James 
seems to assume that his audience will hold the view that philosophy should be in the 
business of proving the existence or non-existence of God.  The fact that James 
confesses his opposition to this view, rather than simply contesting it, suggests, perhaps, 
that he too is wary of discounting it. In any case James’s tone is markedly different to 
that adopted by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus. Climacus is far from 
apologetic and shows no sign of being tempted by the view that philosophy can or 
should prove the existence of God. Climacus simply ridicules the idea that philosophers 
should be in that line of business at all. With characteristic brio and irony he writes: 
‘For the fool says in his heart that there is no God, but he who says in his heart or to 
others: Just wait a little and I shall demonstrate it – ah, what a rare wise man he is!’
4 
Proving the existence or non-existence of God would, in Climacus’ estimation, make ‘a 
superb theme for a comedy!’
5 For Climacus, then, the real scandal is that anybody 
should think that it makes sense to try to prove the existence of God in the first place. 
Where James is polite and cautious, Climacus is palpably confrontational. 
Despite the difference in tone between Climacus and James, however, both men 
do reject the idea that we can, by means of philosophy, prove the existence of God. And 
accordingly it is both natural and pertinent to ask whether Climacus and James are 
substantially in agreement with one another on this issue, and whether the difference 
between them is merely one of presentation or tone. In this chapter I assess whether or 
not Climacus and James are in substantive agreement, and evaluate their respective 
arguments. I argue that Climacus’ position is both different to and better than James’s. I 
also defend Climacus, arguing that his position is compelling and is not at all as 
scandalous as we may at first think. I set the stage by making some brief remarks about 
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the apparent similarities between the two philosophers. At the end of this preliminary 
discussion I set out the scheme of my arguments. 
 
1) Preliminary Discussion 
It certainly is true, then, that both James and Climacus reject the notion that philosophy 
can prove the existence of God. However it does not follow from this that James and 
Climacus share the same view. For they can only be said to share the same view if they 
mean similar things by ‘philosophy’ and ‘God’, and account similarly for why the 
former cannot demonstrate the existence of the latter. My view is that Climacus and 
James understand ‘philosophy’ and ‘God’ quite differently, and, for that reason, their 
cases are dissimilar. But, nonetheless, there are arguments in Climacus and James, 
which, on the face of it at least, look sufficiently similar for us to ask whether they 
really are similar. 
In particular, both James and Climacus argue that philosophical proofs for the 
existence of God are irrelevant to one’s personal decision whether to believe in God. 
James expresses this position in the following remark: ‘I do believe that feeling is the 
deeper source of religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas are secondary 
products, like translations of a text into another tongue.’
6 
7 In matters of religion, 
philosophy merely states differently what is first put to us by our feelings. Consequently 
philosophy cannot persuade us that God exists, or that God does not exist. For 
philosophy merely restates in formal terms the conviction that religious or atheistic 
feelings have already brought about in us. If philosophical arguments contradict our 
religious or atheistic feelings, then – to continue with James’s linguistic figure – they 
will fall on deaf ears. Summarising these points, James writes: ‘If you have a God 
already whom you believe in, these arguments [of philosophy] confirm you. If you are 
atheistic, they fail to set you right.’ 
8  
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Climacus similarly thinks that philosophical proofs of the existence of God are 
irrelevant to one’s personal decision whether to believe in God. In Philosophical 
Fragments, for example, Climacus writes: ‘If at the moment he is supposed to begin the 
demonstration it is not totally undecided whether the God exists or not, then of course, 
he does not demonstrate it, and if that is not the situation in the beginning, then he never 
does make a beginning – partly for fear that he will not succeed because the god may 
not exist, and partly because he has nothing with which to begin.’
9 Here Climacus 
repeats in (slightly) more formal terms much of James’s view. James’s point was that 
philosophy cannot demonstrate the existence of God because philosophy merely 
elucidates the conviction about God’s existence that one already has. Climacus makes a 
comparable point by noting that if philosophy is to demonstrate the existence of God it 
must not merely elucidate the philosopher’s personal conviction on this matter.
10 But if 
a philosopher is ‘totally undecided’ about whether God exists then he or she has no 
conviction from which to argue. Such a philosopher has ‘nothing with which to begin’, 
and therefore never manages to ‘make a beginning’ on his or her philosophical 
demonstration. James no doubt would insist that a philosopher who is ‘totally 
undecided’ as to whether God exists has no relevant feelings that he or she can translate 
into philosophical discourse. In any case, James and Climacus seem to agree that 
personal conviction precedes philosophical proof when it comes to settling the question 
of whether there is a God. 
  Furthermore, this shared emphasis on personal conviction over philosophical 
demonstration is perhaps not unexpected in view of Climacus’ and James’s broader 
philosophical commitments. Particularly relevant here are Climacus’ and James’s 
claims that philosophical problems are best understood and addressed in the concrete, 
practical contexts in which they arise. James’s attitude on this point is well captured in 
an anecdote that he recounts in Pragmatism. The story concerns his meeting with a 
young man, ‘a graduate of some Western college’.  
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‘[He] began by saying that he had always taken for granted that when you entered a 
philosophic classroom you had to open relations with a universe entirely distinct from 
the one you left behind you in the street. The two were supposed, he said, to have little 
to do with each other, that you could not possibly occupy your mind with them at the 
same time. The world of concrete personal experiences to which the street belongs is 
multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed. The world to 
which your philosophy-professor introduces you is simple, clean and noble.’
11 
 
James, of course, was not the kind of professor who liked to introduce his students to a 
simple, clean and noble world immune from the difficulties of quotidian life. And the 
point of James’s anecdote is that there is some important sense in which philosophical 
reflection should track the ‘tangled, muddy, painful’ everyday world in which people 
worry in a multitude of ways about issues such as how to live their lives and whether to 
believe in God. In Varieties James even develops this point by suggesting that 
philosophers who keep philosophy at arms length from daily life are lacking in 
character. ‘All-inclusive, yet simple; noble, clean, luminous, stable, rigorous, true; - 
what more ideal refuge could there be than such a [philosophical] system would offer to 
spirits vexed by the muddiness and accidentality of the world of sensible things?’
12 
And in a similar vein, Climacus is often given to criticize, and indeed ridicule, 
the kind speculative metaphysics that James’s western interlocutor would of no doubt 
found ‘noble’. For example, Climacus notes that, ‘Even if a man his whole life through 
occupies himself exclusively with logic, he still does not become logic; he himself 
therefore exists in other categories.’
13 Of course, even the young man immortalized by 
James recognizes that outside of the philosophic classroom one does not live in the 
categories of formal logic. But while Climacus and the young graduate seem to agree on 
this point, they react to it in markedly different ways. For where the young man thinks 
that philosophy should stick to the business of formal argumentation, Climacus does 
not. Climacus is avowedly in the business of getting to grips with the categories in 
which people actually do exist, not with purely formal concepts, however ‘simple, clean 
and noble’ they may be. And in this regard Climacus and James are united against the 
young man. What James and Climacus both do, then, is to draw the question of whether 
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there is a God away from formal philosophical speculation and return it to the context of 
the untidy, quotidian, lives of people who are vexed by that question. And this would 
seem to suggest that Climacus and James might have something important in common.  
Nonetheless, I don’t think that this similarity between Climacus and James is 
profound. If, as I have observed, Climacus and James both claim that the question of 
whether there is a God is a matter of personal conviction that should be viewed in the 
concrete practical contexts in which it is arises, this observation also draws attention to 
where such a comparison breaks down. For when we pay attention to the manner in 
which Climacus and James think we should recover the question of God’s existence 
from the unhelpful attention of metaphysicians, we find that they execute very different 
strategies.  The apparent similarities between Climacus and James turn out to be 
superficial. 
As we shall see, James and Climacus propose quite different reasons for the 
view that the existence or non-existence of God is a matter of personal conviction rather 
than metaphysical speculation. For James, reclaiming from metaphysicians the question 
of whether there is a God comes down to two things. Firstly, he argues that religious 
belief is grounded not in philosophical speculation but in personal feeling. And 
secondly, he argues that the business of philosophy should be to make judgements about 
which religious feelings can be taken seriously and which cannot. According to James, 
then, philosophy cannot ground religious belief, which rests solely on personal religious 
feelings. But philosophy can tell us which of our religious feelings are misleading or 
inappropriate as grounds for religious belief.  
All of this stands in marked contrast to Climacus’ treatment of the question of 
whether it is possible to demonstrate the existence of God. Climacus’ procedure is to 
give an elucidation of the concept of God. His point is that if we understand how this 
concept is actually used – rather than how metaphysicians and ‘speculative 
philosophers’ have used it - we shall also come to understand why it is that it makes no 
sense to try to prove the existence of God. According to Climacus, then, the business of 
philosophy is not to propose metaphysical speculations, and nor is it to ground religious 
belief. It is to elucidate concepts in such a way that we can command a clear view of 
their use and meaning. 
From the foregoing brief descriptions it is clear that Climacus and James make 
very different arguments. But in what follows I shall go beyond differentiating their   53 
views and argue that Climacus’ view can be used to criticize James’s. My argument is 
that Climacus’ method of conceptual elucidation shows why it is that religious belief 
cannot be grounded in feeling in the way that James thinks it can. James strongly 
differentiates between conceptual understanding of religion and religious feeling, 
arguing that the immediacy of the latter can ground religion in a way that the former 
cannot. According to this view, concepts, and the arguments constructed from concepts, 
are but pale imitations of what is given in immediate religious feelings. Climacus 
would, I think, object to the notion that religious concepts are mere shadows of religious 
experiences. For Climacus’ point is that we have to command a clear view of the 
relevant concepts in order to know which experiences are religious and which are of 
some other kind. This is not to say that Climacus is arguing that philosophers should 
draw up formal criteria that might subsequently be applied to the emotional content of 
people’s lives. This would be to side with the young graduate who so infuriated James 
by wanting to oppose the serene machinations of the philosophical classroom to the 
multitudinous concrete experiences of the street. Climacus does not oppose concepts to 
the concrete experiences of quotidian life. On the contrary, when Climacus claims that 
we must command a clear view of religious concepts, he means that we must 
understand how they are used in the context of our ‘tangled, muddy, painful and 
perplexed’ lives.  
In order to make this argument I start by setting out critical accounts of James’s 
and Climacus’ reasons for thinking that philosophy cannot prove the existence of God. 
Secondly, I give a comparative evaluation of the arguments of Climacus and James. 
Thirdly, I propose a Kierkegaardian criticism of James’s view that ‘religious feelings’ 
can ground religious belief. James’s view has attracted support from Ellen Kappy 
Suckiel, and I shall also address her arguments. I conclude by summarising my account; 
and by indicating how my arguments serve to introduce the issue of mystical 
experience, to which I turn in the following chapter. 
 
2) James on Feelings, Philosophy and the Justification of Faith 
In chapter eighteen of Varieties James develops various arguments concerning the 
philosophical justification of faith. These arguments can be divided roughly but usefully 
into two groups. The first group contains arguments in which James seeks to 
demonstrate that it is a mistake to look for philosophical grounds for religious belief. To   54 
this end James criticises traditional proofs for the existence of God – such as the 
cosmological argument and the argument from design – as well as the arguments of 
‘modern’ (absolute) idealism. The second group contains arguments in which James 
ascribes a positive role for philosophy in relation to the justification of religious belief. 
Here James commends the further development of the new ‘Science of Religions’, and 
outlines the kind of role that this science can play in our thinking about religion.
14  
  On the face of it we might think that since James both rejects and commends 
philosophy in relation to the justification of religious belief he is peddling a confused 
position. It seems that the arguments of the first group must flatly contradict the 
arguments of the second group. But this isn’t the case. As we shall see, James’s 
argument against the philosophical justification of faith informs his views on the 
positive role that philosophy can play with regard to the justification of faith. 
Consequently, James doesn’t contradict himself. Rather, he distinguishes between the 
kind of justification that philosophy can give to religious belief and the kind of 
justification that it cannot. But the fact that James’s position is more consistent than it 
might at first appear does not imply that it is correct. In what follows I shall critically 
review the first and second groups of James’s arguments, bringing pressure to bear on 
the first group in particular.  
 
2.1) James on Formal Proofs for the existence of God 
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about James’s treatment of proofs for the existence 
of God is its extreme brevity. It takes James just two paragraphs to dismiss the idea that 
it is possible to formulate a philosophical demonstration of the existence of God. This 
certainly is audacious, but just as certainly it is not an oversight. James thinks that there 
is a good reason why a long analysis is not required. He reasons that he need not make a 
detailed assessment of the proofs because, as a matter of historical record, those 
arguments have not been persuasive. So, in order to come to terms with James’s key 
brace of paragraphs, we first need to understand why it is that he thinks that the 
historical fate of a proof frees us from the burden of scrutinizing it closely. 
   James’s thinking on this matter has its roots in the contrast that he draws – 
rather sketchily - between philosophical argumentation and religious feeling. James 
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argues that feelings are essentially personal and cannot be disclosed to another person. 
‘Feeling is private and dumb, and unable to give an account of itself.’
15 Consequently, 
religious feeling cannot act as a universal ground for belief in God. Only the person 
who experiences a religious feeling can ground his or her belief in God on that feeling. 
Philosophical argumentation, however, holds out the promise of delivering public, 
universal grounds on which to ground religious belief. ‘To redeem religion from 
unwholesome privacy, and to give public status and universal right of way to its 
deliverances, has been reason’s task.’
16 Furthermore, there are two ways in which 
philosophers can approach this task. One is to bring philosophical reflection to bear on 
peoples’ religious feelings, and thereby ‘attempt to extract from the privacies of 
religious experience some general facts which can be defined in formulas upon which 
everybody may agree.’
17 This kind of philosophical reflection is at the heart of what 
James calls the Science of Religions, and I shall return to it below. However, another 
philosophical approach is to abandon any appeal to religious feelings at all, and to 
construct purely formal arguments in support of religious belief. James characterises 
this approach, which he associates with dogmatic theology and absolute idealism, in the 
following way: ‘It assumes to construct religious objects out of the resources of logical 
reasons alone, or of logical reason drawing rigorous inference from non-subjective 
facts.’
18 Furthermore, the authority of this kind of argument precisely stems from the 
fact that it makes no appeal to the species of ‘obscure and wayward personal 
persuasion’
19 afforded by religious feelings. In contrast to such appeals to religious 
feelings, purely formal arguments drive at objective truth by means of inferences that 
are repeatable and which are available for public inspection.  
  And it is this difference in the kind of authority that attaches to formal 
philosophical arguments and to religious feelings which informs James’s thinking on 
how we might choose between these two approaches. Appeals to religious feelings can 
only carry authority for the person who has those feelings. But if a formal argument is 
correct, then it has authority for everybody. The dilemma that we have, then, is to 
choose between these two kinds of authority. James spells this out in his commentary on 
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some passages from Principal John Caird and from Cardinal Newman, writing: ‘In both 
these extracts we have the issue clearly set before us: Feeling valid only for the 
individual is pitted against reason valid universally.’
20 The way out of this dilemma, 
according to James, is to see which of the two approaches under consideration – private 
religious feeling and universal reason - delivers on its promises with respect to the kind 
of authority that it carries. And, of course, formal philosophical argumentation has a 
great deal more to live up to than appeals to religious feeling; for the former is supposed 
to carry universal authority, whereas the latter is not. Accordingly the burden of proof 
lies with advocates of formal philosophical arguments, who must show that their 
arguments do carry the universal authority that they claim for them. James puts this in 
the following way: 
 
‘The test is a perfectly plain one of fact. Theology based on pure reason must in point of 
fact convince men universally. If it did not, wherein would its superiority consist? If it 
only formed sects and schools, even as sentiment and mysticisms form them, how 
would it fulfil its programme of freeing us from personal caprice and waywardness? 
This perfectly definite and practical test of the pretensions of philosophy to found 
religion on universal reason simplifies my procedure to-day. I need not discredit 
philosophy by laborious criticism of its arguments. It will suffice if I show that as a 
matter of history it fails to prove its pretension to be ‘objectively’ convincing.
21  
 
  James, of course, takes the view that, ‘[i]n fact philosophy does so fail’ to prove 
its pretension to be ‘objectively’ convincing.
22 His reason for this conclusion is that 
formal proofs for the existence of God simply have not commanded universal assent.  
 
‘The bare fact that all idealists since Kant have felt entitled either to scout or to neglect 
them [formal proofs for the existence of God] shows that they are not solid enough to 
serve as religion’s all-sufficient foundation. Absolutely impersonal reasons would be in 
duty bound to show more general convincingness.’
23 
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Formal philosophical argumentation fails James’s ‘perfectly plain’ test of fact, then, in 
the sense that in practice it fails to command the universal authority that is claimed for 
it. 
  There are, I think, a number of problems with the practical test that James 
proposes. The first of these is that James’s position is made less clear by his 
equivocation between the terms ‘universal’ and ‘objective’. When James introduces the 
dilemma of choosing between grounding religious belief on religious feeling or on 
formal arguments, he tells us that the choice is between the private authority of the 
former and the universal authority of the latter. But the ‘practical test’ that he proposes 
in order to negotiate this dilemma is to determine whether formal arguments are 
objectively convincing, not whether they are universally convincing. This equivocation 
seems to be a problem because having universal authority and having objective 
authority need not come to the same thing. If a proposal has universal authority, this 
may only mean that it is binding on every member of some community. If a proposal 
has objective authority, this implies that it is true regardless of who formulates, inspects 
or proclaims it. But the fact that a proposal is universally binding on the members of 
some community need not imply anything about its objective truth. For example a club 
may be set up for people who think that Elvis is still alive and living on the moon. The 
proposition that Elvis is alive and living on the moon is binding on every member of 
that club. But we would have to be exceptionally broad minded – or indeed a potential 
member of the club – to think that this proposition might be objectively true. And if a 
proposal can have universal authority without having objective authority this suggests 
that there is a mismatch between the dilemma that James sets up and the means by 
which he proposes to resolve it.  
  Somebody may counter that James’s apparent equivocation between objective 
authority and universal authority need not damage his position. It is true that universal 
authority need not imply objective authority; but there is a perfectly good sense in 
which objective authority implies universal authority. To claim that a proposal is 
objectively true is to claim that it is universally true, in the sense that it is true regardless 
of who formulates, inspects or proclaims it. And in this sense, having objective 
authority does come to the same thing as having universal authority. So if we take it that 
James’s practical test is to establish whether formal arguments for the existence of God 
are objectively true, then no difficulty arises. If it can be shown that such arguments are   58 
objectively true we can also say that those arguments are also universally true. 
Consequently, James’s equivocation between objective authority and universal authority 
presents us with a problem that is merely verbal. 
  The difficulty with this solution, however, is that it runs counter to the way in 
which James actually conducts his ‘practical test’. James does not try to establish 
whether the formal arguments for the existence of God are objectively true, and then 
conclude from this whether or not they have universal authority. Establishing the 
objective truth of these arguments would require exactly the kind of detailed, technical 
philosophical appraisal that James thinks is unnecessary. On the contrary, James’s 
practice is to look to see if such arguments carry universal authority. And, as we have 
seen, universal authority need not imply objective authority. Furthermore, the manner in 
which James executes his ‘practical test’ for universal authority introduces a further 
difficulty into his case. Rather than analysing the arguments in order to see whether 
there is some sense in which they can be said to have universal authority, James looks to 
see whether, as a matter of historical record, they have had universal authority. His 
argument is that if, as a matter of historical record formal arguments for the existence of 
God have not enjoyed universal authority, then there is a sense in which they are not 
true. And the problem with this argument is that it conflates veracity with approval. 
  Simply because the public has not been convinced by arguments proposed by 
philosophers, it does not follow that those arguments are bad. The proposals made by 
philosophers may not have been understood. And given that a proof is a formal, 
technical account there is plenty of room for misunderstanding. This is not to take the - 
frankly rather snobbish - view that the public could never get to grips with philosophical 
material. Rather, it is to point out that many people don’t happen to be in a position to 
do so. Similarly, because I lack the relevant training and expertise I am not in a position 
to pronounce on the veracity of papers on freshwater biology and quantum mechanics. 
And, of course, while we all lack the skills and training necessary to participate in 
certain forms of debate, this is to say nothing of the overwhelming indifference that we 
all feel with regard to some kinds of technical discourse. Even if in principle everybody 
could get to grips with philosophical proofs for the existence of God, it is doubtful that 
everybody would have the inclination to do so. Yet it would be not only incorrect but 
surely also churlish to conclude that simply because somebody is uninterested in an 
argument it follows that the argument is wrong.    59 
  Someone might object that James may only mean to claim that as a matter of 
fact professional philosophers have not been able to convince one another whether or 
not God exists. James’s remark that since Kant idealist philosophers have not felt the 
need to engage with proofs for the existence of God suggests that this is indeed what he 
does mean. And, similarly, in his discussion of modern idealism it is the opinion of 
philosophers that James appeals to. ‘And again, I can be excused from proving 
technically that the transcendentalist reasonings fail to make religion universal, for I can 
point to the plain fact that a majority of scholars, even religiously disposed ones, 
stubbornly refuse to treat them as convincing.’
24 Arguably professional philosophers 
ought to be both sufficiently well trained and motivated to understand the proofs that 
have been canvassed. And this seems to nullify the problems noted above in relation to 
the public: namely that they are in no position to judge whether proofs for the existence 
of God are successful. But, of course, the mere fact that a person is a professional 
philosopher does not guarantee that he or she is sufficiently trained and motivated to 
understand the proofs. Indeed, philosophers commonly complain that their colleagues 
have misunderstood them. So the fact that professional philosophers have not agreed on 
whether or not the existence of God has been demonstrated does not support the 
inference that such proofs are mistaken. It could be that the philosophers are mistaken in 
their judgements about the proofs. Moreover, the claim that philosophers don’t agree 
whether or not there is a God leaves open the possibility, however remote, that in the 
future they might come to an agreement on this matter. In principle, then, philosophers 
could demonstrate the existence of God, at least to one another. 
  James’s claim that ‘as a matter of history’ philosophers have failed to prove the 
existence of God suggests that he would accept that in principal an effective proof could 
be formulated in the future. But, in fact, James does not think that this is the case. For 
although he holds that the development of the ‘Science of Religions’ will lead to a 
better philosophical account of religious belief, he does not hold that religious belief can 
ever be based on proofs for the existence of God. And this brings into focus another 
important problem with James’s case, closely related to the difficulty I have just 
discussed. The problem is that James draws an unwarranted philosophical conclusion 
from a strictly historical inference. It may or may not be the case that proofs for the 
existence of God haven’t enjoyed much success since Kant. But this alone does not 
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demonstrate that it is never possible to give a philosophical demonstration of the 
existence of God. To hold otherwise would be akin to claiming that, say, the long 
history of failed attempts at powered flight demonstrated that powered flight is not 
possible. In view of the history of powered aviation this inference is of course not only 
unwarranted but also demonstrably wrong. It would be a different matter, of course, if it 
could be shown that there was some reason why the ambition to achieve powered flight 
could never be realized. Presumably if this were indeed the case, and physicists had 
demonstrated it, then the Wright brothers would rightly have stuck to the bicycle trade. 
But as it was they correctly understood that the history of failed attempts at powered 
flight did not imply that powered flight could never be achieved. Similarly, a 
philosopher need not conclude from the fact that many proofs have failed that his or her 
proof must also fail.  
  This last criticism of James may perhaps be met by the observation that he does 
provide at least one reason why it is that the existence of God can never be given a 
philosophical demonstration. The reason is that religious belief is grounded on religious 
feelings and not on philosophical arguments. Explaining this point James writes: ‘What 
religion reports, you must remember, always purports to be a fact of experience: the 
divine is actually present, religion says, and between it and ourselves relations of give 
and take are actual.’
25 
  Furthermore, the notion that belief in God is grounded in religious feelings goes 
some way to explaining why there has been a history of failed philosophical proofs for 
the existence of God. James contends that the reason that proofs for the existence of 
God have been and continue to be formulated and discussed is that such proofs are 
inspired by the same religious experiences and feelings that actually do ground faith. He 
writes: 
 
‘I believe, in fact, that the logical reason of man operates in this field of divinity exactly 
as it has always operated in love, or in patriotism, or in politics, or in any other of the 
wider affairs of life, in which our passions or our mystical intuitions fix our beliefs 
beforehand. It finds arguments for our conviction, for indeed it has to find them. It 
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amplifies and defines our faith, and dignifies it and lends it words and plausibility. It 
hardly ever engenders it; it cannot now secure it.’
26 
 
For James, the fact that philosophers have been motivated by ‘subjective facts’ does not 
imply that their proofs are convincing. On the contrary, since our religious convictions 
are founded on ‘subjective facts’, it is a mistake to think that they can or should be 
founded on such proofs. To return to the passage from James quoted in the introduction, 
we can say that proofs for the existence of God are translations of religious experiences, 
and the convictions they engender, into the conceptual vocabulary used by philosophers. 
And because proofs for the existence of God merely translate the convictions we 
already have, they do not prove anything. 
 
‘The fact is that these arguments do but follow the combined suggestions of the facts 
and of our feeling. They prove nothing rigorously. They only corroborate our pre-
existent partialities.’
27 
 
  It is for this reason that James is able to dismiss not only the doctrines of 
dogmatic theology, but also the modern idealism of Caird. According to James, for all 
his philosophical ingenuity, Caird still fails to prove the existence of God and has 
merely elaborated on the suggestion of religious feelings: ‘he [Caird] has simply 
reaffirmed the individual’s experiences in a more generalized vocabulary.’
28 So, 
although the fact that people have religious feelings and experiences to some extent 
explains why proofs for the existence of God are still formulated and discussed, it also 
shows why those formulations and discussions are inappropriate. For they misleadingly 
draw our attention away from the real source of our convictions; namely our religious 
feelings and experiences. 
  We have seen, then, that James’s claim that religious belief is based on feeling is 
central to his argument. It allows James to make the claim that it is never possible to 
give a philosophical demonstration of the existence of God. And it also provides the 
basis of an explanation for the past and continued formulation of these proofs. But 
although James’s claim that religious belief is based on religious feelings solves some 
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difficulties with his argument, it also creates a further problem. In particular it is not 
clear how we are to understand James’s ‘practical test’ in the light of this claim. For if 
James means to claim that it is never possible to give a philosophical demonstration of 
the existence of God because religious belief is rooted in religious feelings, then his 
‘practical test’ is unnecessary. That is to say that if it can be shown that belief in God 
can never be grounded in argument then it is besides the point to conduct a test to see 
whether as a matter of fact it has been grounded in argument. Alternatively, we might 
take it that James’s argument does hinge on his ‘practical test’. Looked at in this way 
James is only claiming that as a matter of historical fact religious belief is based on 
feeling and not on argument. As we have seen, however, James is also committed to the 
claim that philosophers can never prove the existence of God. Accordingly he is guilty 
of drawing a philosophical conclusion – that it is not possible to prove the existence of 
God - from an historical inference – that it has not yet been done. 
 
2.2) James and Science of Religions 
As I noted above, James does not hold the view that philosophy has no role to play in 
furthering our understanding of religious belief. On the contrary, James views Varieties 
as a contribution to a philosophical ‘Science of Religions.’ ‘We have the beginnings of 
a ‘Science of Religions,’ so-called; and if these lectures could ever be accounted a 
crumb-like contribution to such a science, I should be very happy.’
29 James argues that 
the Science of Religions can perform two tasks. Firstly, it can provide a conceptual 
vocabulary by means of which it is possible to communicate and discuss the private 
religious experiences upon which religious belief is grounded. The second task of the 
Science of Religions is to evaluate whether particular religious beliefs are true or false. 
James describes these two tasks in the following way: 
 
 ‘We are thinking beings, and we cannot exclude the intellect from participating in any 
of our functions. Even in soliloquising with ourselves, we construe our feelings 
intellectually. Both our personal ideals and our religious and mystical experiences must 
be interpreted congruously with the kind of scenery which our thinking mind inhabits. 
The philosophic climate of our time inevitably forces its own clothing on us. Moreover, 
we must exchange our feelings with one another, and in so doing we have to speak, and 
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to use general and abstract verbal formulas. Conceptions and constructions are thus a 
necessary part for our religion; and as moderator amid the clash of hypotheses, and 
mediator among the criticisms of one man’s constructions by another, philosophy will 
always have much to do.’
30 
 
  It is clear from this that James thinks that the conceptual expression of religious 
sentiments is inevitable. That is to say that if we are to converse about our religious 
feelings – even with ourselves – then we must employ concepts to do so. And the 
business of the Science of Religions is to adjudicate between the different conceptual 
arguments that are based on different religious feelings. 
  James makes it clear that the evaluative work of the Science of Religions should 
be modelled on the critical procedures of the empirical sciences. Philosophy must 
‘abandon metaphysics and deduction for criticism and induction.’
31 Furthermore, the 
point of subjecting religious claims to the examination of empirical science is to 
discredit those religious claims that do not have a scientific basis: ‘By confronting the 
spontaneous religious constructions with the results of natural science, philosophy can 
also eliminate doctrines that are now known to be scientifically absurd or 
incongruous.’
32 By clearing the field of claims that are scientifically ungrounded, the 
Science of Religions leaves us only with religious claims that are possibly true and 
which can be tested by means of further scientific operations.  
 
‘Sifting out in this way unworthy formulations, she can leave a residuum of conceptions 
that at least are possible.  With these she can deal as hypotheses, testing them in all the 
manners, whether negative or positive, by which hypotheses are ever tested.’
33 
 
Once the Science of Religions has investigated all reasonable looking religious 
hypotheses, it can identify and lend support to the most reasonable looking religious 
hypothesis:  
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‘She [the Science of Religions] can perhaps become the champion of one which she 
picks out as the most closely verified or verifiable.  She can refine upon the definition of 
this hypothesis, distinguishing between what is innocent over-belief and symbolism in 
the expression of it and what is to be literally taken. As a result, she can offer mediation 
between different believers, and help to bring about consensus of opinion. She can do 
this more successfully, the better she discriminates the common and essential from the 
individual and local elements of the religious beliefs which she compares.
34 
 
  But if the point of the Science of Religions is to elucidate what is ‘common and 
essential’ in various religious beliefs, it is nonetheless the ‘individual and local 
elements’ of religious beliefs that secure conviction. For although the Science of 
Religions can establish which religious beliefs are plausible hypotheses, only personal 
religious feelings can tell us which religious beliefs are true. ‘In the religious sphere, in 
particular, belief that formulas are true can never wholly take the place of personal 
experience.’
35 Philosophical concepts may allow us to discuss our religious feelings, but 
by enabling this discussion they also take us away from the private immediacy of 
sentiment by which religious conviction is achieved. As James puts it:  
 
‘Philosophy lives in words, but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed 
verbal formulation. There is in the living act of perception always something that 
glimmers and twinkles and will not be caught, and for which reflection comes too 
late.’
36 
 
3) Climacus on Proofs for the existence of God 
In Fragments Climacus makes two kinds of comments with regard to formal proofs.
37 
The first kind is comments relating to philosophical proofs for the existence of people 
and things. The second kind is comments relating to philosophical proofs for the 
existence of God. These two streams of thought can be traced back to a distinction that 
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Climacus makes – rather abruptly – between proving the existence of something that 
can be named and proving the existence of a concept. When Climacus opens his 
discussion of philosophical proofs he posits the existence of an ‘unknown’ and asks 
himself if it is possible to demonstrate the existence of such a thing. In the early part of 
his discussion Climacus refers to the unknown as ‘the god’, adding that this is ‘only a 
name we give to it.’
38 But in the discussion that immediately follows, Climacus does not 
discuss the existence of things that are completely unknown. On the contrary, his 
discussion relates to the existence of things – such as stones – and people – such as 
Napoleon. Here, then, Climacus seems to allow the arbitrary name ‘the god’ to stand for 
any noun or proper name. But a short way into his argument Climacus makes what 
appears to be a startling reversal, asserting that, ‘God is not a name but a concept.’
39 So 
having used ‘the god’ to stand for any noun or proper name, Climacus then asserts that 
‘the god’ is not a name at all. And having asserted this Climacus directs his thoughts to 
the business of proving the existence of ‘the god’ where ‘the god’ is understood as a 
concept. But although, as I have noted, Climacus changes rather abruptly from 
discussing  ‘the god’ taken as any noun or proper name to discussing ‘the god’ taken as 
a concept, I don’t think this change itself is an oversight. In fact Climacus contrasts 
these two kinds of discussion in order to make his case. The best way to appreciate this 
is to start by looking at Climacus’ remarks on the existence of people and things before 
turning to his remarks on the existence of God. 
 
3.1) Climacus on the Existence of People and Things 
Climacus is firmly opposed to the view that we can demonstrate the existence of people 
and things. On the face of it this is a troubling and counter-intuitive position. After all 
we do commonly infer the existence of things from relevant evidence. It hardly seems 
unreasonable, for example, to claim that the terrible state of my lettuce proves the 
existence of slugs. Similarly, catching sight of some rare animal – a river dolphin, for 
example - surely demonstrates that the species still exists and that it is not extinct. It is 
important to note, however, that nothing that Climacus says indicates that he would 
oppose this kind of talk. He does not cast doubt on the notion that it makes sense to look 
for evidence of slugs or of river dolphins or indeed anything else where relevant 
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evidence could in principle be found. However, Climacus does object to the idea that 
this kind of enquiry actually demonstrates existence. And the reason for this is that the 
enquiry must presuppose that its object does exist. Climacus makes this claim in the 
following way. 
 
‘The whole process of demonstration continually becomes something entirely different, 
becomes an expanded concluding development of what I conclude from having 
presupposed that the object of investigation exists. Therefore, whether I am moving in 
the world of sensate palpability or in the world of thought, I never reason in conclusion 
to existence, but I reason in conclusion from existence. For example I do not 
demonstrate that a stone exists, but that what exists is a stone.’
40 
 
  In order to get to grips with Climacus’ position let us stay for a moment with the 
examples of slugs and river dolphins. If I survey my lettuce for signs of slug damage 
then what is in doubt is not whether slugs exist per se, but whether they happen to be in 
my garden. And in a similar vein if I go looking for river dolphins I don’t doubt at all 
that they have existed, but only seek to ascertain whether there are any left. In these 
cases, then, there is an important sense in which existence of what we are looking for – 
slugs and river dolphins – is never in doubt. And because the existence of these things is 
never in doubt it is therefore the case that their existence is never demonstrated. It is 
true that these enquiries do show something; namely whether slugs reside in my garden 
and whether river dolphins are extinct. And we can if we wish express these results by 
saying that slugs do or do not exist in my garden and that river dolphins do or do not 
continue to exist at all. But although it makes perfect sense to talk in this way, we still 
cannot draw the conclusion that we have demonstrated existence, or indeed non-
existence. For, as we have seen, the enquiries that underpin these conclusions must 
presuppose the existence of slugs and dolphins. And by definition one cannot 
demonstrate what one presupposes. 
  This argument is perhaps more difficult to appreciate in the case of a potentially 
extinct animal than in the case of slugs. Suppose, for example, that we could show that 
there are no living river dolphins. This surely entitles us to claim that river dolphins do 
not exist. And, furthermore, we did not presuppose this. In fact we presupposed the 
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opposite – namely that river dolphins do exist – otherwise we would not have bothered 
looking for them. And since we did not presuppose what we concluded, it seems that we 
have been able to demonstrate the non-existence of river dolphins. But, of course, what 
we mean by this is that river dolphins no longer exist. And it only makes sense to say 
that river dolphins no longer exist if we accept that at some point they did exist. 
However, at no point in our enquiry did we prove that dolphins have existed. We 
presupposed that dolphins have existed in order to enquire whether they continue to do 
so. 
  Somebody may object that things would be different if we did come across a 
river dolphin. If a river dolphin swam alongside my boat then I would know that they 
exist and would not have to presuppose this fact, and nor would I need to look for 
evidence from which to infer their existence. Similarly, if I caught a slug on my lettuce I 
wouldn’t have to presuppose that slugs exist, and I wouldn’t have to infer their presence 
in my garden. I’d simply know that slugs exist and that they do so in my garden. 
However, Climacus does not think that things are so straightforward. This is indicated 
by his remark that, ‘I do not demonstrate that a stone exists, but that what exists is a 
stone.’
41 Stones, like slugs, are things that we come across quite regularly. So it is clear 
that Climacus does not think that simply because we have come across some empirical 
object this implies that we have demonstrated that it exists. Simply coming across 
something, for example by seeing it, or by picking it up, does not demonstrate anything 
about the existence of what I see or pick up. That is to say that the business of looking 
at something does not describe a philosophical trajectory from a premise about what we 
see to a conclusion about the existence of what we see. I can of course demonstrate my 
ability to see things and to pick them up, for example by taking an eye test or by 
carrying a hod. But there is nothing about reading an eye chart that formally proves that 
eye charts exist and there is nothing about lugging bricks that formally proves they exist 
either. 
  Naturally we can reflect upon the business of seeing a stone, say, or picking it 
up. And somebody may argue that by reflecting on those actions we can infer that the 
stone I saw and picked up must exist. Here, I take it the argument would be that sense-
experience alone cannot demonstrate anything because it is immediate and not 
reflective. But by bringing reflection to bear on immediate sense-experience we can 
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order it in such a way that it demonstrates the existence of whatever it was that we 
experienced. This argument seems particularly promising because if it is the case that 
sense-experience is purely immediate it cannot, as it were, smuggle in any 
presuppositions about the existence of the things we encounter. We either immediately 
experience things or we do not, but either way we do not presuppose anything about 
existence.  
  However, the argument that we experience something and subsequently reflect 
on that experience in order to establish whether the thing we experienced exists is not 
compelling. In order to ask myself ‘does the stone in my hand exist?’ I must already 
know what a stone is. And the criteria that are relevant to claiming that the stone exists 
or does not exist are drawn from our extant understanding of what stones are. In other 
words part of what it means to know what stones are is to understand the contexts in 
which it makes sense to say that they are. For example if somebody were to ask what a 
stone is we might point to an example of a stone, or tell them to look for them at the 
base of a cliff or describe the geological processes in which stones are made. But, 
importantly, pointing to an example of a stone, indicating where stones are found and 
how they are made are all contexts in which it makes sense to say that stones exist. 
When we elucidate our understanding of what stones are, then, we also elucidate the 
contexts in which it makes sense to claim that stones exist. Furthermore these are not 
arbitrary ways of talking about the existence of stones. If we said that ‘stones are 
formed by music’ this would make no sense, except perhaps in the context of an 
excruciating pun about ‘rock n roll’ or the Rolling Stones. However, even these puns 
would only come off if we already understood what it does make sense to say about the 
formation of stones. And if we already understand the contexts in which it makes sense 
to claim that stones exist then we do not entertain any general doubt about the existence 
of stones. Consequently the issue I am faced with is not whether stones in general do or 
do not exist but whether what I have in my hand is a stone. This is also captured in 
Climacus’ remark that, ‘I do not demonstrate that a stone exists, but that what exists is a 
stone.’
42 When I grasp and examine the stone in my hand I do not first gather some 
sensations and then reflect on whether those sensations indicate that the stone exists. I 
don’t make any inferences from sense experience – for example by experiencing 
reaching-for-the-stone and then reflecting a bit on that and then experiencing closing-
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my-fingers-on-the-stone and then reflecting a bit on that. Rather, when I take a stone in 
my hand I already understand that this is a context in which it makes sense to say that 
the stone exists. 
  The difficulty I have been discussing, then, is that by identifying what it is that 
we wish to prove exists we also identify the senses in which it does exist. Consequently 
we presuppose what we want to prove, namely the existence of the thing in question. 
But suppose we did not start out by identifying what it is that we wish to prove exists. 
For example we might take Climacus at his word when, near the beginning of his 
discussion, he posits ‘the god’ that is ‘not a human being insofar as he knows man, or 
anything else he knows.’
43 Here Climacus seems to be saying that ‘the god’, whom he 
posits, is completely mysterious to us. The god is, so to speak, of another, wholly 
unimaginable, world. Since we do not know anything about ‘the god’ we cannot say 
what ‘it’ is. And because we cannot say what the god is we cannot know the contexts in 
which it makes sense to say that ‘it’ exists or that ‘it’ does not exist. Consequently not 
knowing what ‘it’ is that we are dealing with brings with it the advantage that we do not 
presuppose that ‘it’ exists. And since we do not presuppose that ‘it’ exists we thereby 
afford ourselves the opportunity to demonstrate whether or not ‘it’ does exist.  
  Once again, however, things are not so straightforward. In order to formulate our 
demonstration we must start by declaring that ‘something’ – we do not say what – may 
or may not exist – we do not say which. But if we do not say what it is we are dealing 
with we cannot have any way of determining whether or not ‘it’ exists. We couldn’t 
know what must be the case if ‘it’ does exist or if ‘it’ does not exist. As a result we 
couldn’t know what we need to establish in order to show that ‘it’ does or does not 
exist. Furthermore, even if we were undeterred by this problem and wrote a proof 
anyway, we could never know whether our proof is successful. For if we cannot know 
what we must establish then we cannot make any judgement about whether we have 
been successful in establishing it. Trying to prove the existence of ‘something’ without 
presupposing anything is doubly senseless, then. We simply won’t know what to say or 
how to judge what we do say. And this is the case whether we choose to compose an 
empirical proof or a purely formal proof. For since we cannot know what it is that needs 
to be shown then we cannot know which of these two kinds of proofs is relevant or 
judge how successful they are. 
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  In the foregoing I have looked at Climacus’ arguments about proofs for the 
existence of various kinds of things but not at his arguments about proofs for the 
existence of people. In fact Climacus’ opening remarks about proving the existence of 
people are largely of a piece with his remarks on proving the existence of things. In 
order to demonstrate that some person exists, we must presuppose that he or she does 
exist. Climacus makes this point in a discussion of Napoleon. 
 
‘If one wanted to demonstrate Napoleon’s existence from Napoleon’s works, would it 
not be most curious, since his existence certainly explains the works but the works do 
not demonstrate his existence unless I have already in advance interpreted the word 
“his” in such a way as to have assumed that he exists.’
44 
 
However, Climacus also voices a different criticism of the notion that it is 
possible to demonstrate the existence of Napoleon from Napoleon’s works. Climacus 
notes, ‘But Napoleon is only an individual, and to that extent there is no absolute 
relation between him and his works – thus someone else could have done the same 
works.’
45 Here Climacus seems to imply that although it is certain that somebody 
executed Napoleon’s works – for example by commanding the French army – in 
principle we can never be sure whether we have identified the correct person as 
Napoleon. Understood in this way Climacus’ point is rather weak. After all there simply 
isn’t any significant scholarly doubt about the identity of Napoleon. Similarly, if I catch 
a slug munching on my lettuce there really is no room to doubt which slug is the guilty 
party. In order to doubt either that we have identified the correct man as Napoleon or 
the correct slug as the lettuce loving gourmet we should need to posit eccentric 
theoretical possibilities. For example we might assert that it is always possible that the 
man who we think of as Napoleon was in fact an impostor. Or, even more fancifully, we 
might say that it is always possible that, although it is not recognised, pairs of slugs can 
swap places instantaneously. But in order to take these proposals seriously we should 
first need to overturn large areas of existing scholarship. Indeed it wouldn’t make sense 
even to look for evidence that slugs simultaneously swap positions unless we first 
abandoned our whole way of looking at animal biology. So although it is theoretically 
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possible that we have the wrong Napoleon or the wrong slug these are not well founded 
possibilities. I do not doubt that the identities of some historical people and animals are 
hard to pin down. But in the cases of Napoleon and my slugs it seems ridiculous to 
suppose that we have made a mistake. 
It is for this reason that Climacus’ remark is perhaps best understood in another 
way. In fact the point of Climacus’ observation that somebody else could have done 
Napoleon’s works seems to be to facilitate an important contrast between people and 
God. For while it is true that in principle another person could have executed 
Napoleon’s works, the same is not true of God and his works. As Climacus puts it, 
‘However, between the god and his works there is an absolute relation.’
46 That is to say 
that it wouldn’t make sense to claim that somebody or some other spiritual entity could 
substitute for God in the execution of his works. And this difference between people 
and God is a point of principle. We have seen that it is always possible to doubt whether 
we have identified the correct Napoleon, even if, pragmatically, such doubt seems 
exaggerated and inappropriate. But in relation to God there is, as it were, no room at all 
for such doubt. It is not merely unlikely that God did not perform God’s works, it is 
perfectly impossible. 
And it is in view of this distinction between Napoleon and God that Climacus 
goes on to posit a further, more general distinction between names and concepts. 
‘Napoleon’ is of course a name. And it is not possible to infer anything about the 
relationship between a person and his works simply from the fact that he is called 
‘Napoleon’. We might say that the name ‘Napoleon’ does not convey anything about 
the logical relations between the man that bears the name and the works that he does. 
And nor does it tell us what the man is like, whether he is kind or is given to 
vituperative outbursts and so on. In order to discover how the man relates to his works 
and what he is like we should have to look at the man himself and not at his name. 
However, this is not the case with God. The concept God does tell us about what God is 
like and about his relation to his works. That is to say that when we use the concept God 
certain things follow about what God is like that do not follow when we use the name 
Napoleon. For example, a man named Napoleon may or may not be gracious, but God 
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simply is gracious, and eminently so. Climacus expresses this difference by saying that 
‘God is not a name but a concept […]’
47 
This has far-reaching implications, one of which is that if we are to understand 
what God is like we need to attend to the concept of God. That is to say that we need to 
understand how this concept relates to other concepts, in what contexts it makes sense 
to use it, and how it is used in those contexts. Climacus appeals to such an 
understanding when he points out that only God can do God’s works. To claim that 
somebody else could do God’s works just as somebody else could do Napoleon’s works 
is to misunderstand the concept ‘God.’ And, just as I noted above that we are not free to 
talk in arbitrary ways about stones, so too we are not free to talk in arbitrary ways about 
God. If we could say anything at all about God then, of course, there is an important 
sense in which we wouldn’t have a concept of God. All we would have is a cacophony 
of unrelated expressions featuring the word God. Furthermore, if we had no concept of 
God, and were free to use the word God however we wish, then it would not be possible 
to use it incorrectly. But clearly it is possible to make blunders when we talk about God. 
Consider, for example, the following letter penned by a young girl. 
 
           Dear God, 
Are you real? 
Some people 
             don’t not believe 
            it. If you are you 
                  better do something 
               quick. Harriet Ann
48 
 
 
The reason that this is funny, or at the very least peculiar, is that it shows a 
misunderstanding of what is meant by the word ‘God’. Anybody who does understand 
the concept of God would hardly be letting God know what people think of him, or 
offering him advice. The concept of God, then, is not up for grabs. And it is with this in 
mind that Climacus discusses proofs for the existence of God, to which I will now turn. 
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3.2) Climacus on Proofs for the existence of God 
Climacus opens his case by considering whether it is possible to demonstrate the 
existence of God from God’s works. Attempting a demonstration on this basis seems 
like a particularly promising strategy in view of Climacus’ earlier claim that only God 
can do God’s works. For this would seem to imply that we have only to identify God’s 
works in order to demonstrate that God exists. After all, if they are God’s works then by 
definition they could not have been the works of somebody or something else. If God’s 
works exist then so must God. However, once again, Climacus does not think things are 
so straightforward. 
 
‘God’s works, therefore, only the god can do. Quite correct. But, then, what are the 
god’s works?’  […] Do we not encounter the most terrible spiritual trials here, and is it 
ever possible to be finished with all these trials?’
49 
 
The works of God are not something that can be observed in the same way that weather 
patterns or prices can be observed. No meteorologist would dispute that a warm front is 
exactly that, and no stockbroker would argue that the figures in the Financial Times 
show anything other than the trade value of stock. But whether one sees a weather 
system or a financial crash as a work of God is a completely different matter. No doubt 
people will reach different views. And no doubt people will change their views. For it is 
one thing to see the world as God’s work when the sun is shining and money is easy to 
come by, but it is quite another thing when natural disasters strike and poverty hits 
home. I take it that this is why Climacus says that looking for God’s works is a spiritual 
trial. It is a test of faith to see the hand of God in what is abhorrent as well as what is 
fine. And, as Climacus points out, this test is never completed. For one’s faith will 
always have to face the challenge of accommodating whatever abhorrent events 
tomorrow brings. And for this reason, as Climacus also points out, I could never finally 
conclude from an examination of God’s works that God exists. ‘But I still do not 
demonstrate God’s existence from such an order of things, and even if I began, I would 
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never finish and also would be obliged continually to live in suspenso lest something so 
terrible happen that my fragment of demonstration would be ruined.’
50 
But suppose somebody were to bypass this kind of spiritual trial by simply 
declaring that whatever happens, whether pleasing or abhorrent, is all down to the hand 
of God. If everything that happens in the world is an act of God, and only God can do 
God’s works, this surely would demonstrate that God exists. Here again, however, 
Climacus sees important difficulties. To claim that everything that happens in the world 
must be the work of God is not to judge the unfolding events of the world as they occur. 
It is to prejudge all possible events so as to determine in advance that they are the works 
of God. In other words the works are, as Climacus puts it, ‘regarded ideally.’
51 
However, once this step has been taken it is no longer possible to prove the existence of 
God from God’s works. For in order to prejudge all the events in the world as works of 
God I must first presuppose that God exists. And if I start by presupposing that God 
exists I cannot demonstrate that God exists. As Climacus explains: 
 
‘But then I do not demonstrate it [the existence of the god] from the works, after all, but 
only develop the ideality I have presupposed; trusting in that, I even dare to defy all 
objections, even those that have not yet arisen. By beginning, then, I have presupposed 
the ideality, have presupposed that I will succeed in accomplishing it, but what else is 
that but presupposing that the god exists and actually beginning with trust in him.’
52 
 
  Simply elucidating the concept of God’s works, then, will not demonstrate that 
God exists. However, Climacus does not draw from this the conclusion that there is no 
point in elucidating the concept of God at all. In fact Climacus holds that elucidating the 
concept of God helps us to deepen our understanding of why it is not possible to 
demonstrate that God exists. In this regard one important aspect of the concept of God 
is precisely that it is a concept. As we have seen, Climacus distinguishes strongly 
between concepts and names. Climacus thinks of names as appellations that we attach 
to people and things. Consequently the fact that God is not a name implies that God is 
neither a person nor a thing. And if it is the case that God is neither a person nor a thing 
it follows that none of the techniques that we have for demonstrating the existence of 
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people and things are relevant to demonstrating the existence of God. So while I might 
reasonably look for slugs in my garden, or for river dolphins in the Yangtze River, or 
for evidence of the birth of Napoleon in historical records, it wouldn’t be reasonable to 
conduct similar kinds of survey for God.  
  This is a difficult point because, of course, the Christian faith is bound up with 
some quite specific historical claims. For example it is not possible to be a Christian if 
one does not believe that Jesus was born, was crucified and rose from the dead. And 
since these are historical claims it is difficult to see what is objectionable about trying to 
demonstrate that they did or did not take place. After all nobody would object to the 
notion that we could in principle look for evidence that the two men crucified with 
Christ actually were born and were executed. Why should it be any different with 
Christ? Why cannot we look for evidence that he existed just as we might look for 
evidence that Napoleon existed? 
  In response to this we should remind ourselves that, for the reasons we have 
discussed above, Climacus does not think that it is ever possible to demonstrate the 
existence of people or things. So although we could look for evidence to support the 
claim that the two men crucified with Christ were indeed born and executed, this would 
not amount to demonstrating that they existed. Furthermore, this is not because of the 
long historical perspective involved. It is because, as Climacus never tires of pointing 
out, if we are to look for evidence of their existence we must presuppose that they did 
exist. Moreover, since, as we have seen, Climacus does not allow that we can prove 
existence from sense-data the situation would not change if we were present at the time 
of the crucifixions. If we witnessed the crucifixions we could not thereby demonstrate 
to ourselves or to anybody else the existence of the men, or the stones they trod on, or 
the clothes they wore, or the crosses that they died on. And with this in mind it is no 
longer exceptional to claim that it is not possible to demonstrate the existence of Christ. 
If we regard Christ as an historical figure then we should not expect to be able to 
demonstrate his existence simply because this can never be done in relation to any 
historical figure. 
  But, of course, in another respect Christ qua Christ is absolutely different to the 
men who accompanied him to the cross. And here we are returned to Climacus’ 
distinction between names and concepts. Christ is a concept and consequently, as I 
noted above, it won’t do to look for evidence of the existence of Christ in the same way   76 
that I might look for evidence of slugs in my garden or of river dolphins in rivers. But 
we can develop this case if we go beyond simply observing that Christ is a concept and 
elucidate the concept itself. As we saw in the previous chapter Climacus argues that 
Christ is a paradoxical concept. Christ is God and therefore is eternal. But Christ is also 
a man and therefore is finite. To be knowledgeable about Christ, then, one would have 
to understand ‘something’ that is simultaneously temporal and eternal. And this, as 
Climacus often says, is absurd. Consequently, there is an important sense in which it is 
not possible to have knowledge of Christ. Climacus explains this point in the following 
way: 
 
‘It is easy to see, then (if, incidentally, the implications of discharging the understanding 
need to be pointed out), that faith is not a knowledge, for all knowledge is either 
knowledge of the eternal, which excludes the temporal and the historical as 
inconsequential, or it is purely historical knowledge, and no knowledge can have as its 
object this absurdity that the eternal is the historical.’
53 
 
But if it is not possible to have knowledge of Christ in the sense that Climacus sets out, 
then we cannot expect to objectively know whether or not Christ exists. Or to put this in 
another way, it makes no sense to set about objectively proving whether Christ exists 
when Christ cannot be known in a way that is relevant to such an investigation. 
  This last point is easily misunderstood because, of course, Christians do claim to 
know Christ. Consequently it appears that Climacus’ argument flatly contradicts a basic 
Christian claim. But Climacus doesn’t deny that there is any sense in which Christ is 
known to people. What he denies is that a disinterested enquiry into Christ can lead to 
knowledge about whether or not he exists, or tell us about the nature of Christ. For 
when one disinterestedly surveys the concept of Christ all one can say is that he is, 
absurdly, both finite and infinite. However, there is, of course, a quite different sense in 
which one might come to know Christ, and that is in the context of having faith in him. 
Here ‘knowing’ Christ comes to something completely different. For, as Climacus 
points out in the passage I have just quoted, faith is not a form of knowledge. To know 
Christ in the context of faith, then, is not to become more knowledgeable about him – 
for example by developing improved theories about his nature, or his actions or his 
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origins, say. Rather, to know Christ, in the context of faith, is to conduct a relationship 
with him. To know Christ in this sense involves acknowledging him as God, 
worshipping him, being obedient towards him, and so on.   
And here we are reminded of the importance of Climacus’ observation that 
Christ is a concept and not a name. For it is only by understanding the Christian concept 
of God that we can appreciate how it is that activities such as acknowledging God and 
worshipping him are connected to claims about his existence. For understanding the 
concept of God means understanding that activities such as acknowledging God and 
worshipping him are contexts in which it makes sense to say that God exists.  
 
4) Critical Comparison of Climacus and James 
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that Climacus and James make very different 
arguments. But in spite of these differences it is possible to identify three strands of 
common interest. Firstly, both Climacus and James argue that God is a concept. 
Secondly, both Climacus and James argue that it is not possible to demonstrate the 
existence of God simply by reflecting on the concept ‘God.’ Finally, and as I noted in 
my preliminary discussion, both Climacus and James argue that religious belief is 
grounded in personal conviction and not in philosophical proofs for the existence of 
God. In this section I shall critically compare the arguments of Climacus and James in 
each of these three areas. 
 
4.1) God as a Concept 
Both Climacus and James hold that God is a concept, but they mean very different 
things by this. James argues that the concept God and its attendant theological terms 
are, as it were, necessary evils born out of the need to communicate our religious 
sentiments. Such concepts allow us to discuss religious beliefs, evaluate them, form 
creeds and so on. However, they also fail to capture what ‘glimmers and twinkles’ in the 
‘living act of perception’ in which we encounter God.
54 As James puts it, with regard to 
the experience of the divine, ‘reflection comes too late.’
55 In contrast to James, nothing 
that Climacus says indicates that he thinks that the concept of God fails to capture the 
‘living act of perception’ in the way that James does. That is not to say that Climacus 
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thinks that in order to be a Christian one need only understand the concept of God. Such 
an understanding could be had by way of a disinterested survey of the concept. But on 
the contrary, Climacus insists that if one is to be a Christian one must have an interested 
relation to the concept God. If one is to be a Christian then one’s understanding of God 
must be shown appropriately in one’s life. The key difference between Kierkegaard and 
James, then, is that where James opposes religious concepts to religious sentiment, 
Climacus places an understanding of religious concepts at the heart of religious life. To 
put this differently, where James thinks that the real business of religious life is the pre-
conceptual experience of religious sentiments, Climacus thinks that the business of a 
religious life is to articulate one’s understanding of religious concepts by one’s manner 
of living. 
  The difficulty with James’s position is that it isn’t clear how we could know that 
the sentiments we experience are religious sentiments. For if, as James holds, reflection 
comes ‘too late’ to capture the immediacy of experience, then it is not clear why we 
should call any particular experiences ‘religious’. Moreover, this problem cannot be 
solved by the creation of a better conceptual vocabulary. For concepts always fail to 
grasp the ‘glimmer and twinkle’ of experience. Climacus does not face this difficulty 
precisely because he thinks that, so to speak, the boot is on the other foot. Climacus’ 
position is not that concepts fail to grasp religious experience, but rather that if one is a 
Christian then one understands experience through religious concepts. In other words, 
for Climacus, sentiments and experiences can be said to be religious insofar as they are 
understood in relation to religious concepts. And, as I noted above, this means seeing 
the hand of God in what is abhorrent as well as what is fine. However, maintaining 
one’s faith in the light of all that is abhorrent in the world is a quite different problem to 
the one faced by James. To struggle over one’s faith is to struggle to apply religious 
concepts to one’s experiences. But James holds that religious concepts never do quite 
apply to religious experiences, thereby making us wonder how those experiences can be 
know to be religious? 
 
4.2) Concepts and Proofs 
As we have seen, James does not examine in any detail arguments for the existence of 
God. And this seems to be because he considers such an examination unnecessary in 
view of the fact that religious conviction is born out of religious experience, not   79 
philosophy. Climacus, on the other hand, unpacks the concept of God so as to show that 
it doesn’t make sense to attempt a disinterested proof of existence. That is to say that 
Climacus draws our attention to the fact that God is a paradoxical concept and not a 
person or a ‘thing’, in order to disabuse us of the notion that we might try to prove the 
existence of God in the same way that we might try to prove the existence of people and 
things. 
  The advantage of Climacus’ position is that it is built on a consideration of the 
logic of religious claims. That is to say that Climacus holds that it follows from a 
consideration of the claim ‘Christ exists’ that this cannot be shown by means of a 
disinterested enquiry. James’s case, however, rests on the psychological observation 
that as a matter of fact people are not moved to faith by formal arguments for the 
existence of God. The problem with this argument is that it is contingent upon the range 
of James’s observations. Somebody may come along who does claim to base his or her 
religious beliefs on a formal proof for the existence of God. Such a person would 
confound James’s view that as a matter of fact people do not make this claim. But such 
a person would not confound Climacus’ views. Climacus accepts that many people 
claim that faith is based on proof of God’s existence. His response is to elucidate the 
concept of God in such a way that such claims are shown to be confused or mistaken.  
 
4.3) Proofs and Personal Conviction 
In my preliminary discussion I noted that Climacus and James appear to make similar 
cases because they both claim that religious belief is grounded in personal conviction, 
not formal proof. I also claimed that this apparent similarity is not profound. And, in 
view of the preceding two sections we are now in a better position to see why. James’s 
claim that religious faith rests on personal conviction is bound up with his complaint 
that concepts never quite capture experience. Since concepts never quite capture 
religious experiences they can never persuade us into religious belief. For Climacus, 
however, things are very different. Climacus argues that it only makes sense to assert 
that God exists in the context of a personal faith in God. Or to put this in another way, 
by elucidating the concept of God Climacus shows that it is literally senseless to make 
the assertion that God exists – or that God does not exist – from the point of view of a 
disinterested enquiry.   80 
  That advantage of Climacus’ position is that it ties together the logic of religious 
claims with the notion that faith rests in personal conviction. James, on the other hand, 
seems only to make the point that as a matter of fact it is personal conviction that does 
carry the day. But this observation about what is generally the case leaves the central 
philosophical question unanswered – why shouldn’t faith be based on proofs for the 
existence of God?  
  I have argued, then, that Climacus makes a better argument than James 
regarding why it is that faith cannot be grounded on proofs for the existence of God. In 
what follows I shall argue that Climacus’ case also constitutes a powerful criticism of 
James’s view that faith can be based on feeling. 
 
5) Religious Feelings as Grounds for Religious Belief 
Climacus dismisses both logical and empirical proofs for the existence of God. James 
certainly dismisses logical proofs; but nonetheless admits that certain feelings can 
ground a religious conviction for the person who experiences them. Climacus would, I 
think, have rightly objected to James’s view. In this section, then, I shall press home 
what I take to be Climacus’ objection to James’s appeal to religious feelings. But I shall 
first discuss a defence of James’s views advocated by Ellen Kappy Suckiel.  
 
5.1) Suckiel on James and Religious Feelings 
As I have noted, James is committed to the claim that feeling is the ‘deeper source’ of 
religious belief. According to this view religious feelings are not simply an 
accompaniment to a religious belief, as they would be for somebody who always felt a 
certain way whenever he or she thought about God. And, furthermore, the kinds of 
religious feelings that James has in mind are not caused by a religious belief. On the 
contrary, James’s argument is that people experience religious feelings that move them 
to believe in God. As Suckiel explains: 
 
‘But James is not interested in providing only a set of psychological observations about 
what religious feelings may be like as subjective states, or what their practical, moral, or 
aesthetic benefits may be. For he believes that states of mind such as “religious rapture,”   81 
“ontological wonder,” or “cosmic emotion” may also be deeply significant cognitively - 
they may be a means by which the subject recognizes genuine religious truths.’
56 
 
In addition, Suckiel points out that James does not think that cognitive value attaches 
only to those feelings that seem to disclose the presence of God. Feelings associated 
with religious needs ‘may have cognitive value as well’.
57 Moreover, the sense in which 
both types of feeling can be said to have cognitive value, and the reason that they move 
people to believe in God, is that they help substantiate the claim that God exists. 
Accordingly Suckiel notes that for James ‘[…] emotions, and even desires or needs, can 
provide evidence for claims about the existence of a divine reality […]’
58  
  This undoubtedly is an unusual claim; and for what Suckiel calls ‘scientific 
rationalists’ it is not only atypical, but it is also particularly hard to swallow. Suckiel 
speculates that the reason for this is that scientific rationalists place too much faith in 
the principle of parsimony. In other words, what seems questionable about James’s 
proposal is that it is unnecessarily speculative. There are, according to this view, 
simpler explanations for the fact that we have religious feelings than that God exists. 
And if that is the case it seems that there is little point in giving James’s view an airing. 
Suckiel counters this objection in two ways. Firstly, she questions the logical force of 
the principle of parsimony, pointing out that the simplest explanation for something is 
not necessarily the correct explanation
59. If the simplicity of an explanation does not a 
guarantee its veracity, then it is unreasonable to exclude James’s proposal on the 
grounds that it is complex. Secondly, Suckiel argues that the principle of parsimony is 
not applicable to the question of whether there is a God. 
 
‘I suggest that the mistake of the many philosophers […] is to think that the point of 
religion is to provide a list of existing entities, an inventory of the world’s contents, no 
different in kind, for example, from everyday empirical enumerations of the contents of 
a room. The difference between religious and secular accounts of the universe, on this 
view, is that religious accounts (at least theistic ones) include at least one additional 
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entity (God), and additional actions or judgements (God’s) which secular accounts leave 
out, and which are regarded as unnecessary.’
60 
 
But, as Suckiel points out, when we ask religious questions we are not ‘asking for the 
leanest and most austere possible inventory of the contents of the world.’
61 On the 
contrary, ‘We are asking for the profoundest possible explanation, to help us understand 
and appreciate, as deeply as we can, why we are here; what, if anything, life and 
existence mean; and how we should behave with regard to them.’
62 To think that 
Ockham’s razor should be applied to religious questions, then, is to misunderstand the 
kind of questions that are being put. 
  Having blunted the threat of Ockham’s razor, Suckiel sets out three defences of 
James’s proposal. James advanced the first two of these defences. The third defence is 
an extension of his thinking.  
  James’s first argument is that, as a matter of fact, our feelings do influence the 
conduct of scientific research and that, by extension, there is nothing inappropriate 
about allowing our feelings to guide us in religious matters. Suckiel summaries this 
view in the following way. 
 
‘In his first argument, James draws parallels between the most basic feelings and desires 
which animate both science and religion. He supports religion by suggesting that while 
its basis is emotional, so also is the basis of science. He argues, moreover, that since 
scientific judgements built upon that emotional basis have shown themselves to be 
reliable (in that they have been confirmed), one should not deny the possibility that 
religious feelings (like wonder or awe) will support judgements equally as successful as 
scientific ones.’
63 
 
James’s second argument is that not putting trust in our religious feelings would 
be both uncomfortable and unduly negative. ‘Given the value and deeply natural 
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character of religious emotions, James claims, it would be disconcerting and self-
destructive to hold that such feelings are intrinsically and ineluctably untrustworthy.’
64  
Finally, the third defence, proposed by Suckiel but not by James, hinges on 
showing that not only does trusting our religious feelings save us great deal of 
discomfort, but there are also independent reasons for thinking that our religious 
feelings are reliable indicators of the existence of God. Suckiel starts with the 
observation that as a matter of fact it is quite common for people to experience religious 
feelings. Furthermore we can and do make judgements about when it is appropriate to 
have such feelings. And this implies that there are ‘reasonably well agreed-upon criteria 
for what constitutes an appropriate context for religious and spiritual emotions.’
65 
Suckiel argues that some people – for example people with autism or with ‘frontal lobe 
damage’ to the brain – cannot experience religious feelings or understand the contexts 
in which they might be appropriate.
66 But, in Suckiel’s view, these exceptions prove the 
norm. She argues that people who cannot experience religious feelings are normally 
regarded as ‘in some measure limited.’
67 Conversely, since it is ‘normal’ to be 
‘unlimited’ in this regard, this at least implies that there may be some truth to the view 
that religious feelings should be taken at face value. Summarising her case, Suckiel 
writes:  
 
‘Of course the fact that religious emotions may be regarded as normal and appropriate 
does not by itself entail the existence of divine realities. Contrary to James’s critics, 
however, it does help establish the probability of religious truths. Does not the fact that 
we can trust other healthy human functions provide presumptive evidential justification 
for trusting our healthy and appropriate religious feelings as well? Just as we trust that 
our eyes are fitted to the world (indeed, what it means to have visible property x is for 
an object to look like x to a person with normal eyesight under normal conditions), why 
may we not trust that our normal and natural religious intuitions, feelings, and 
experiences, are evidence for God’s existence? The point of the argument is this: it is 
irrational to hold, on the one hand that the ability to have religious or spiritual feelings 
is a healthy, normal capacity, and that the inability to do so is a deficiency; and on the 
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other hand to hold to a metaphysics and epistemology which categorically invalidates 
the kinds of claims which these feelings support.’
68 
 
5.2) Evaluation of Suckiel’s arguments 
Before considering what Climacus would make of the foregoing arguments, let us first 
make some more general comments on them. I don’t see anything objectionable about 
the view that the simplest explanation for something need not be best explanation. 
Simplicity doesn’t imply anything about explanatory power. However the three further 
arguments that Suckiel proposes in support of James are much less attractive. With 
regard to the first argument it is extremely hard to know what is meant by the claim that 
emotion ‘is the basis of science’. For what typifies scientific research is disinterested 
inductive or deductive enquiry, not appeals to sentiment. It may be true that scientists 
sometimes have ‘hunches’ or ‘feelings’ about which hypothesis will turn out to be 
correct. However such ‘hunches’ are clearly not the ‘basis of science’. If a scientist 
chooses to follow a ‘hunch’ then he or she does so by attempting to verify it by means 
of best scientific practice. Consequently it is the scientific practices of disinterested 
induction, deduction, verification, falsification and so on, which demonstrate the 
veracity of the hunch. The hunch does not ground those scientific practices. 
   James’s second argument is similarly unattractive. The fact that a religious 
feeling is valuable and deeply held simply does not imply that we can infer from it that 
God exists. It may well be upsetting to distrust such religious feelings. But, again, the 
fact that this is upsetting doesn’t imply that we can reliably infer the existence of God 
from the religious feeling.  
The third argument, advanced by Suckiel and not by James, is perhaps the least 
attractive of the bunch. Suckiel tries to go beyond James’s rather suggestive arguments 
by showing not only that it is comfortable or normal to trust our religious emotions but 
also that there are good reasons to do so. In order to do this Suckiel makes two 
important claims. Firstly, that there are universal criteria by means of which we can 
judge whether an emotion is a specifically religious emotion. And, secondly, that there 
are a minority of people who are unable to have feelings that meet those criteria. From 
these two claims Suckiel infers that because most people have religious feelings this 
implies that there is some probability that God exists. 
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I should certainly want a much more detailed account than Suckiel provides if I 
am to be persuaded that there are universal criteria by means of which we can judge 
whether an emotion is a specifically religious emotion. In view of the vast multiplicity 
of religious claims Suckiel’s assertion looks implausibly weak, and, at any rate, nobody 
is likely to accept it at face value. And, one would hope, few people are likely to accept 
at face value Suckiel’s assertion that autistic people are ‘limited’ on the grounds that 
they have different cognitive abilities to non-autistic people. To call autistic people 
‘limited’ is to make a value judgement about their cognitive abilities in relation to one’s 
own. It is not to report a fact. Consequently Suckiel’s reference to autistic people does 
not show what she intends to show. For all it demonstrates is that some people 
sometimes make the judgement that autistic people are ‘limited’. But to make that 
judgement doesn’t imply anything at all about the veracity of the religious sentiments of 
non-autistic people. It is clear, then, that neither of Suckiel’s two key claims holds 
water. But, in any case, the inference that she draws from these two claims is equally 
problematic. For I simply don’t see any reason to think that because lots of people have 
religious feelings it follows that there probably is a God. 
 
5.3) Climacus on Religious Feelings 
Climacus’ objection to James and to Suckiel is much more profound than the criticisms 
I have just rehearsed. This is because I have, so to speak, addressed those arguments on 
their own terms. In other words, I have pointed out where the arguments do not 
demonstrate what they are supposed to demonstrate. But Climacus would view the 
whole business of grounding religious belief on religious feeling as completely 
mistaken. 
  There are, I think, at least three arguments that Climacus would rightly bring to 
bear on  Suckiel’s case. The first of these is bound up with the claim that it is not 
possible to demonstrate existence from sense-data. As we saw above, Climacus’ claim 
is that we cannot demonstrate existence from sense data for two reasons. Firstly, simply 
receiving a sense impression of something does not come to the same thing as making a 
philosophical argument. That is to say that the business of looking at something, for 
example, does not describe a philosophical trajectory from a premise about what we see 
to a conclusion about the existence of what we see. And this argument can, I think, be 
applied to the claim that feelings can demonstrate existence. That is not to argue that   86 
having a feeling is the same as looking at something. However, it is to argue that having 
a feeling does not demonstrate the existence of anything, for the same reason that 
simply looking at something does not demonstrate the existence of anything. In other 
words both looking at something and having a feeling are kinds of immediate 
experience. And because they are immediate experiences they do not constitute 
philosophical arguments. Of course, somebody may reply that we can reflect upon our 
immediate experiences and thereby make inferences from them. By reflecting on what 
we see, or on our feelings, then, we might construct a philosophical demonstration. But, 
as we saw above, Climacus does not think that this strategy can work. And this brings 
us to the second reason that Climacus doesn’t think that it is possible to demonstrate 
existence from sense experience. For, as we saw above, if we reflect on our sense 
experiences in order to demonstrate the existence of something, then we must assume 
what we wish to demonstrate. In order to ask myself ‘does the slug on the lettuce exist?’ 
I must already know what a slug is. And the criteria that are relevant to claiming that the 
slug exists or does not exist are drawn from our extant understanding of what slugs are. 
In other words part of what it means to know what slugs are is to understand the 
contexts in which it makes sense to say that they are. Consequently, I must presuppose 
the existence of slugs in order to demonstrate their existence. But, of course, if I 
presuppose the existence of slugs then I do not demonstrate it. And similarly, in order to 
ask myself ‘does this feeling demonstrate the existence of God’ I must already 
understand the contexts in which it makes sense to claim that God does or does not 
exist. And this is to presuppose what we wanted to prove: namely that God exists. 
  This last point is closely related to the second criticism that Climacus would 
level against Suckiel’s argument. Suckiel asserts that there are widely accepted criteria 
by which we can judge whether a feeling is a religious feeling or not. There are two 
ways in which we might understand this claim. Firstly, we might take it to mean that 
there are criteria by which we can tell whether a particular feeling is a feeling that 
somehow derives from, or is inspired by, God. But this, of course, is to presuppose that 
God exists. As a result, the occurrence of religious feelings cannot demonstrate the 
existence of God; for we presupposed the existence of God in order to identify the 
relevant feelings as specifically religious feelings. Secondly, then, we may take it that 
Suckiel only means that these criteria are to be understood in cultural or historical 
terms. In other words her point may be that, as a matter of fact, people have commonly   87 
made similar judgements about what constitutes a religious feeling. But if we take 
Suckiel’s claim in this way, then we must still wonder what it is that people are 
asserting when they assert that certain kinds of feelings are religious feelings. If by that 
they mean that they are feelings that are somehow caused by God, then we are returned 
to the difficulty that we saw above. For to claim that a certain feeling is a feeling caused 
by God is to presuppose that God exists. Of course, people may not be asserting that the 
occurrence of religious feelings implies the existence of God. But if we take this view 
then it follows that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated by pointing to 
examples of religious feelings.  
  Somebody may point out that Suckiel does not go as far as claiming that the fact 
that people have religious feelings actually demonstrates the existence of God, but 
merely gives us some grounds for believing in God. In other words Suckiel is only 
committed to the claim that the fact that people have religious feelings implies that there 
is some likelihood that God exists. But, of course, this is still to claim that religious 
feelings are evidence for the existence of God. And as a result the criticisms of 
Suckiel’s position that I have just rehearsed will still apply. And, furthermore, this 
brings into view the third criticism of Suckiel’s position. For the claim that there is 
probably a God is an hypothesis. And as an hypothesis it is a claim that will turn out to 
be objectively true or objectively false. But, of course, Climacus denies that – in the 
context of Christianity at least – it makes sense to say that it is objectively true or that it 
is objectively false that God exists. As we saw in Chapter 1, and in section 3.2 above, 
for Climacus faith is a profoundly subjective affair in the sense that all objective 
reflections on the existence of God are misleading and irrelevant. 
 
6) Conclusion 
I started this chapter by discussing why we might think that James and Climacus hold 
similar views about the possibility of proving the existence of God. Subsequently, I 
agued that although both Climacus and James reject the notion that it is possible to 
prove the existence of God, their views are nonetheless importantly dissimilar. I 
criticised James’s arguments against proofs for the existence of God and defended 
Climacus’ rejection of proofs for the existence of God. Furthermore I used Climacus’ 
arguments in order to criticise James’s and Suckiel’s view that religious belief can be 
grounded in religious feelings.   88 
  Throughout my discussion I have left aside all mention of one important kind of 
subjective experience which is sometimes taken to prove the existence of God. By that I 
mean ‘mystical’ experiences. Both Climacus and James have quite a lot to say on this 
matter and, for that reason, I shall turn to it next.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Kierkegaard and James on Religious Experience 
 
Introduction 
It has often been claimed that God has communicated with a person by means of a 
voice, or in a vision or in a reverie. For example, in Genesis it is said that ‘the word of 
the Lord came to Abram in a vision’.
1 Similarly, Simone Weil reports that whilst she 
was reciting a poem by George Herbert, ‘Christ himself came down and took possession 
of me.’
2 Weil subsequently made a habit of reciting the Our Father in Greek; a practice 
that she associates with further, and more profound encounters with Christ. ‘Sometimes, 
also, during this recitation or at other moments, Christ is present with me in person, but 
his presence is infinitely more real, more moving, more clear than on that first occasion 
when he took possession of me.’
3 Many people who live religious lives claim to have 
had religious visions. But it is also true that many religious people do not claim to have 
had experiences of this kind. And this leads us naturally to ask whether religious visions 
can, or indeed should, serve to justify religious beliefs. On the one hand it seems that 
many people feel perfectly able to carry on with their religious observances without 
having had a dramatic ‘brief encounter’ with God. On the other hand, however, it is also 
difficult to resist the notion that people who have had a vision from God have an 
important advantage. After all, they seem to have been granted a rare glimpse of the 
deity to whom they are devoted. Other people may claim that reports of religious 
visions are always unreliable, or that we cannot judge their veracity. Maurice O’C. 
Drury wonders whether it is possible to dissociate reports of mystical visions from the 
spectre of mental illness.  
 
‘Can we distinguish between madness and religion? Can we say of one such state: ‘This 
is a mental illness and is the province of the psychiatrist’? And of another: ‘This is a 
spiritual experience sent by God for the advancement of the soul and is the province of a 
wise director’?’
4 
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In view of these formidable controversies, it seems difficult to know whether religious 
visions can or should justify religious belief. Both Kierkegaard and James address 
themselves to this dilemma. In this chapter I critically compare their arguments, with a 
view to showing that Kierkegaard’s position trumps James’s. 
Neither Kierkegaard nor James take the view that all reports of religious visions 
are in principle unreliable. For Kierkegaard the notion that God reveals himself in 
visions is absolutely indispensable to the Christian faith. Accordingly, to write off or 
explain away the concept of revelation as merely a convenient vehicle for the deranged 
or deluded is to discard a religious concept without which Christianity is completely 
changed. As the pseudonym Petrus Minor puts it: 
 
‘No Christian, and thus no Christian ecclesiastical superior either, can be willing to 
allow the syllogism: a man has claimed to have had a revelation in which the Savior has 
communicated this and that to him – ergo, the man is mentally deranged. If the state 
church ever allows this conclusion, it has destroyed itself.’
5 
 
Petrus Minor clearly would not condone the argument that simply because Abram, Weil 
and others claim to have had a revelation it follows that they must be deluded. And 
James would likewise be minded to resist the peremptory rubbishing of their claims. 
James argues that if we are to gain an understanding of the specifically religious aspects 
of people’s lives we must be prepared to take seriously reports of mystical visions, 
voices, reveries and the like. In Varieties James makes this point in the following way. 
 
‘One may say truly, I think, that personal religious experience has its root and centre in 
mystical states of consciousness; so for us, who in these lectures are treating personal 
experience as the exclusive subject of our study, such states of consciousness ought to 
form the vital chapter from which the others will get their light.’
6 
 
Where Petrus Minor argues that to do away with revelation is to do away with 
Christianity, James makes the broader claim that to do away with mystical experience is 
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to do away with personal religious experience per se. Since Kierkegaard does not wish 
to abolish Christianity, and James does not wish to abolish personal religious 
experience, both men conclude that we must be prepared to take reports of religious 
visions seriously. 
But for Kierkegaard and for James taking reports of religious visions seriously 
comes to quite different things. Not only do they fail to draw similar conclusions, but 
also they propose fundamentally different kinds of argument. James offers a theoretical 
account of the origin and meaning of religious visions. From this he infers that such 
visions constitute evidence for the existence of God. But he qualifies his view by adding 
that religious visions are a special, personal kind of evidence that is authoritative only 
for people who experience them at first hand. Kierkegaard does not offer theoretical 
speculations on the origin and meaning of religious visions, but rather offers an 
elucidation of the specifically Christian concepts of revelation and authority. By means 
of this elucidation he shows that there is a sense in which the authority of religious 
visions is profoundly personal. But, crucially, this authority has nothing to do with the 
evidential value of religious visions. Kierkegaard takes the view that religious visions 
have a personal authority in the sense that to understand them is to be obedient with 
regard to them. Religious visions do not justify faith, then. On the contrary, one must 
already have a degree of spiritual development in order to exhibit the kind of obedience 
that is relevant with regard to religious visions. 
My view is that both Kierkegaard’s approach and his conclusions are superior to 
James’s. I shall argue that Kierkegaard is right to elucidate relevant concepts rather than 
propose a speculative theory, as James does. And Kierkegaard is also right to argue 
against the view that religious visions constitute evidence for the existence of God. In 
order to make this case I shall critically compare three aspects of Kierkegaard’s and 
James’s thinking on religious visions. Firstly, I shall examine their accounts of what 
constitutes a religious vision. James theorizes that mystical visions are communications 
from an ‘unseen order’
7 that is normally beyond the compass of human sense 
perception. Kierkegaard, however, does not think that revelations are messages from an 
unseen order. He holds that the origin of a revelation is to be understood by reference to 
Christian concepts, and not by reference to a mostly invisible realm. Furthermore, from 
Kierkegaard’s point of view, James’s speculative approach actually obscures the 
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phenomena that he wishes to understand. For the latter’s speculative theory leaves aside 
the very religious concepts that give sense to the phenomena he wishes to explain. 
   Secondly, I shall examine James’s and Kierkegaard’s views on the evidential 
value of religious visions. James regards mystical experiences as evidence for the 
existence of the unseen order from which they emanate. Kierkegaard criticises the view 
that revelations can be evidence for the truth of Christianity. Kierkegaard argues that the 
claim that revelations constitute evidence for the truth of a religious belief is rooted in 
the misleading view that such beliefs are theories. If religious beliefs are viewed as 
theories it is natural to look for evidence that can support or falsify them. And religious 
visions seem like a good place to look for such evidence. For, if such visions are true, it 
seems that the religious theory must rest on a sound, if unusual empirical footing. But 
against this view Kierkegaard argues that a religious belief is not a theory. And because 
a religious belief is not a theory it does not make sense to look for evidence that could 
support or falsify it. Consequently, it is mistaken to think that religious visions 
constitute evidence for the truth of religion. 
Thirdly, I shall compare what Kierkegaard and James have to say on the 
authority of religious visions. James thinks that mystical reveries are authoritative only 
for those people who experience them. That is to say that a mystical experience only 
vouchsafes the existence of an ‘unseen order’ to the person who has had that 
experience. This view assumes that mystical revelations are communications from an 
unseen order, and that religious visions are evidence for the truth of religion. Since 
Kierkegaard rejects both of these views it is unsurprising to find that he also rejects 
James’s conclusions about the authority of religious visions. For Kierkegaard, the 
authority of religious visions does not rest at all on their evidential value, but rather 
stands on a completely different footing. Kierkegaard argues that religious visions are 
authoritative in the sense that in order to understand them one must know how to be 
obedient towards them. Accordingly, religious visions are in principle authoritative for 
anybody who has sufficient spiritual development to observe the relevant kind of 
obedience. 
  Before making these arguments, however, I shall start by briefly locating 
Kierkegaard’s and James’s remarks on revelation and mystical experience in their 
respective oeuvres. I shall then briefly examine some autobiographical remarks made by 
Kierkegaard and James regarding mystical experiences and revelations. Besides being   93 
of some historical interest, this will usefully serve to introduce in broad terms the 
differences between the two philosophers on the subject of religious visions. Following 
these introductory remarks, I shall discuss in turn each of the three points outlined 
above. In each case my procedure will be to start by discussing James’s view before 
elaborating Kierkegaard’s view by way of a critical response. 
One potential objection to my case is that James’s remarks on ‘mysticism’ 
address a phenomenon quite different to Kierkegaard’s remarks on ‘revelations’; and 
that, therefore, it is inappropriate to use the latter to criticise the former. This is an 
important matter, and for that reason it is best left alone until I have set out my 
arguments in full. Accordingly, I conclude by examining this objection. My argument is 
that James’s use of the term ‘mystical’ is so broad that we cannot exclude Kierkegaard’s 
reflections on specifically Christian ‘revelations’ from his analysis. But once we admit 
this, it is perfectly legitimate to use Kierkegaard’s arguments to criticise James’s. 
 
1) Kierkegaard’s remarks on Mysticism and Revelation 
In this section I briefly review Kierkegaard’s remarks on religious visions, with a view 
to showing which of these remarks should lay claim to our attention and which can be 
left aside. Kierkegaard sometimes refers to religious visions as ‘mystical’; but much 
more frequently he uses the term ‘revelation.’ I shall start by examining his 
observations on mystical visions. My argument here is that there is not a great deal to be 
gleaned from these remarks. With that in mind I shall go on to propose that, for my 
present purposes at least, Kierkegaard’s remarks on revelations are much more 
instructive. 
Kierkegaard makes surprisingly few comments on mysticism. Even his 
voluminous journals contain only a small number of entries on the subject. One entry 
shows that Kierkegaard was to some extent aware of the history of Christian mysticism 
in the Middle Ages.
8 In another remark Kierkegaard very briefly contrasts Hegel’s 
philosophical notion of ‘nothing’ with the ‘divine nothing’ that the ‘mystical always 
ends up with’, and which Socrates ‘continually reached.’
9 More promising, perhaps, is 
Kierkegaard’s remark on the work of J. E. Erdmann. Kierkegaard cites Erdmann’s 
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definition of mysticism approvingly, noting that it is correct to say that the mystic ‘does 
indeed forsake society […] and yet wants to come into relationship with the 
universal.’
10 What seems promising about this remark is that Kierkegaard’s notion that 
the mystic, qua mystic, is separated from society parallels his oft-repeated argument 
that the Christian qua Christian is in some important sense separated from his or her 
milieu. In this remark, then, Kierkegaard appears to connect mysticism with one of his 
principal doctrines. But I don’t think we can make too much of this. Kierkegaard simply 
doesn’t say enough in order for us to judge whether he thinks ‘mystics’ are separated 
from their societies in exactly the same sense that the Christian ‘single individual’ must 
be. Furthermore, we are discouraged from speculating along these lines by a journal 
entry penned by Kierkegaard about six years after his reflections on Erdmann. In this 
later entry Kierkegaard equates mysticism with ‘sensuality proper’, where ‘the factor of 
the will is lacking’.
11 The notion of ‘sensuality proper’ seems much more at home in 
Kierkegaard’s various portrayals of somewhat louche aesthetic lifestyles than it is with 
his account of properly Christian belief. Consequently this remark seems to take us 
away from the notion that ‘mysticism’ is fundamentally similar to Christianity in some 
regard, and even encourages us to think that ‘mysticism’ is fundamentally opposed to 
Christianity in some other regard. This impression is strengthened by Kierkegaard’s 
remark that ‘Mysticism does not have the patience to wait for God’s revelation.’
12 This 
might imply that Kierkegaard thought of ‘mystical’ experience as anathema to Christian 
revelation. And this is further implied by another remark penned a month earlier in 
which Kierkegaard complains that mystics think they have a direct relationship to God 
and will not acknowledge the truth of Christian revelation according to which ‘all men 
have only an indirect relationship’
13 with God. But I don’t think we can conclude from 
Kierkegaard’s journal remarks that his views are inconsistent, or even that he changed 
his mind. In the context of his journals, Kierkegaard never develops his remarks on 
mysticism into arguments, and accordingly it would be at best unfair and at worst 
churlish to suggest that he was in any way fickle. 
However, Kierkegaard’s remarks on mysticism are not limited to his journals. 
He discusses mysticism in his doctoral dissertation on The Concept of Irony; and 
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reflections on mysticism also feature in the exchange between the young aesthete and 
the judge that is staged in Either/Or. In his doctoral dissertation Kierkegaard refers to 
‘Oriental Mysticism’; which he boldly likens to a desire for narcotics - ‘It is wishing for 
the foggy, drowsy wallowing that an opiate can procure’
14 - whilst simultaneously 
casting aspersions on his own understanding of the subject.
15 Kierkegaard’s remarks 
here are perhaps most charitably understood as ‘playful’; although it would be perfectly 
appropriate to point out that the same remarks are ill informed and high handed in 
roughly equal measure. But, as Christopher Nelson has pointed out, Kierkegaard does 
not seem to have been interested in setting out an incisive account of ‘Oriental 
mysticism.’ Rather, he simply mentions Oriental mysticism as a foil for his principal 
argument, namely that Socratic irony is a fundamentally Greek concept.
16 
  In a similar vein, Judge William, author of the papers collected in the second 
part of Either/Or, uses the notion of mysticism as a foil for his argument against the 
aesthetic lifestyle. Interestingly, William seems to think that mystics occupy a halfway 
house between the purely aesthetic lifestyle of his interlocutor and the ethical lifestyle 
that he recommends. The mystic is ethically developed insofar as he or she chooses to 
live a life devoted to God. That is to say that by choosing a life of devotion, the mystic 
adopts a sense of responsibility concomitant with his or her commitment. Nonetheless, 
the mystic’s manner of devotion does not completely satisfy the judge. For the mystic’s 
devotion to God does not develop his or her sense of responsibility. That is to say that 
rather than engendering ethical maturity, the mystic’s way of life leaves him or her 
waiting for the next moment of divine illumination. The Judge writes:  
 
‘It is frightful to read a mystic’s laments over the flat moments. Then when the flat 
moment is over comes the luminous moment, and thus his life is continually alternating; 
it certainly has movement, but not development.’
17  
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The mystic, then, is ‘strung out’ between periodical galvanizing encounters with God. 
And this lifestyle is objectionable, according to the Judge, insofar as it features three 
ethical failings. Firstly the mystic is irresponsibly unconcerned with the material 
circumstances in which he or she lives. Secondly, the mystic does not witness to the 
love of God at every moment of his or her life. And thirdly, mystics opt for a life of 
solitude that they do not have a right to choose. The Judge’s ethical critique of 
mysticism is Kierkegaard’s most developed argument on acute religious experience that 
we have looked at so far. Furthermore the Judge draws a clear conclusion: ‘this road [of 
religious mysticism] is not only a dangerous but a wrong road’
18 
Nonetheless, there is good reason to be cautious with regard to this account. For 
just as in his doctoral dissertation Kierkegaard casts aspersions on his own 
understanding of mysticism, so too the Judge draws attention to his own lack of 
expertise in this area. The Judge notes that, ‘Since I do not have a theological education, 
I do not regard myself as competent to deal with religious mysticism in greater detail.’
19 
So while it is clear that the Judge wishes to indict religious mysticism on ethical 
grounds, it is also clear that he doubts his judgement here. In reply to this we might 
bring an action of our own, indicting the Judge on the grounds that he strongly 
condemns something that he also professes not to understand. But, more importantly, it 
isn’t feasible to overcome the doubts that the Judge expresses on the basis of his few 
remarks. For although his remarks on mysticism are more developed than those we find 
in the Journals and in The Concept of Irony, they still constitute a very slight treatment 
of a complex subject. The Judge may or may not be right to impugn his understanding 
of religious mysticism, then, but he certainly doesn’t impart much understanding to his 
reader. 
   For an extended discussion of religious visions we must turn to Petrus Minor, 
pseudonymous author of the Book on Adler. Minor makes no reference to mysticism, 
but nonetheless is profoundly interested in religious visions, which he refers to as 
‘revelations.’ In particular Petrus Minor concerns himself with the revelatory encounter 
reported by Magister Adolph Peter Adler. Adler, a Danish pastor, claimed that on one 
evening in December 1842 Christ came to him accompanied by a ‘hideous sound’ and 
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told him to take down a dictation.
20 This claim led Adler into conflict with the Lutheran 
Danish state church, and in 1845, he was retired on the grounds of heresy and insanity.
21 
  The Book on Adler contains what are by far both Kierkegaard’s most 
sophisticated and most extended thoughts on religious visions. Furthermore, 
Kierkegaard was well placed to discuss Adler’s case, being not only well versed in the 
latter’s writings but also personally acquainted with him.
22  Before claiming that it is the 
most useful source of Kierkegaard’s thinking on religious visions, however, we must 
first deal with the fact that it was published posthumously. As I noted in the 
introduction to this thesis, the fact that an author chooses to withhold certain works 
from the public may in certain respects cast doubt on the value of those works. For we 
cannot in good conscience attribute to an author ideas that he or she deliberately chose 
to hold back from the public. This is not to say that we should never look at such 
suppressed ideas or that they never have any value. They may have intrinsic value as 
ideas and they may also tell us about the history of a writer’s thinking. But I do not 
intend to discuss the development of Kierkegaard’s thought. And, furthermore, for my 
purposes it will not do simply to claim that the ideas expressed in the Book on Adler 
have intrinsic value. For it is not my intention to allow the Book on Adler to stand alone. 
Rather, my intention is to treat this work in the context of the rest of Kierkegaard’s 
published works. I shall treat Minor as simply another of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, 
even though Kierkegaard himself did not allow this.  
  The problem posed by Kierkegaard’s suppression of the Book on Adler can, I 
think, be satisfactorily resolved by looking more closely at what he withheld and why 
he chose to do so. Kierkegaard did in fact publish a small portion of his original 
manuscript. In 1849 Kierkegaard published the last section of The Book on Adler in the 
work Two Essays, attributed to the pseudonym H.H.
23 It is clear, then, that Kierkegaard 
did not completely withhold The Book on Adler, and was happy to allow a section of it 
to form a part of his public pseudonymous production. Kierkegaard perhaps allowed 
only this section of The Book on Adler to appear because it does not refer to Adler by 
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name. For Kierkegaard’s two principal reservations about publishing The Book on Adler 
hinged on the fact that Adler is identified in that work. Kierkegaard was troubled by the 
effect his book might have on Adler. And, secondly, Kierkegaard was concerned that 
the book would be viewed as a personal spat between himself and Adler, rather than 
read as a serious reflection on Christian revelations. 
24 On the face of it these are two 
perfectly good reasons for withholding the work. However, they are not reasons that 
need bother the modern-day reader of Kierkegaard. Adler has of course passed away, so 
we need not be concerned about hurting his feelings. And, far removed as we are from 
the gossip of nineteenth century Copenhagen, there is nothing to make us presume that 
the work is merely a personal attack on Adler. Finally it is also worth pointing out that 
Kierkegaard had no qualms about the quality of the arguments that he set out in The 
Book on Adler. On the contrary, Kierkegaard said of the book that it ‘has great merit.’
25  
Not only is The Book on Adler Kierkegaard’s most extended treatment of religious 
visions, then, it is also legitimate to treat this posthumously published work in the 
context of other works that he published during his lifetime. 
 
1.1) James’s Remarks on Mysticism 
The difficulties posed by James’s writings on religious visions are quite different to 
those posed by Kierkegaard’s. As we have seen, Kierkegaard uses two terms, 
‘mysticism’ and ‘revelation’ and the difficulty is to see whether to draw on one or both 
of these discussions. James’s work does not present a similar dilemma, simply because 
he mostly sticks to the term ‘mysticism’ and doesn’t introduce what we might call 
competing terms. However, this introduces a new difficulty, namely that James uses the 
term ‘mysticism’ very broadly. For example, in his essay What Psychical Research Has 
Accomplished, James introduces his subject by noting that psychical research examines 
the ‘dust-cloud of exceptional observations’
26 which scientific research has not been 
able to classify. Refining this point, James notes that, ‘No part of the unclassified 
residuum has usually been treated with a more contemptuous scientific disregard than 
the mass of phenomena generally called mystical.’
27 The ‘mass of phenomena’ that 
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James goes on to discuss is very diverse, covering, amongst other things, clairvoyance, 
hypnotism, hallucination and ‘physical mediumship’. It would, I think, be unfair to 
criticize James for using the term ‘mystical’ so broadly. After all he does point out that 
he is using the term in a popular fashion, not as a technical term. And in Varieties James 
himself complains that applying the term ‘mystic’ loosely has ‘has little value.’
28 
Nonetheless, it remains the case that James frequently applies the term ‘mystical’ to a 
wide range of phenomena. And this presents us with the difficulty of knowing how to 
come to terms with James’s account of mysticism. For, in view of the diversity of the 
phenomena under discussion, it isn’t beyond question whether James intends to advance 
a unified philosophical account of mysticism at all. 
  Here it is important to recall that James did think that the various mystical and 
psychical phenomena that interested him should be understood by reference to a single 
explanatory framework.
29 And in the light of this, the difficulty posed by the variety of 
James’s interests in ‘mystical’ phenomena is best addressed by pointing to the core 
collection of theoretical propositions that crop up in his writings about them. There is, I 
think, such an identifiable core of propositions that runs through many of James’s 
numerous treatments of ‘mysticism’ and of the psychical phenomena that he took to fall 
under the same umbrella. And if this is the case, then not only can we say that James 
advances a theory of mysticism, but we can also identify in a preliminary fashion what 
that theory is. However, I certainly do not claim that James unswervingly advanced the 
same ideas on mysticism throughout his career. Rather, my view is that in these writings 
James, as it were, reworks the same territory. In order to bring that territory into view I 
shall set out a short survey of James’s writings. 
  The idea that James continually returns to in his writings about mystical 
experiences is that they are the result of a widening of our consciousness. James 
expresses this notion in various ways, but it is, nonetheless, a consistently identifiable 
element of his thinking on mysticism. For example, in his early account of What 
Psychical Research has Accomplished, James claims that the most important work of 
the Society for Psychical Research has been that done by ‘Mr. Myers on what he now 
calls the ‘subliminal self,’ or what one might designate as ultra-marginal 
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consciousness.’
30 
31 According to Myer’s theory ‘mystical’ experiences take place when 
our ‘ultra-marginal consciousness’ ceases to be marginal and comes to the centre of our 
attention. And James felt able to embrace this account of mystical experience in his own 
work on hallucinations. ‘The result [of my research] is to make me feel that we all have 
potentially a “subliminal” self, which may make at any time irruption into our ordinary 
lives.’
32 
  James returns to the notion of ‘ultra-marginal consciousness’ in his Ingersoll 
lecture on Human Immortality of 1898. Here James contrasts what he calls the 
‘production theory’ of the brain with ‘permissive’ and ‘transmissive’ theories of the 
brain. The production theory holds that the brain produces thoughts. Against this, James 
argues that the brain is ‘permissive’ and ‘transmissive’ in the sense that it acts as a filter 
through which our consciousness is strained. In other words our brains do not produce 
consciousness, but our brains do determine how it is that we participate in 
consciousness. James argues that this ‘permissive’ and ‘transmissive’ conception of the 
brain affords us an explanation of assorted ‘psychical’ phenomena, including ‘religious 
conversions’.
33 Such phenomena occur when the brain permits ‘more’ consciousness 
through than is usually the case. James notes that, ‘According to the state in which the 
brain finds itself, the barrier of its obstructiveness [to consciousness] may also be 
supposed to rise or fall.’
34 When the barrier is low, ‘a comparative flood of spiritual 
energy pours over.’
35 And it is this flood of usually excluded or marginal consciousness 
that lies at the root of psychical phenomena. 
  The notion that mystical experiences have their root in the acute widening of our 
consciousness is also present in James’s 1902 tour de force Varieties. Varieties contains 
James’s lengthiest treatment of religious visions. There he not only devotes two 
complete chapters to the subject but also discusses it in many other places, most notably 
in Chapter III, The Reality of the Unseen. In this chapter, and as we shall see in greater 
detail below, James posits a kind of ‘sixth sense’ by means of which we can gain 
cognition of an ‘unseen’ reality that is normally beyond the compass of our senses. 
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Furthermore, during his first chapter on mysticism James recounts an experience of his 
own, which he interprets as a widening of his consciousness.  
 
‘One conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time, and my impression of its truth 
has ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal waking consciousness, rational 
consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, 
parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness 
entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply 
the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite 
types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and 
adaptation.’
36 
 
In the conclusion to Varieties, James again returns to the notion that mystical 
experiences are the result of widened consciousness. There James claims that religious 
experiences – including mystical experiences – are best explained by reference to 
regions of ‘ultra-marginal consciousness’. And he further speculates that, ‘the conscious 
person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come’.
37 
  Further evidence that James did not abandon the view that mystical experiences 
are experiences of ‘ultra-marginal consciousness’ can be seen in the fact that he 
advances this thesis in writings that post date Varieties. In The Last Report of 1909, for 
example, James expresses in more figurative terms the notion set out in his Ingersoll 
lecture that our brains normally filter out a portion of our consciousness.  
 
‘The maple and pine may whisper to each other with their leaves, and Connecticut and 
Newport hear each other’s foghorns. But the trees also commingle their roots in the 
darkness underground, and the islands also hang together through the ocean’s bottom. 
Just so there is a continuum of cosmic consciousness, against which our individuality 
builds but accidental fences, and into which our several minds plunge as into a mother-
sea or reservoir. Our “normal” consciousness is circumscribed for adaptation to our 
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external earthly environment, but the fence is weak in spots, and fitful influences from 
beyond leak in, showing the otherwise unverifiable common connection.’
38  
 
  In A Pluralistic Universe, also published in 1909, James again advances the 
notion that we typically experience only a restricted region of consciousness, and that 
religious experiences occur when our consciousness is expanded.  
 
‘I think it may be asserted that there are religious experiences of a specific nature, not 
deducible by analogy or psychological reasoning from our other sorts of experience. I 
think they point with reasonable probability to the continuity of our consciousness with 
a wider spiritual environment from which the ordinary prudential man (who is the only 
man that scientific psychology, so called, takes cognisance of) is shut off.’
39 
 
  And, finally, in his 1910 essay A Suggestion about Mysticism, James again 
reiterates the view that mystical experiences are born out of the expansion of our 
consciousness. ‘The suggestion, stated very briefly, is that states of mystical intuition 
may be only very sudden and great extensions of the ordinary ‘field of 
consciousness.’’
40  
In the foregoing I have not attempted to give a detailed or critical account of 
James’s views. I shall turn to this below. However, it is abundantly clear from the brief 
survey that I have set out that James’s thoughts on mystical experiences never stray far 
form the notion that they are the result of an expansion of consciousness. Furthermore 
James’s statement of this position in Varieties is particularly forceful. For in Varieties 
James also describes in some detail what mystical experiences are like. And, crucially 
for my purposes, James also discusses the authority of mystical experiences vis-à-vis 
that of philosophical arguments. 
On the whole, then, my comparisons will be between Kierkegaard’s reflections 
on Christian revelations in the Book on Adler and James’s reflections on mysticism in 
Varieties.  
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2) Mysticism and Revelation in the lives of Kierkegaard and James 
Before turning to their arguments ‘head on’, we can gain a useful preliminary sense of 
the dissimilarities between Kierkegaard and James by referring briefly to some relevant 
autobiographical remarks. I shall recount what Kierkegaard and James have to say about 
their mystical experiences – and lack of mystical experiences – before indicating how 
these remarks point us towards some of the important philosophical differences between 
the two men. 
In Varieties James makes the following claim regarding his own familiarity with 
mystical experiences. ‘My own constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment almost 
entirely, and I can speak of them only at second hand.’
41 This is an odd remark, for 
James seems to assume that mystical experiences must be ‘enjoyable’ in some way.
42 
But it is also a revealing remark, in that James does not say that his constitution leaves 
him completely excluded from mystical experiences. No doubt part of the reason that 
James said this was because, as we have already noted, he defines mystical experiences 
very broadly. He includes déjà vu, drunkenness and drug-induced reverie in his roster of 
legitimate mystical occurrences. Even if James had not experienced déjà vu, or had 
never been three sheets to the wind, he perhaps had no reason to think that he was 
constitutionally barred from either of these experiences. But even if he had been, he 
certainly was not constitutionally barred from the experience of drug-induced reverie. 
For, as is well known, under the influence of Benjamin Paul Blood’s The Anaesthetic 
Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy James certainly did experiment with drugs
 .
43 
James used nitrous oxide (laughing gas), and was clearly impressed by the results of his 
experiment. In Varieties he notes that, ‘Depth beyond depth of truth seems revealed to 
the inhaler.’
44 Perhaps fearing that his reader would think his judgement on this matter 
to have been seriously impaired by the drug in question, James insists that a (seemingly 
small) community of fellow inhalers shares his view. ‘I know more than one person 
who is persuaded that in the nitrous oxide trance we have a genuine metaphysical 
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revelation.’
45 Perhaps looking to swell the numbers of like-minded people, James even 
evangelises on behalf of the ‘anaesthetic revelation’: ‘I strongly urge others to repeat the 
experiment, which with pure gas is short and harmless enough.’
46 Despite his 
protestation that he could only speak of mystical experiences at second hand, then, there 
certainly was at least one mystical experience about which James could discourse at 
first hand. It is true that James did not think that a nitrous oxide ‘high’ was the apogee 
of mystical experience. Nonetheless James did think that laughing gas could ‘stimulate 
the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree’
47, and encouraged his readers to 
follow his example, so that they too might be able to discuss at first hand the 
‘tremendously exciting sense of an intense metaphysical illumination’
48 attendant upon 
its inhalation. 
  James’s somewhat curious stance of downplaying his credentials as a mystic 
whilst reporting his mystical experience is one that he repeated in 1910, some eight 
years after the publication of Varieties. In A Suggestion About Mysticism James repeats 
the claim that he has no special personal insight into mystical experience. ‘I also am an 
outsider, and very likely what I say will prove the fact loudly enough to readers who 
possibly may stand within the pale.’
49 But, just as was the case in Varieties, James goes 
on to recount several ‘mystical’ experiences of his own. Unlike the laughing gas 
episode recounted in Varieties, however, these experiences are not experimental. That is 
to say that these experiences were not deliberately induced, but rather came upon James 
in the course of his daily affairs. James claims to have had four such mystical 
experiences between 1905 and 1910. He divides these four experiences into two kinds. 
The first kind, which he experienced on three occasions, has to do with a short-lived and 
rapid expansion of perception. James describes these experiences in the following way: 
 
‘What happened each time was that I seemed all at once to be reminded of a past 
experience; and this reminiscence, ere I could conceive or name it distinctly, developed 
into something further that belonged with it, this in turn into something further still, and 
so on, until the process faded out, leaving me amazed at the sudden vision of increasing 
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ranges of distant fact of which I could give no articulate account. The mode of 
consciousness was perceptual, not conceptual – the field expanding so fast there seemed 
no time for conception or identification to get in its work.’
50 
 
The second kind of experience that James relates in A Suggestion About Mysticism is 
rather different and has to do with a series of dreams that he had on two successive 
nights. On the first night James awoke from a ‘quiet dream of some sorts’ and, ‘whilst 
gathering my waking wits, seemed suddenly to get mixed up with reminiscences of a 
dream of an entirely different sort, which seemed to telescope, as it were, into the first 
one, a dream very elaborate, of lions, and tragic.’
51 On the following night James again 
awoke from a dream, and, thinking back on it he ‘became suddenly confused by the 
contents of two other dreams that shuffled themselves abruptly in between the parts of 
the first dream, and of which I couldn’t grasp the origin.’ The experience rendered 
James perplexed and scared, as he wondered whether he was somehow ‘getting into 
other people’s dreams’
52 He only shook off his fear and confusion when he was able to 
relate the dreams that he was experiencing more securely to himself. This he did by 
supposing not that the dreams ‘belonged’ to other people, but that they had been dreamt 
by him on previous occasions. ‘Dream states carry dream memories – why may not the 
two succedaneous dreams (whichever two of the three were succedaneous) be memories 
of twelve o’clock dreams of previous nights, swept in, along with the just-fading dream, 
into the just-waking system of memory.’
53  This notion, though hard to grasp, 
apparently gave James ‘great relief’.
54 
  Although the experiences that James describes are clearly peculiar we may 
wonder whether they are examples of mystical experiences. Freewheeling trains of 
intense sensory perception and confused recollections of dreams certainly don’t have to 
be taken as examples of mystical experience. Furthermore James’s assertion that he is 
an ‘outsider’ to mysticism seemingly lends support to the view that we should not 
understand his experiences in this way. However, the issue is not clear cut, for James 
does also seem to allow that his experiences were – to some extent at least – mystical in 
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nature. There are three reasons for thinking that James does think that the experiences 
he recounts are examples of mystical experience.  Firstly, James claims that the 
hypothesis that propounds in A Suggestion About Mysticism ‘was originally suggested 
to me by certain experiences of my own’.
55 This claim would not make sense unless 
James held that there was something about his experiences that enlightened him about 
mystical states. Secondly, and perhaps with this first point in mind, James explicitly 
claims some common ground between his temporarily heightened sense perception and 
‘classical’ mystical experiences. Summarising his experiences of heightened sense 
perception James notes that, ‘This conviction of fact-revealed, together with the 
perceptual form of the experience and the inability to make articulate report, are all 
characters of mystical states.’
56 James does also draw attention to the dissimilarity 
between his experiences and those of ‘classical mysticism.’ In this regard he notes that, 
‘The point of difference is that in my case certain special directions only, in the field of 
reality, seemed to get suddenly uncovered, whereas in classical mystical experiences it 
appears rather as if the whole of reality were uncovered at once.’
57 Nonetheless we need 
not conclude that because James detected some difference between his experiences and 
fully (or classically) mystical experiences he did not think we could say that his 
experiences were at all mystical. This brings us to the third point, which is that James 
makes it clear that he thinks that it is possible for certain aspects of an experience to be 
mystical whilst others are not. This is a point that he makes with great force in relation 
to his confusing and frightening dream experience.  
 
 ‘The distressing confusion of mind in this experience was the exact opposite of 
mystical illumination, and equally unmystical was the definiteness of what was 
perceived. But the exaltation of the sense of relation was mystical (the perplexity all 
revolved about the fact that the three dreams both did and did not belong in the most 
intimate way together); and the sense that reality was being uncovered was mystical in 
the highest degree.’
58 
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For James, then, there need not be any cut and dried distinction between 
mystical and non-mystical experiences. And this perhaps goes some way to explaining 
his otherwise seemingly disingenuous position in both Varieties and A Suggestion About 
Mysticism. James’s claim to be an outsider to mysticism can be squared with his 
accounts of personal mystical experience by reference to his view that experiences can 
be mystical by degree. James may be an outsider to fully-fledged religious mysticism, 
but he nonetheless holds that aspects of some his experiences were mystical. And he 
appeals to those aspects to inform his philosophical account of mysticism. 
  James’s autobiographical comments on mystical experience stand in marked 
contrast to those made by Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard denied having had a revelation 
from God. Furthermore he sought to dissuade people from explaining his work by 
reference to insights gained through mystical experience:‘[I] only ask the reader not to 
think of revelations and the like, since with me everything is dialectical.’
59 Nonetheless, 
Kierkegaard claimed that he had ‘needed God’s assistance day after day, year after 
year’
60 in order to execute his work as an author. Furthermore, Kierkegaard claimed to 
have received that assistance in the form of divine ‘governance’ that directed his writing 
and his life more generally. Kierkegaard draws attention to the fact that his 
understanding of governance is rooted in his Christian education. And by his Christian 
education he understands not only what was imparted to him in his early years – that 
‘powerful religious impression of childhood’
61 – but also the business of living a 
thoughtful and committed Christian life, or, as he puts it, ‘living in decisive religious 
categories’.
62 
We can say, then, that Kierkegaard and James had markedly different 
experiences of the divine. James experienced a short-lived ‘metaphysical revelation’ 
induced by laughing gas, and he also had at least four ‘mystical’ experiences that he did 
not bring upon himself. Kierkegaard, by contrast, had no revelation, but did feel the 
press of Christian governance. I do not claim that this is an exhaustive treatment of the 
religious experiences of the two philosophers. And nor do I claim that this difference 
between the biographies of Kierkegaard and James explains the differences between 
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their accounts of mystical experiences. Rather, I want to draw attention to the different 
ways in which Kierkegaard and James account for their religious experiences and 
suggest how these differences point to areas of philosophical disagreement. 
As we have seen, James took an experimental approach to the study of mystical 
experience. By inhaling laughing gas, and encouraging others to do so, he hoped to 
confirm or falsify the hypothesis that the world is fundamentally divine. And he 
understood his uninvited mystical experiences as tentative evidence for the truth of a 
speculative theory of the ‘field of consciousness.’ Kierkegaard, on the other hand, did 
not experiment with religious experience. Rather, his understanding of revelations is 
rooted in his understanding of, and fluency with, specifically Christian concepts. 
With this difference between Kierkegaard and James in view we can begin to 
appreciate what a Kierkegaardian critique of James’s position might look like. James’s 
experiments with laughing gas call to mind Petrus Minor’s rather angry remark that, 
‘Nowadays one takes for a revelation any sort of strong impression, and the same 
evening puts it in the newspaper.’
63 Here Petrus Minor is attacking the view that if one 
has any kind of ‘strong impression’ it is reasonable to call it a religious revelation and to 
post an account of it so that it might be studied and assessed. Arguably this is precisely 
the procedure that James carries out with regard to his laughing gas experiment. The 
‘strong impression’ made by the gas is called a metaphysical insight and the whole 
affair is written up in a scholarly essay for peer evaluation.
64 But Kierkegaard would no 
doubt find this procedure as objectionable as Petrus Minor does. And this is for two 
reasons. Firstly, James’s experiment is not rooted in a religious tradition, and is not 
conveyed using specifically religious concepts. As a result it is misleading to attribute a 
specifically religious significance to the ‘strong impression’ made by the gas. Secondly, 
James’s experiment is designed to demonstrate or refute a religious hypothesis. But, for 
Kierkegaard, as we have seen in the previous two chapters, a religious belief is not a 
belief in a hypothesis. A religious belief is unconditional, and therefore is not related to 
evidence whether pro or contra. Moreover, James’s accounts of the unprovoked 
mystical experiences that befell him, would, no doubt, also fail to impress Kierkegaard. 
For the significance that James attaches to these experiences has to do with whether 
they demonstrate the truth of his claim that we sometimes experience a wider field of 
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consciousness. And, again, this means that the significance of such mystical events is 
specifiable without reference to any specifically religious concepts. From Kierkegaard’s 
point of view, then, James’s reflections on mystical experiences are contributions to a 
psychological hypothesis, not elucidations of profound religious phenomena. In the 
following three sections I shall draw out in detail the critical implications of this 
difference between the two men, starting with a consideration of James’s notion that 
mystical experiences are communications from an ‘unseen order.’ 
 
3) James on Mysticism and the ‘Unseen Order’ 
James describes the fundamental features of religious life in the following way: ‘Were 
one asked to characterize the life of religion in the broadest and most general terms 
possible, one might say that it consists of the belief in an unseen order, and that our 
supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.’
65 One obvious 
objection to this formulation is that if the order is unseen we wouldn’t have any reason 
to believe in it, and wouldn’t know how to bring ourselves into accord with it. But there 
is every indication that James would not think his position defeated by this remark. 
James argues that we can gain a relevant sense of the ‘unseen order’ by means of 
mystical experiences. It is for this reason that ‘religious experience has its root and 
centre in mystical states of consciousness.’ For mystical experiences disclose the 
‘unseen order’ from which religious life derives its sense. In order to get to grips with 
James’s understanding of mystical experiences, then, we need to examine how it is that 
such experiences disclose the unseen order. 
  By an unseen order James means an order that is not usually and not readily 
apprehended by means of sense perception. To believe in this order, then, is to believe 
in something of which one cannot readily apprehend by our senses. James argues that 
we do, as a matter of fact, believe in all kinds of ideas that we cannot apprehend in this 
way. James has in mind various kinds of ideas, and in particular ‘[a]ll sorts of higher 
abstractions’.
66  Such ideas, although they cannot be sensed can, nonetheless, galvanise 
the lives of those who believe them. James writes: 
 
                                                 
65 Varieties, op. cit., 53. 
66 Varieties, ibid., 56.   110 
‘The sentiment of reality can indeed attach itself so strongly to our object of belief that 
our whole life is polarized through and through, so to speak, by its sense of the 
existence of the thing believed in, and yet that thing, for the purpose of definite 
description can hardly be said to be present to our mind at all.’
67 
 
From a survey of some of the kinds of insensible ideas that can polarize the lives of 
those who believe them, James draws the inference that we may have an ability, or a 
capacity, perhaps, to discern what is missed by our senses. James makes his point in the 
following way: 
 
 ‘But the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion something like this: It is as 
if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective 
presence, a perception of what we may call ‘something there,’ more deep and more 
general than any of the special and particular ‘senses’ by which the current psychology 
supposes existent reality to be originally revealed.’
68 
 
  James is speculating, then, that we have a kind of ‘sixth sense’ for which the 
psychology of the day fails to account. However, we need not wait for psychology to 
catch up in order to start testing the veracity of James’s speculation. We can notice that 
people sometimes have experiences that seem to indicate the existence of a ‘sixth 
sense.’ Chief among these experiences is hallucination. When a person hallucinates he 
or she gains an impression of something, but not by means of ordinary sense perception: 
“the person affected will feel a ‘presence’ in the room, definitely localized, facing in 
one particular way, real in the most emphatic sense of the word, often coming suddenly, 
and as suddenly gone; and yet neither seen, heard, touched, nor cognized in any of the 
usual ‘sensible’ ways.”
69 Accounts of hallucinations such as this provide empirical 
evidence for the existence of the ‘sixth sense.’ 
  In his chapters on mysticism James continues with his task of gathering 
evidence for the existence of a ‘sixth sense’. To this end he examines a range of 
phenomena, starting with rather common experiences and culminating in ‘classical’ 
mystical experiences. At the bottom of this ‘mystical ladder’ is the experience of a 
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‘deepened sense of the significance of a maxim or a formula which occasionally sweeps 
over one.’
70 Déjà vu is a ‘more pronounced step forward on the mystical ladder […].’
71 
And one advances still further with experiences of ‘yet other dreamy states.’
72 
Drunkenness and other forms of intoxication approximate mystical states still more 
closely. The summit of the ladder is reached with ‘religious mysticism pure and simple’, 
a phenomenon that James claims is ‘not uncommon.’
73 
  Having arrived at mystical experiences James considers whether and in what 
sense they can be considered to be true. And he proposes two kinds of answers to these 
questions. Firstly, he proposes a pragmatic answer. That is to say that in order to know 
whether and in what sense mystical experiences are true we must enquire into their 
practical value, or what James calls their ‘fruits for life’. And in this regard James notes 
that ‘Their fruits appear to have been various’. Moreover their fruits have not always 
been useful. ‘Stupefaction, for one thing, seems not to have been altogether absent as a 
result.’
74 Nonetheless it is also the case that mystical experiences can have more 
positive outcomes, including ‘the formation of a new centre of spiritual energy’
75 and 
rendering ‘the soul more energetic in the lines which their inspiration favors.’
76 
  However, James also admits that reinvigorating effects of mystical experiences 
are only genuinely advantageous if they do not rest on a delusion of some kind.  
 
‘But this [the positive ‘fruits for life’ attendant upon mystical experiences] could be 
reckoned an advantage only in case the inspiration were a true one. If the inspiration 
were erroneous, the energy would be all the more mistaken and misbegotten. So we 
stand once more before that problem of truth which confronted us at the end of the 
lectures on saintliness.’
77 
 
James’s answer to this difficulty is not pragmatic but speculative. That is to say that he 
situates mystical experiences in relation to theoretical account of truth. And he does this 
in two distinct ways. One is to show that mystical experiences are in fact in accord with 
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certain philosophical positions. That is to say that mystical experiences can be 
accommodated by certain philosophical accounts of what the world is like. James makes 
this point in the following way. 
 
‘In spite of their repudiation of articulate self-description, mystical states in general 
assert a pretty distinct theoretical drift. It is possible to give the outcome of the majority 
of them in terms that point in definite philosophical directions. One of these directions 
is optimism, and the other is monism.’
78 
 
James’s second way of relating mystical experiences to a theoretical account of truth is 
to propose a speculative explanation of the cause and meaning of mystical experiences.  
 
“Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its farther side, the 
‘more’ with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its hither 
side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized 
psychological fact as our basis, we seem to preserve a contact with ‘science’ which the 
ordinary theologian lacks. At the same time the theologian’s contention that the 
religious man is moved by an external power is vindicated, for it is one of the 
peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region to take on objective 
appearances, and to suggest to the Subject an external control.”
79 
 
James explains away as inessential differences between reports of mystical experiences. 
Those differences relate only to the manner in which mystical experiences are 
conceptualised, and to the creeds to which they give rise. These features, which James 
refers to as over-beliefs, are subsequent to immediate mystical experience itself. When 
we look beyond over-beliefs to the immediate mystical experiences upon which they 
depend we find not a diverse collection of events but a single kind of event. Moreover, 
taken in this way, mystical experiences attest to the truth of James’s theory of ‘the 
subconscious continuation of our conscious life.’
80 James writes: 
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‘Disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining ourselves to what is common and generic, 
we have the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through 
which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it 
seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far as it goes.’
81 
 
  Elaborating on this theory, James speculates that, ‘The further limits of our 
being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the 
sensible and merely ‘understandable’ world.
82 And this ‘other dimension of existence’ 
can be thought of in religious terms. ‘Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural 
region, whichever you choose.’
83 Furthermore, although this ‘mystical’ or 
‘supernatural’ region at the margins of our consciousness is unexplained this does not 
imply that we cannot assert that it is real. James reasons that transactions between our 
daily consciousness and our ‘mystical’ marginal consciousness serve to shape our 
personality. And since it makes sense to say that there have been ‘real’ changes in the 
personality of a person it also makes sense to say that the causes of those changes are 
‘real’. Although we cannot ‘know’ the mystical region of our consciousness, then, we 
can know that it is real by virtue of the effects that it has upon us. As James explains, 
‘But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so 
I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical world 
unreal.’
84 
 
3.1) Kierkegaard and the Unseen Order 
We have seen that James argues that mystical experiences originate from an ‘unseen 
order’. Compared with this rather complex speculation Kierkegaard’s assertion that 
revelations come from God perhaps seems disarmingly simple. Nonetheless 
Kierkegaard often argues that God cannot be apprehended directly, that he is 
paradoxical in such a way that he ‘thrusts away’ disinterested reasoning and 
speculation. Accordingly, there is an important sense in which Kierkegaard thinks that 
God is hidden or mysterious. And for this reason we might wonder whether 
Kierkegaard and James are actually somewhat in agreement. For the notion that 
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mystical experiences have their origins in an ‘unseen order’ doesn’t seem all that far 
removed from the notion that mystical experiences have their origin in an ‘unseen’ or 
mysterious God. 
  However, this apparent similarity is, I suggest, specious. And clarifying the 
differences between Kierkegaard and James here will also bring further into view what 
a Kierkegaardian critique of James looks like. For Kierkegaard, God is hidden in a quite 
different sense to which James’s ‘unseen order’ or ‘mother-sea’ of consciousness is 
hidden. James thinks that the ‘unseen order’ is sometimes revealed to us, either by our 
‘sixth sense’ or through religious visions. But for Kierkegaard God is essentially 
hidden. That is to say that it is not an empirical fact that God is – for the most part – 
hidden from our lives. Rather, it belongs to the concept of God that there is an important 
sense in which he is always hidden. Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus 
makes this point with some force. In the Postscript Climacus simply ridicules the idea 
that we sometimes gain, as it were, a better look at God, as if it is sometimes possible to 
pierce the veil of his mystery and thereby gain a glimpse of God unveiled and as he 
really is. 
 
‘But with regard to the absolute paradox [God], this glimpsing and squinting with the 
eyes, this listening silence of the congregation of revivalists that is broken only as one 
after the other stands up and in a tense posture tries to catch a glimpse of what His 
Reverence glimpses, while the women remove their hats in order to catch every 
prophetic word – all this excitement about what His Reverence glimpses is very 
ludicrous. And most ludicrous of all is the notion that this glimpsing is supposed to be 
something higher than the passion of faith.’
85 
 
For Climacus, the notion that one can catch a glimpse of God is ‘neither more nor less 
than pious flirting.’
86 Furthermore, claims to have penetrated God’s mystery are 
unattractively egotistical. ‘But the more a person stresses the incomprehensible, if he 
ends up with glimpsing, the more corruptive is his flirtation, because it all becomes a 
compliment to himself.’
87 
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  If God is ‘unseen’, then, Kierkegaard certainly doesn’t think that it is sometimes 
possible to catch a glimpse of him as James does. However, while this observation 
drives a wedge between the views of Kierkegaard and James it also makes 
Kierkegaard’s views all the more puzzling. For Kierkegaard does hold that religious 
visions come from God, and, on the face of it, this would seem to be one important way 
in which God does reveal himself to us. Surely, when God chooses to impart a religious 
vision to some person, he does set aside his veil of mystery and allows that person to 
catch a glimpse of him. In order to appreciate why it is that this criticism fails we need 
to look in more detail at what Kierkegaard means when he claims that God cannot be 
‘glimpsed.’ And in particular we need to appreciate that God is not mysterious to us 
because we lack important knowledge about him. Revelations from God, then, are not 
additional pieces of information that allow us to fill in the gaps in our knowledge - as 
would be the case, for example, if somebody gave us the key to a code. 
  Climacus routinely points out that Christ is paradoxical, and that, as a result, it is 
not possible to develop disinterested objective theories about him. This does not imply, 
however, that we are deprived of an important source of knowledge about God. As I 
argued in the opening chapter, the fact that we cannot have objective knowledge of God 
in no way implies that we have to compensate for this by guessing or gambling on what 
God is like and whether he exists. Rather, it implies that objective knowledge is not 
relevant to our understanding of God. What is relevant to our understanding of God are 
the ways in which we live and understand our lives in relation to him.  To affirm a 
belief in God or to deny the existence of God, are both personal, interested – Climacus 
would say ‘subjective – courses of action which resonate throughout the whole conduct 
of one’s life. 
  It is with Climacus’ remarks on the redundancy of objective knowledge in 
relation to God that we can gain a better understanding of the sense in which he thinks 
that God is mysterious or hidden. When Climacus says that it is not possible to 
‘glimpse’ God he seems to have in mind at least two things. Firstly, when Climacus 
says that God cannot be ‘glimpsed’ he seems to mean that it is not possible to have 
objective knowledge of God. But, as his reference to emotional revivalists makes clear, 
Climacus isn’t only concerned to ward of the unhelpful attention of scholars. He is also 
concerned to point out that – contrary to what the revivalists seem to think – it makes no 
sense to try to get ‘beyond’ one’s faith in God. In other words, for Climacus, faith in   116 
God is not a necessary evil brought about by the uncomfortable fact that one cannot 
objectively know God. To know God is to have faith in him. 
  But here we are returned to the question of what is shown by a revelation. Surely 
a revelation does tell us something about God that we didn’t know before? It is true that 
revelations can for example reveal to us the will of God. Both Moses and Mary had 
visions in which God explained his will. But, importantly, these are only explanations 
of God’s will in the context of faith. Somebody who is not a Christian simply isn’t 
going to accept that the Ten Commandments, for example, are an expression of the will 
of God. Indeed, part of what is meant by the claim that one doesn’t believe in God is 
that one doesn’t recognize the authority of visions such as the one that Moses had. 
Conversely, one of the things that is meant by the claim that one is a Christian is that 
one does recognise the authority of such visions. And what these observations make 
clear is that revelations from God do not grant us some special objective knowledge of 
God; and nor do they provide us with a means by which we can get ‘beyond’ faith. 
Revelations are taken as revelations within the context of faith. 
  Somebody may point out that revelations do in fact occur to people who do not 
have faith; and indeed, one reason why people convert to faith is because they have had 
a religious vision of some kind. But far from constituting an objection, this observation 
actually illustrates the point at stake. For people who are converted in this way, having a 
religious vision is the occasion upon which they reorient their lives. That is to say that 
they do not have a new piece of information, or a new theory, but a new way of life. 
And, accordingly, they do not gain a ‘glimpse’ of God that supersedes faith and thereby 
makes it redundant. Rather, what the new convert acquires is faith. 
  From Climacus’ point of view, then, James’s mistake is to think that revelations 
give us knowledge about some hitherto unknown region of our consciousness. 
Revelations only give us knowledge of God in the context of faith.  
 
4) Mysticism, Revelation and Evidence 
We have seen that James offers a speculative account of the explanation and meaning of 
mystical experiences. And it is in the context of this speculative account that mystical 
experiences count as evidence for the truth of that theory. But if, as James claims, 
mystical experiences are evidence for the truth of his theory, they are certainly an 
unusual kind of evidence. For mystical experiences tend to be profoundly personal, and   117 
cannot be repeated in a controlled setting. The burden of James’s case, then, is to show 
that it is legitimate to think of mystical experiences as evidence at all. And in order to 
do this James makes two kinds of arguments. The first is that mystical experiences are, 
in some important sense, analogous to sense experiences. We commonly do accept that 
sense experiences can be evidence relevant to determining the truth of our theories. By 
extension, then, we should accept that in principle mystical experiences might also 
serve as evidence for the truth of theories in the same way. James argues this in the 
following way:  
 
‘Our own more ‘rational’ beliefs are based on evidence exactly similar in nature to that 
which mystics quote for theirs. Our senses, namely, have assured us of certain states of 
fact; but mystical experiences are as direct perceptions of fact for those who have them 
as any sensations ever were for us.’
88  
 
  James’s second strategy for defending the claim that mystical experiences 
constitute evidence for the truth of a theory is to motivate the notion that, as a matter of 
fact, our criteria for what counts as good evidence are much more complex than is 
commonly recognised. Once we recognise this fact it is much more difficult to dismiss 
mystical experiences as evidence because they fail to meet a narrow set of ‘rational’ 
criteria, such as the need to be impersonal and the need to be repeatable. James sketches 
his views as follows: 
 
‘The opinion opposed to mysticism in philosophy is sometimes spoken of as 
rationalism. Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for 
themselves articulate grounds. […] Vague impressions of something indefinable have 
no place in the rationalistic system, which on its positive side is surely a splendid 
intellectual tendency, for not only are all our philosophies fruits of it, but physical 
science (amongst other good things) is its result. 
  Nevertheless, if we look on man’s whole mental life as it exists, on the life of 
men that lies in them apart from their learning and science, and that they inwardly and 
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privately follow, we have to confess that the part of it of which rationalism can give an 
account is relatively superficial.’
89 
 
The reason that the rationalist account of reasoning is superficial, then, is simply 
that it fails to account fully for what actually goes on in our thinking. We arrive at our 
beliefs in the light of our complex conscious and sub-conscious biographies. And, 
furthermore, the rationalist’s criteria for what counts as a sound belief are actually 
trumped by these biographical influences. ‘Your whole subconscious life, your 
impulses, your faiths, your needs, your divinations, have prepared the premises, of 
which your consciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you 
absolutely knows that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk, 
however clever, that may contradict it.’
90  
In view of these considerations James concludes that we may in principle treat 
mystical experiences as evidence for the truth of his theory that our consciousness is 
sometimes broadened. And, furthermore, he asserts that there is sufficient evidence of 
this kind to make his theory plausible. ‘In spite of rationalism’s disdain for the 
particular, the personal, and the unwholesome, the drift of all the evidence we have 
seems to me to sweep us very strongly towards the belief in some form of superhuman 
life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious.’
91 
 
4.1) Kierkegaard on Revelation and Evidence 
Unlike James, Kierkegaard doesn’t think that revelations are evidence that God exists. 
This follows from Kierkegaard’s arguments against proofs for the existence of God, 
which I rehearsed in the previous chapter. Kierkegaard argues there cannot be any kind 
of evidence that demonstrates the existence of God. I shall not rehearse those arguments 
again here. However, the pseudonym Anti Climacus summarises the upshot of 
Kierkegaard’s case in the following way:  
 
‘That is, he [Christ] himself makes it clear that in relation to him there can be no 
question of any demonstrations, that there is no direct transition to becoming Christian, 
                                                 
89 Varieties, ibid., 73. 
90 Varieties, ibid., 73. 
91 A Pluralistic Universe, op. cit., 309.   119 
that demonstrations can at best serve to make a person aware, so that he can now come 
up to the point: whether he will believe or he will be offended.
92 (96) 
 
5) Mysticism, Revelation and Authority 
At the conclusion of his two chapters on mysticism James sets out an account of the 
kind of authority that he believes we should attach to mystical experiences. His account 
has three principal points, the first of which is that it is legitimate for mystical 
experiences to be authoritative for those who have them. James cites two reasons for 
this conclusion. He notes that such mystical experiences ‘are usually authoritative over 
those who have them’, adding that it ‘is vain for rationalism to grumble about this.’
93  
However, James also contends that people who have had mystical experiences are 
entitled to take them to be authoritative simply because we commonly do take 
experience in general to be authoritative. ‘Our senses, namely, have assured us of 
certain states of fact; but mystical experiences are as direct perceptions of fact for those 
who have them as any sensations ever were for us.’
94 Furthermore, not only are mystical 
experiences on a par with our ordinary sense experiences, but as a source of knowledge 
they are more profitable than formal arguments.  
  But, of course, not everybody has mystical experiences. And accordingly James 
considers whether mystical experiences should be authoritative for people who do not 
have them. And this brings us to James’s second principal point. He argues that 
mystical experiences can have no authority over people who have not had them. 
‘[M]ystics have no right to claim that we ought to accept the deliverance of their 
peculiar experiences, if we are ourselves outsiders and feel no private call thereto.’
95 
There are two reasons why James thinks that reports of mystical experiences are not 
authoritative. Firstly, citing such reports would only amount to an appeal to numbers 
that has ‘no logical force.’
96 And secondly, James argues that mystical experiences 
cannot have universal authority because they do not have any intellectual content. ‘The 
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fact is that the mystical feeling of enlargement, union, and emancipation has no specific 
intellectual content of its own.’
97 
  James’s final point in relation to the authority of mystical experiences point is 
that they are authoritative in the sense that they may just as well serve to inform our 
beliefs as formal arguments and more standard kinds of empirical evidence. ‘Yet, I 
repeat once more, the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the pretension 
of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what we may believe.’
98 
 
5.1) Kierkegaard on the Authority of Revelation 
Previously I argued that Kierkegaard’s claim that God is ‘hidden’, ‘mysterious’ or 
‘unseen’ is a conceptual point not an empirical claim. And I inferred from this that 
although revelations come from God they are not evidence that God exists. For Petrus 
Minor these two points have an important bearing on the kind of authority that attaches 
to revelations. If revelations are not evidence for the existence of God it follows that the 
kind of authority that they have cannot be the kind of authority that attaches to evidence. 
Evidence presented in a court of law, for example, underwrites the truth of certain 
propositions. A video may demonstrate to us the truth of the claim that it was young 
Freddy who pilfered a hamster from a pet shop. But if revelations are not evidence then 
they cannot underwrite the truth of propositions in the same way that evidence 
presented to a court of law can. That is to say that revelations are not authoritative in the 
sense that they demonstrate the truth of the proposition that God exists. But, as Minor 
makes clear, this is not to say that revelations have no authority. Consequently one of 
his key tasks in The Book on Adler is to differentiate the kind of authority that properly 
belongs to revelations from the kind of authority that properly belongs to various kinds 
of evidence. And this means gaining a clear view of the conceptual relations between 
revelation and authority. 
  In order to get to grips with Minor’s case it will be useful to stay for a moment 
with the example of evidence that is given in a court of law. Consider in particular the 
case of the so-called ‘expert witness’. The role of expert witnesses is to bring their 
knowledge to bear upon certain aspects of a case. Typically this means interpreting what 
certain facts or statements show. The authority of the expert witness stems from the fact 
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that he or she is in a better position than any layperson to make such an interpretation. 
While the unaided jury could only speculate whether the presence of certain drugs in a 
person’s bloodstream may have caused that person to be drowsy, a medical doctor 
would be able to spell out the implications in some detail. Consequently, it makes sense 
for the jury to defer to the opinion of the doctor on that matter. What is important to 
note is that it is the expert knowledge and skills that the doctor brings to the courtroom 
that gives him or her authority. Any doctor with relevant skills and knowledge could act 
as the expert witness. And, in principle, any layperson could take the place of the expert 
witness provided he or she first successfully acquired the relevant skills and knowledge. 
But not all authority stems from expertise. Take, for example, the case of parental 
authority. Here authority is not conferred by virtue of knowledge, but by virtue of 
parenthood. Clearly children and young adults do not always recognise this authority, 
by refusing to eat their greens, or by sneaking off to parties, stealing hamsters from pet 
shops, and so on. Expert witnesses are perhaps less likely to meet with this kind of 
rebellion. Nonetheless, the fact that children do rebel against their parents shows that 
there is a concept of authority at stake. If parents had no authority over their children it 
would make no sense to say that the children had rebelled. Furthermore, parental 
authority cannot be gained by undergoing training in the way that the authority of an 
expert witness can be gained by so doing. It is true that one can gain parental authority – 
for example by fostering a child – or lose it – for example by becoming estranged. But 
gaining and losing parental authority in these ways does not come down to losing or 
gaining knowledge. 
  What the example of parental authority shows, then, is that not all concepts of 
authority rest on knowledge. Or to put this differently, not all figures of authority have 
that authority by virtue of their knowledge. And Minor draws our attention to how easy 
it is to lose track of this fact, and to assume that all authority is rooted in superior 
knowledge.  
 
‘If a son were to say, “I obey my father not because he is my father but because he is a 
genius, or because his commands are always profound and brilliant, “ this filial 
obedience is affected. The son emphasizes something altogether wrong, emphasizes the 
brilliance, the profundity in a command, whereas a command is simply indifferent to 
this qualification. The son is willing to obey on the basis of the father’s profundity and   122 
brilliance, and on that basis he simply cannot obey him, because his critical attitude with 
regard to whether the command is profound and brilliant undermined the obedience.’
99 
 
The mistake that the son makes is to confuse parental authority with the kind of 
authority that comes with expertise. 
The point that Minor makes here with respect to the relation between parent and 
child can also be made with respect to the relation between the religious person and 
prophets. The mistake that the son makes is to think that he should obey his father 
because his father is clever, erudite or knowledgeable. But this is not how the concept of 
parental authority works. One is – or should be – obedient to one’s parents simply 
because they are one’s parents. What is important is who they are, not what they know. 
And, similarly, what is important about religious prophets is who they are, not their 
intellect, erudition or knowledge. As Minor explains: 
 
‘I am not to listen to Paul because he is brilliant or matchlessly brilliant, but I am to 
submit to Paul because he has divine authority; and in any case it must become Paul’s 
responsibility to see to it that that he produces this impression, whether anyone submits 
to his authority or not. Paul must not appeal to his brilliance, since in that case he is a 
fool; he must not become involved in a purely aesthetic or philosophic discussion of the 
content of the doctrine, since in that case he is absentminded. No, he must appeal to his 
divine authority and precisely through it, while he willingly sacrifices life and 
everything, prevent all impertinent aesthetic and philosophical superficial observations 
against the form and content of the doctrine.’
100 
 
  In this passage Climacus points out that the concept of divine authority has 
implications not only for those who would listen to the world of God, but also for those 
who would preach it. If it is a mistake to look for expert knowledge in religious 
preaching it is also a mistake for a religious prophet to peddle knowledge in his or her 
preaching. For if one peddles special knowledge then one’s authority is that of an 
expert. But, as we have seen, religious authority is more akin to parental authority than 
to expert authority. As Minor explains: 
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‘A Christian pastor, if he is to speak properly, must simply say, “We have Christ’s word 
that there is an eternal life, and with that the matter is decided. Here it is a matter neither 
of racking one’s brains nor of speculating, but of its being Christ who, not in the 
capacity of profundity but with his divine authority, has said it”’
101 
 
  Minor speculates that the tendency to confuse divine authority with expert 
authority is rooted in our failure to come to terms with important differences between 
the concept of God and the concept of a person.  
 
‘A king exists physically in such a way that one can physically assure oneself of it, and 
if it is necessary perhaps the king can very physically assure one that he exists. But God 
does not exist in that way. Doubt has made use of this to place God on the same level 
with geniuses, poets and thinkers, whose utterances are imply evaluated only 
aesthetically or philosophically; and if it is said well, then the man is a genius – and if it 
is said exceptionally well, then it is God who has said it!!!’
102 
 
Somebody who thinks in this way reasons that the wisdom or philosophical acumen that 
can be found in the sayings of God ‘compensates’ for the fact that God is not an 
empirical entity. 
  From Minor’s point of view James’s error is to fall into the trap of thinking that 
the authority of revelations is derived from the special knowledge that they bring. 
According to James mystics are entitled to trust in their visions precisely because in 
those visions they are given an immediate ‘glimpse’ of God. They are granted, as it 
were, an insider’s knowledge of God. But people who have not had such experiences do 
not know what it is to stand in the presence of God. Mere reports of this knowledge are 
not compelling. One has to have the experience in order to really know. But for Minor 
the authority of revelations does not have to do with knowledge at all, but with 
obedience. 
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6) A Concluding Defence 
In the foregoing I have pitted Kierkegaard’s understanding of revelation against James’s 
understanding of mysticism. But before it is possible to conclude anything from this 
exchange, it is necessary to address an important objection. Somebody may ask, quite 
rightly, whether in comparing Kierkegaard’s remarks on Christian revelation with 
James’s more general remarks on mysticism we are really comparing like for like? If 
revelation is conceptually distinct from mysticism are we not simply talking about two 
things? If that is the case then the exchange between Kierkegaard and James that I have 
set out above is really only what the Dane would doubtless call shadow boxing. Both 
sides can claim an easy victory; but it is a pointless victory, since the opponent is really 
elsewhere. 
  In reply to this objection let us first note that the terms ‘mysticism’ and 
‘revelation’ need not be mutually exclusive. It would certainly make sense to say that a 
revelation from Christ, say, is a mystical experience. And, secondly, James did not think 
that the Christian tradition is excluded from his account of mystical experiences. Saint 
Ignatius, Saint John of the Cross, Saint Teresa and Dionysius the Areopagite all make 
an appearance in James’s pages on mysticism. Furthermore, both Kierkegaard and 
James address the same philosophical question, namely what kind of authority should 
be attached to acute religious experiences. We can conclude, then, that although the 
accounts offered by Kierkegaard and James are, so to speak, chalk and cheese, this does 
not mean that there is no sense in comparing them or bringing their arguments to bear 
on one another.  
 
7) A Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter I have compared Kierkegaard’s and James’s accounts of religious 
experience. I surveyed the remarks made on this subject by Kierkegaard and James; and 
compared the religious experiences of the two philosophers. I then compared three 
aspects of their accounts. Firstly, I compared what Kierkegaard and James have to say 
about the origins of religious experiences. Secondly, I assess James’s claim that 
religious experiences are evidence for the existence of God in the light of Kierkegaard’s 
claim that religious experiences cannot be evidence of the existence of God. Finally I 
compared James and Kierkegaard on the issue of what authority we can attach to   125 
religious experiences. My argument has been that in each of these three areas of 
comparison Kierkegaard’s case is superior to James’s.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Life-views and Sick Souls 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters I have made several arguments to the effect that Kierkegaard 
does not think that having a religious belief comes to accepting the objective truth of 
certain propositions. In the first chapter I argued that although Kierkegaard thinks that 
faith is risky, he does not think that the kind of risk involved has to do with not knowing 
whether it is objectively true that there is a God. In other words, for Kierkegaard, faith 
is not a gamble on the objective truth of the proposition that there is a God. In the 
second chapter I argued that Kierkegaard denies the coherence and relevance of formal 
proofs for the existence of God. Such proofs, of course, are designed to demonstrate the 
objective truth of the proposition that there is a God. But, for Kierkegaard, it is a great 
misunderstanding to think that such a demonstration can ground a life of faith. It is 
clear, then, what Kierkegaard does not think constitutes a good account of religious 
belief. In this chapter I shall consider Kierkegaard’s more positive account of what 
constitutes a religious belief. In particular I shall discuss his proposal that a religious 
belief is a ‘life-view.’ And I shall also discuss whether James makes any similar 
proposals. 
Gilmartin deserves credit for tabling the suggestion that there may be some 
mileage in comparing Kierkegaard’s notion of a life-view with certain arguments in 
James.
1 However, I shall only touch briefly on Gilmartin’s case. The reason for this is 
that Gilmartin’s argument is intimately bound up with his proposal that similarities 
between the biographies of James and Kierkegaard explain similarities between their 
philosophical views. I have already discussed this proposal in the introduction, where I 
argued that it is untenable. Nonetheless, it is possible to ask whether there are other, 
non-biographical reasons for thinking that Kierkegaard and James are making similar 
cases. Furthermore, there is considerable value in comparing Kierkegaard’s arguments 
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with James’s. It gives us an opportunity to clarify their positions, and, as I shall argue, 
to clarify the differences between their arguments in particular. 
One way of gaining an initial purchase on what Kierkegaard means by a life-
view is to recall his observation that we live ‘forwards’ but understand ‘backwards’. 
The bald observation that we live forwards and understand backwards is by no means 
easy to understand. If by ‘living forwards’ is meant facing the future then the remark 
seems simply false. We do of course understand quite a bit about the future, for example 
that the cricket season will finish at the end of summer. And, conversely, there’s quite a 
bit that we don’t know about the past, for example the precise number of waves that 
broke on West Bay beach last year. But Kierkegaard’s observation is not about 
understanding things like the cricket season and oceanography. Rather, I take it that his 
point is to highlight an important distinction between the actual contingencies and 
exigencies of our lives and the disinterested study of life. Kierkegaard insists that we are 
often guilty of losing track of this distinction between the interested pursuit of life and 
the disinterested study of life. In his journals, for example, he complains, ‘How easily a 
person is led to think of man (an abstraction) instead of himself, this tremendous 
concretion.’
2 And the Dane ruminates further on this theme in a journal entry for 1843: 
 
‘Philosophy is perfectly right in saying that life must be understood backwards. But 
then one forgets the other clause – that it must be lived forwards. The more one thinks 
through this clause, the more one concludes that life in temporality never becomes 
properly understandable, simply because never at any time does one get a perfect repose 
to take a stance: backwards.’
3 
 
Here Kierkegaard seems to think that life is contingent and demanding; and that only by 
thinking about life retrospectively in a disinterested fashion can we make it orderly and 
thereby comprehensible. But Kierkegaard also seems to worry that the contingencies 
and exigencies of life are such that no disinterested retrospective view of it is possible. 
Our ‘backwards’ understanding is rooted in the ever-changing present, such that no 
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conclusions can ever finally be drawn: ‘life in temporality never becomes properly 
understandable.’
4 
  As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, James was familiar with 
Kierkegaard’s distinction between living forwards and understanding backwards. For 
that reason it is perhaps unsurprising that in Varieties James similarly makes a strong 
distinction between the ‘backwards’ disinterested contemplation of life and the 
concrete, personal conduct of life: ‘Knowledge about life is one thing; effective 
occupation of a place in life, with its dynamic currents passing through your being, is 
another.’
5 In common with Kierkegaard, then, James holds that our lives are contingent 
and exigent in a way that somehow resists disinterested ratiocination. Furthermore, both 
Kierkegaard and James offer piecemeal explanations as to why this distinction between 
understanding ‘backwards’ and living ‘forwards’ has sometimes been ignored or has not 
been recognized.
6 But, interestingly, neither Kierkegaard nor James concludes that there 
is no sense in which we can say that that ‘life in temporality’ is ‘properly 
understandable’. In fact while neither Kierkegaard nor James recant on the distinction 
between living forwards and understanding backwards, both philosophers try to remove 
the ‘sting’ that apparently follows from it. To this end Kierkegaard argues that we can 
understand ourselves in temporality by developing what he calls a ‘life-view’. 
David Swenson helpfully glosses Kierkegaard’s complex notion of a life-view in 
the following way: ‘A view of life is a principle of living, a spirit and an attitude 
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capable of maintaining its unity and identity with itself in all life’s complexities and 
varying vicissitudes; and yet also capable of being declined, to use the terminology of 
the grammatical sciences, in all the infinite variety of cases that the language of life 
affords.’
7 What a life-view provides to the person who has it, then, is a consistent 
interpretation of life, such that the kind of meaning and significance that one attaches to 
one’s life is not hostage to the vicissitudes of everyday, contingent ‘forward facing’ 
existence. A life-view is not ‘backwards’ facing, in the sense that it is not a disinterested 
theoretical account of the past events in one’s life. Consequently, and as Swenson points 
out, a life-view ‘is not acquired as a direct and immediate result of a course of study, the 
reading of books, or a communication of results.’
8 But this does not imply that a life-
view is ‘forwards’ facing.  By that I mean that a life-view is not simply a register of all 
the new and contingent things that happen or fail to happen in one’s life. And one does 
not attain a life-view simply by keeping an inventory of such things. Rather, the 
attainment of a life-view is ‘wholly a product of the individual’s own knowledge of 
himself as an individual.’
9 Consequently, a life-view is attained not by theorizing about 
past events in one’s life or by recording new events in one’s life, but by what 
Kierkegaard sometimes calls ‘self-examination’. Furthermore, for some people, the 
result of such self-examination will be to come to a religious point of view. That is to 
say that such a person will adopt a religious perspective as his or her ‘principle for 
living.’ 
Quite what Kierkegaard means by a life-view, and the ramifications that this 
idea has for his philosophical project, are subjects that I shall discuss in the course of 
this chapter. However, as I noted above, I shall also discuss to what extent James 
promotes an idea similar to Kierkegaard’s. With this in mind there are two areas in 
James’s corpus that I shall examine. The first of these is Pragmatism. At the outset of 
Pragmatism James notes that the most important thing to know about one’s fellows is 
their philosophy. But he does not mean philosophy in any formal or academic sense; 
and his point is not that it is important to know whether one’s fellows are Hegelians, or 
devotees of Berkeley, or anything of that kind. Rather, as James puts it, ‘the philosophy 
which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is our more or less dumb 
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sense of what life honestly and deeply means.’
10  The question that I wish to raise, then, 
is whether James’s conception of ‘dumb sense’ is comparable with Kierkegaard’s 
notion of a life-view. The second area of James’s corpus that I shall look at is his 
remarks in Varieties concerning the ‘sick soul’. In his discussion of the sick soul, James 
argues that the cure for certain kinds of melancholy is for the afflicted person to adopt a 
religious outlook or perspective on life. Kierkegaard similarly frames some of his 
discussion life-views by reference to melancholy. I shall discuss how far James’s 
account of the sick soul is anticipated by Kierkegaard’s reflections. 
I start by developing an account of Kierkegaard’s conception of life-views, 
locating it in the context of his doctrine of subjective truth. I then discuss each of 
James’s arguments in turn in relation to Kierkegaard’s position. I shall argue that 
Kierkegaard’s conception of life-views and James’s conceptions of  ‘dumb sense’ and 
sick souls are, in fact, quite different. 
 
1) Kierkegaard on life-views 
Kierkegaard’s conception of a life-view is intimately bound up with his view that the 
truth of Christianity is a ‘subjective truth.’ For this reason I shall start by briefly 
rehearsing some of the details and implications of that view. As we have seen in the 
preceding chapters, Kierkegaard thinks that it’s a capital error to argue that the truth of 
Christianity is something that can and should be established by means of objective 
enquiry. Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus points out that if we enquire into 
the objective truth of Christianity this can be done in two ways. Firstly, we can treat 
Christianity as an historical claim that Jesus lived on earth. To enquire into the truth of 
Christianity, then, is to enquire whether it is objectively true that Jesus lived on earth. 
Alternatively, we can treat Christianity as a philosophical thesis. If we accept this 
position then to enquire into the truth of Christianity is to enquire into the objective 
truth of a philosophical position. As we saw in the first two chapters of this thesis, 
Climacus does not think that either of these approaches can work. Climacus argues that 
it is not possible to demonstrate the objective existence of any historical figure, 
including Jesus. And, furthermore, philosophical analysis can only establish that the 
concept of Christ is paradoxical. But to show that the concept of Christ is paradoxical is 
in no way to demonstrate the objective truth or falsity of that concept. The paradoxical 
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concept of Christ is neither objectively true nor objectively false, but simply 
paradoxical. However, as well as objecting to the idea that historical and philosophical 
enquiry can establish the objective truth or falsity of Christianity, Climacus also puts 
forward a different and arguably more fundamental objection to these approaches. 
Climacus’ point is that these approaches not only fail to prove the objective truth or 
falsity of Christianity but are, in any case, irrelevant. For Christianity is not an historical 
claim, nor a philosophical claim, but a religious claim. And as a religious claim, 
Christianity is not a thesis to be objectively demonstrated or refuted but an injunction to 
turn one’s life around. As Climacus complains, ‘Surely a philosophical theory that is to 
be comprehended and speculatively understood is one thing, and a doctrine that is to be 
actualised in existence is something else.’
11 To actualise the Christian doctrine in 
existence is to have a Christian life-view. And, as we shall see below, to have a life-
view is to have a certain kind of fundamental perspective on one’s life. But before 
discussing this claim it will be useful to look a little more at some of the implications of 
Climacus’ conception of subjective truth. 
  Advocates of historical and philosophical research into the truth of Christianity 
might respond to Climacus’ point by saying that surely we should establish whether 
Christianity is objectively true before deciding whether to turn our lives around in 
accordance with it. But against this Climacus objects that an objective enquiry into the 
truth of Christianity cannot have any bearing on whether we choose to turn our life 
around. For to accept that Christianity is objectively true is to accept that it is true 
regardless of how we relate to it on a personal level. But, of course, to turn one’s life 
around is to take Christianity personally. It is, as Climacus says, to actualise it in one’s 
existence. In other words there is a qualitative difference between accepting the 
objective truth of Christianity and turning one’s life around in the light of Christianity, 
such that the former cannot be the ground for the latter. Suppose somebody failed to 
notice this and chose to turn his or her life around strictly on the understanding that 
Christianity had been shown to be objectively true. Such a person would not in fact turn 
his or her life around in the relevant way. For his or her relation to Christianity is still 
fundamentally one of objective enquiry. As Climacus explains, ‘With regard to the 
subject’s relation to known truth it is assumed that if only the objective truth has been 
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obtained, appropriation is an easy matter; it is automatically included as part of the 
bargain, and am Ende the individual is a matter of indifference.’
12 But, of course, 
actualising Christianity in one’s existence is not at all ‘part of the bargain’ when one 
demonstrates the objective truth of Christianity. For the authority of such a proof stems 
from the fact that it does not rest on any personal convictions; consequently accepting 
such a proof in no way places one in a personal relation to Christianity. 
  Of course if objective enquiry is irrelevant to deciding the truth of Christianity, 
then responsibility for that decision must rest with our own personal judgement. In other 
words we cannot, as it were, sit back and wait for some piece of objective evidence or a 
compelling impersonal argument to settle the issue once and for all and for all of 
humanity. We shall each of us have to make a personal decision about whether or not to 
turn our life around according to the Christian injunction. And this in turn raises the 
issue of what kinds of considerations are relevant to such a decision. Clearly, and as I 
argued in chapter 1, Kierkegaard doesn’t think that we can only guess whether or not 
Christianity is true. But, for the reasons I have just discussed, it is also the case that we 
cannot advance philosophical or empirical theses in support of Christianity or against it.  
  In one sense we wouldn’t expect there to be a general answer to the question of 
what kinds of considerations are relevant to deciding between Christian belief and 
unbelief. For, as we have just noted, the issue is strictly personal. But that is not to say 
that any personal views on Christianity are relevant. For example I may greatly enjoy 
church jamborees, but to become a Christian on that basis would clearly be to make a 
mockery of faith. The kinds of personal reflections relevant to deciding for or against 
faith, then, must have to do with Climacus’ claim that Christianity is to be actualised in 
existence. In other words, the kinds of questions that I must ask myself will have to do 
with whether I can see the point of living a Christian existence, whether I can see what 
living in that way comes to, and whether I am really able to actualise that kind of 
existence. To ask such questions is not, of course, to undertake an objective enquiry; for 
they are questions that I pose to myself from a first-person interested perspective. But 
this in no way implies that they are not serious questions, or that I am free to answer 
them in any way that I choose. They are, after all, still questions and not invitations to 
fanciful thinking. 
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  So far, then, we have seen that for Kierkegaard Christianity is not a 
philosophical thesis but an ‘existence communication’. Consequently, if I am to be a 
Christian my task is not to make an objective study of Christianity but to realise 
Christianity in existence. But the distinction that Kierkegaard draws between objective 
study and subjective actualisation does not only apply to Christianity. For, as Climacus 
often insists, it is always the case that to have an objective understanding of something 
is not to actualise it in existence. Of course, although this distinction always holds it is 
not always relevant. For example chemistry is clearly and properly an area of objective 
study. And studying chemistry is not to ‘actualise chemistry in existence’ in the way 
that Christians actualise Christianity in existence. But although it is true that to study 
chemistry is not to actualise it in existence, this observation is surely misplaced. For it 
simply makes no sense to claim that chemistry should be actualised in existence. This 
point is easily misunderstood because we sometimes do make changes to our lives in 
the light of advances in chemistry. For example we utilise new, non-natural materials 
such as nylon. However, to utilise the results of areas of objective study is not to 
actualise those areas of study in existence. Indeed it simply makes no sense to claim that 
I can or should actualise chemistry in existence. For, as we have already noted, 
chemistry is an area of objective research. But to actualise a doctrine in existence is to 
orient oneself subjectively in relation to that doctrine. 
  However, this is not to claim that the distinction between objective study and 
subjective actualisation applies only to Christianity. On the contrary, Climacus argues 
that the distinction is crucial if we are to understand what is involved in answering a 
whole range of what we might call ‘existential’ questions. That is to say, questions 
about what we should do, how we should understand ourselves, and what ethical 
commitments we should have. These are questions that fundamentally have to do with 
how we are to exist. That is to say that to answer such questions by making an objective 
study of them is to miss the mark. For no amount of objective study will come to the 
same thing as actually orienting or committing one’s life in a certain way.  And it is in 
relation to these ‘existential’ questions – including the question of whether to become a 
Christian - that the notion of a life-view is important. The relevant kind of answer to 
these problems is not to develop a philosophical thesis on them, but, rather, to develop 
and actualise in one’s existence a standpoint with regard to them. And to do this is to 
attain a life-view.   134 
We can gain some initial understanding of what Kierkegaard means by a life-
view by looking at his comments on fellow author Hans Christian Andersen. For 
reasons that I shall discuss below, Kierkegaard takes the view that Andersen has no life-
view. Kierkegaard characterises this failure in the following way: ‘- he [Andersen] is 
characterized rather as a possibility of a personality, wrapped up in such a web of 
arbitrary moods and moving through an elegiac duo-decimal-scale of almost echoless, 
dying tones just as easily roused as subdued, who, in order to become a personality, 
needs a strong life-development.’
13 In this passage Kierkegaard is clearly making a 
more complex and more interesting claim than that Andersen is a bit ‘moody’. 
Kierkegaard’s point is that Andersen’s lack of a life-view means that he has no 
fundamental standpoint with regard to his life. And one implication of this is that he has 
no basic context in which to view his own changes of mood. As a result he understands 
his life first one way, then another, then another, and so on, as the slings and arrows of 
outrageous fortune induce different emotional responses in him. He is ‘just as easily 
roused as subdued’.  Consequently, Andersen commands no clear view of his life and is 
only ‘a possibility of a personality’. 
  Kierkegaard’s remark about Andersen certainly brings out something of what 
Kierkegaard thinks follows from a failure to have a life-view. But we still might wonder 
exactly what it is that Andersen lacks. What could provide the kind of fundamental 
perspective that he lacks? Three answers that we might consider are life experience, 
nostalgia and philosophy. By the former I mean to suggest that Andersen’s problem 
could be simply that he hasn’t seen much of life. If he had a richer biography he would, 
perhaps, be able to place his own life into perspective. My second suggestion is that 
Andersen might gain a fundamental perspective on his life by always relating himself to 
one particular event in the past. And by the last suggestion I mean that Andersen’s 
problem could be that he lacks a philosophical account of the self. A theory of the self 
could perhaps provide the relevant perspective by means of which to make consistent 
sense of his own life. But in fact Kierkegaard considers and rejects all of these 
solutions. 
That Kierkegaard distinguishes strongly between a rich biography and a life-
view is clear from the following passage from his review of Thomasine Gyllembourg’s 
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book Two Ages. ‘The life-view creatively sustaining these stories [Two Ages] remains 
the same, while an ingenious inventiveness, a reserve of material gained from a rich 
experience and a fertile luxuriance of mood, all serve to produce change within creative 
repetition.’
14. Here Kierkegaard’s point is not only that a life-view is not a rich 
biography, but that it is only by virtue of having a life-view that the author is able to 
order, interpret and communicate that rich experience. In other words it is only by virtue 
of having a life-view that Gyllembourg is able to have a consistent perspective on the 
rich mixture of moods and events that have featured in her life. It follows that, in 
Kierkegaard’s eyes, Andersen cannot solve his problem by leading a richer or more 
varied life. Arguably leading a more varied life may even worsen his problem, for it will 
furnish him with more moods and experiences without enabling him to view his life 
from the point of view of a consistent standpoint.  
But if a life-view is not a rich biography then neither is it simply nostalgia. 
Kierkegaard explains his thinking on this matter in Repetition. 
 
‘He [a person with a life-view] does not run about like a boy chasing butterflies or stand 
on tiptoe to look for the glories of the world, for he knows them. Neither does he sit like 
an old woman turning the spinning wheel of recollection but calmly goes his way, 
happy in repetition. Indeed, what would life be if there were no repetition? Who could 
want to be a tablet on which time writes something new every instant or to be a 
memorial volume of the past? Who could want to be susceptible to every fleeting thing, 
the novel, which always enervatingly diverts the soul anew?’
15 
 
A life-view facilitates ‘repetition’ in the sense that it provides a constant perspective 
from which to understand oneself and one’s life. In other words if one has a life-view 
one is able to ‘repeat’ the same self-understanding in spite of the constantly changing 
circumstances of one’s life. However, achieving this kind of repetition is not the same 
as being nostalgic and thereby becoming a ‘memorial volume of the past.’ And the 
reason for this, I take it, is that to become a memorial volume of the past is really only a 
way of avoiding or denying the constantly changing circumstances of one’s life. For 
                                                 
14 Kierkegaard, S. (2001) A Literary Review, trans. A. Hannay, London: Penguin, 11. 
15 Kierkegaard, S. (1983) Fear and Trembling & Repetition, ed. and trans. H.V. Hong and E. H. Hong, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 132-3. Hereafter Fear and Trembling.   136 
somebody who is in the grip of nostalgia, what matters is only what has happened in the 
past, and the rest of one’s life is of no consequence. But if that is the case then repetition 
is not possible. For repetition is only possible if one takes seriously the changing 
circumstances of one’s life. It is only possible to ‘repeat’ the same self-understanding in 
spite of the constantly changing circumstances of one’s life if those circumstances are 
indeed changing. Nostalgia, then, avoids the need to repeat one’s self-understanding in 
new and ever-changing circumstances. However, as Constantine points out, the cost of 
this is to lead a seriously impoverished life. 
  Finally, Kierkegaard considers whether a life-view is a philosophical position. In 
the following remark from his review of Andersen, Kierkegaard does seem to come 
close to suggesting that a life-view is some kind of theory. ‘There must come a moment, 
I say, when, as Daub observes, life is understood backwards through the idea.’
16 What 
this observation rightly suggests is that if one has a life-view one has an idea of who one 
is through which one interprets one’s life. But what is misleading about the notion that 
one understands oneself ‘backwards through the idea’ is that it suggests that one’s self-
understanding is primarily theoretical. In other words Kierkegaard seems to be 
suggesting that a life-view is a theory – some sort of philosophical account of the self, 
for example – which one uses to make sense of life. Having a life-view, then, would be 
something like an all-consuming exercise in applied philosophy. But this is not at all 
what Kierkegaard has in mind, as he makes clear in the following declaration: ‘[…] I 
have never maintained that an idea as such (least of all a fixed idea) is to be regarded as 
a life-view […].
17 
  The reason that Kierkegaard discourages us from thinking that a life-view is a 
theory is that theories are hypotheses. And there are two related reasons why a life-view 
cannot be a hypothesis. Firstly, hypotheses are open to revision and replacement. 
Consequently if our life-view were a hypothesis we would be prepared to revise or 
discard it whenever we found it difficult to apply. But, of course, if that were the case 
our life-view would hardly be a means by which we could understand our lives. Rather, 
the ever-changing events in our lives would drive us to keep amending our self-
understanding, which is exactly the unfortunate situation that the development of a life-
view is supposed to head off. The second reason that a life view cannot be a hypothesis 
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is that life-views are profoundly personal.  A hypothesis is subject to disinterested 
enquiry, but self-understanding is by definition developed by interested personal 
enquiry or ‘self-examination’. For this reason Kierkegaard notes that ‘a life-view is 
more than a quintessence or a sum of propositions maintained in its abstract 
neutrality…’
18 
   We know then, that a life-view is not a rich biography or nostalgia or a theory. 
But compared with these statements about what doesn’t constitute a life-view 
Kierkegaard’s positive definitions of a life-view can seem disappointingly brief and 
figurative. In his review of Andersen, for example, he tells us that a life-view is ‘the 
transubstantiation of experience’ and that it is a ‘standpoint’.
19 And the best that we can 
do with these remarks is to underscore what we have already understood; namely that 
for Kierkegaard a life-view is a fundamental perspective through which one understands 
oneself and one’s life. But, arguably, Kierkegaard has quite a bit more to tell us about 
life-views if we look to his pseudonymous works.     
In his pseudonymous works Kierkegaard presents us with what he sometimes 
calls poetic constructions. In these poetic constructions Kierkegaard gives us a portrait 
of characters that hold various life-views. This is not, of course, to claim that 
Kierkegaard presents us with portraits of people who are living various different 
lifestyles. I take it that the term ‘lifestyle’ is generally used to denote practices or 
interests that dominate one’s routine. For example, the ‘healthy’ lifestyle revolves 
around the gym, and the - arguably more congenial - ‘party’ lifestyle revolves around 
boozy socialising, and so on. But Kierkegaard’s imaginary constructions are clearly not 
examples of different lifestyles in this sense. 
Furthermore, it is also important to note that in his imaginary constructions, 
Kierkegaard is not simply presenting us with an eccentrically fictionalised thesis. As we 
have seen above, for Kierkegaard the real task that each of us must undertake in relation 
to ‘existential’ questions is not study them objectively. For example, in relation to 
Christianity our task is to get to grips with whether we really understand what it is to 
believe in Christ, what living a Christian life comes to, and whether we are able and 
willing to live such a life. But, as Climacus repeatedly points out, undertaking this kind 
of reflection is a personal, interested task. In other words one must undertake ‘self-
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examination’ in order to see how one stands subjectively in relation to Christianity. 
Proposing an objective theory of the truth of Christianity, then, is irrelevant and 
misleading in the sense that it leads the reader to reflect objectively on the truth of 
Christianity rather than to reflect subjectively on how one stands in relation to 
Christianity. As Climacus points out, ‘Existing in what one understands cannot be 
directly communicated to an existing spirit, not even by God, still less by a human 
being.’
20 Conseqently Kierkegaard must communicate ‘indirectly’. 
This does not imply that there are no philosophical discussions in Kierkegaard’s 
imaginary constructions. As we have already noted, Climacus himself engages in some 
complex theoretical debates, for example on proofs for the existence of God. But we 
needn’t conclude that Kierkegaard has ‘slipped up’ by including theoretical discourses 
in his imaginary constructions. For Kierkegaard’s conception of indirect communication 
hinges on the claim that Christianity is not a philosophical thesis to be assessed, but an 
‘existence communication’ to be actualised in one’s life. It follows from this that if 
Kierkegaard is to avoid being accused of contradicting himself he must not present 
Christianity as a philosophical thesis. But this in no way bars him from entering any 
philosophical debate. And, indeed, much of Kierkegaard’s work would be a great deal 
more puzzling if he had omitted all philosophical discussion. For example, if Climacus 
had not set out his criticisms of the notion that it is possible and desirable to prove the 
existence of God, then I think many readers would be greatly puzzled by much of what 
he has to say. For surely, given that many philosophers have thought it important to 
prove or disprove the existence of God, we should wonder why Climacus doesn’t 
present us with some kind of proof along these lines. And, furthermore, it does matter 
whether what Climacus says on this issue is plausible or not. Climacus’ rejection of the 
claim that it is plausible and desirable to prove the existence of God is intimately bound 
up with his view that Christianity is not a philosophical thesis, or an historical thesis, 
but an ‘existence communication.’ What Climacus’ says about proofs, then, has an 
important bearing on his whole project. Consequently we should seriously scrutinize the 
objective truth of Climacus’ philosophical claims on proofs. 
Somebody may object that by entering into a philosophical discussion of proofs 
for the existence of God, Climacus will inevitably lead his reader into an objective 
appraisal of his thesis and away from subjective self-examination. Against this we can 
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start by observing that although Climacus makes philosophical arguments about proofs 
for the existence of God, this does not amount to presenting Christianity as a 
philosophical thesis. And for this reason we cannot say that Climacus encourages his 
reader to think that what must be settled is whether Christianity is objectively true or 
false. We can, I think, concede that somebody may, as it were, become obsessed with 
Climacus’ reflections on proofs. Such a person could then become engrossed in making 
an objective assessment of Climacus’ arguments, rather than worrying about his or her 
own subjective relation to Christianity. But in fact I don’t think that this is to concede 
anything that Climacus need worry about. For one thing it is unreasonable to expect 
Climacus to determine in advance how readers will position themselves in relation to 
what he has written. No author can prevent his or her works being read in a context that 
he or she did not intend. Furthermore, there are plenty of remarks in Climacus’ work in 
which he makes it abundantly clear that he does not think that assessing the objective 
truth of philosophical arguments about the existence of God comes to the same thing as 
determining one’s subjective relation to Christianity. Consequently, any reader who 
merely obsesses over Climacus’ remarks on proofs must acknowledge that he or she is 
not, as it were, looking at the full picture. And what I have said here in relation to 
Climacus’ remarks on proofs can, I think, hold good for all of the philosophical 
arguments that are advanced in Kierkegaard’s indirect communication. That is to say 
that we can and should take them seriously as arguments; and to do so is not to 
contradict or lose sight of Kierkegaard’s insight that Christianity is not a philosophical 
thesis. 
  Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication has important implications for 
Kierkegaard’s views on philosophical authorship. I shall return to this below in my 
discussion of James’s conception of the sick soul. At this point, however, I shall finish 
my account of life-views by briefly indicating what a Christian life-view is like, and 
how it is different from other life-views. 
  As is well known, Kierkegaard presents three principal life-views in his 
pseudonymous authorship: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. The pseudonym 
Frater Taciturnus, makes the following distinction between the aesthetic and ethical 
spheres: ‘The aesthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of 
requirement (and this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes   140 
bankrupt)’
21. The notion that the aesthetic sphere is the ‘sphere of immediacy’ is at first 
glance hard to fathom. For the term ‘immediacy’ seems to imply ‘thoughtless’ or 
‘unreflective’. But although Kierkegaard’s various pseudonymous depictions of the 
aesthetic sphere are often full of sensuous pursuits they also depict aesthetes engaged in 
complex reflection. So to be an aesthete, then, is not to be a thoughtless sensualist. And, 
in fact, we might even say that what characterizes the aesthetic sphere is reflection; but, 
importantly, it is disinterested reflection. As Conant points out, ‘With respect to the 
aesthetic, the accent falls on the what – that is, it falls directly on the object of one’s 
concern.’
22  In other words, the aesthete is absorbed in whatever it is that holds his or 
her interest – a person, a glass of fine wine, a stroll, a poem, or whatever. In this sense 
the aesthete is primarily an observer. And it is with this in mind that we can begin to 
appreciate the distinction that Taciturnus cleaves between the aesthetic and ethical 
spheres. To be bound by ethical requirement is to be concerned about one’s subjective 
relation to life’s events. That is to say that ethically one does not merely observe things, 
but takes up an interested stance in relation to them. The ethicist has commitments, 
then, where the aesthete has observations. 
  The religious sphere is also characterised by subjective commitment. This is 
hardly surprising given that Kierkegaard constantly insists that Christianity is not a 
doctrine to be dispassionately assessed but an ‘existence communication’ which is to be 
actualised. However, the religious sphere of existence is by no means the ethical sphere 
in all but name; a point that Climacus makes rather dramatically by pointing out that 
from a religious point of view ethics is a ‘temptation.’
23 To be an ethicist is to act 
responsibly. And to act responsibly is to act in accordance with sound and careful 
judgements about what is good and right, and not to act on the basis of personal whims 
or fancies. As the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio puts it, ‘Thus in the ethical view of 
life, it is the task of the single individual to strip himself of the qualification of 
interiority and to express this in something external.’
24 Of course people can and do 
arrive at different judgements about what, ethically speaking, are right and wrong. But 
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the important point here is that the ethicist’s judgements are not arbitrary. Furthermore, 
since they are not arbitrary judgements it is possible for the ethicist to give an account 
of his views. In other words his or her judgements are at least publicly comprehensible, 
even if we wouldn’t expect everybody to agree with them. And it is this that leads 
Climacus to claim that religiously speaking the ethical is a temptation. For there is an 
important sense in which a Christian cannot explain himself or herself in the way that 
the ethicist can. This is not at all to claim that in order to be a Christian one must deny 
one’s faith or simply keep quiet about it. Rather, it is to claim that one’s Christian faith 
cannot be given a public explanation in the way that one’s ethical judgements can. As 
de Silentio notes, ‘The paradox of faith is that there is an interiority that is 
incommensurable with exteriority, an interiority that is not identical, please note, with 
the first, but is a new interiority.’
25 Clearly Silentio is not arguing that to have faith is 
merely to follow some whim or private fancy. His point, I take it, is that there is an 
important sense in which one cannot enter into a public debate about one’s faith without 
radically misrepresenting it. And the reason for this, I take it, is the same reason that 
underpins Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication. In other words it has to do 
with the fact that Christianity is both paradoxical and an existence communication. As 
we have seen in the foregoing discussion, it is not possible to give an objective account 
of faith precisely because Christianity is not a philosophical doctrine but a paradoxical 
existence communication to be actualised in one’s life. To attempt to give a ‘direct’ 
account of one’s faith – as the ethicist gives a public account of his or her judgements – 
is, then, misleading. That is why Climacus says that religiously speaking ethics is a 
temptation. To enter into a debate about one’s faith in the way that an ethicist enters into 
a debate about moral judgements is to misunderstand what is required by faith. This is 
not of course to claim that Christianity is amoral or even immoral, but merely to point to 
a fundamental distinction between the ways in which ethicists and Christians understand 
themselves and the world.  
 
2) James on the ‘dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means.’ 
As I noted in the introduction there are two places in James’s corpus where we might 
look to see whether he is advancing something like Kierkegaard’s notion of a life-view: 
Pragmatism and Varieties. In the following sections I shall review the relevant 
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arguments that James makes in each of these places, and draw comparisons with the 
account of Kierkegaard’s life-views that I have just set out. James’s remarks in 
Pragmatism have, I think, less mileage in this regard than those in Varieties. For that 
reason, I shall start with the former but devote more space to the latter. 
In Pragmatism James argues that even those of us who are not professional 
philosophers or students of philosophy nonetheless have a philosophy. Furthermore, the 
philosophy that each of us has determines our fundamental attitudes to life. James 
writes, ‘I know that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, 
and that the most interesting and important thing about you is the way in which it 
determines the perspective in your several worlds.’
26 As we might expect, given the 
broadness of this claim, the kind of philosophy that James has in mind is not formal 
philosophy. Rather, it is ‘our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and 
pressure of the cosmos.’
27 Accordingly, ‘the philosophy which is so important in each 
of us is not a technical matter; it is our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly 
and deeply means.’
28 
  But although James is careful to distinguish between the technical philosophy 
practiced by professionals and the ‘dumb sense’ of life’s meaning that we all have, he 
does not think that the two are unconnected. For it is James’s claim that our non-
technical ‘more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means’ has a 
profound influence on which formal philosophical positions we formulate and support. 
In other words, James’s point is that formal philosophical arguments are not composed 
and debated in isolation from the ‘dumb sense’ that each of us has. As James writes:  
 
‘Yet his [the philosopher’s] temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of 
his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, 
making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this 
fact or principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he 
believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it.’
29 
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  It is because, in James’s view, philosophical arguments are motivated by our 
‘dumb sense’ that he famously claims that, ‘The history of philosophy is to a great 
extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments.’
30 When philosophers debate the 
merits of various positions they do so in the context of their own ‘temperamental’ non-
philosophical outlook. What they find broadly objectionable or broadly correct about 
formal philosophical argumentation they do so on the basis of their informal 
understanding of the ‘total push and pressure of the cosmos.’ When two philosophers 
disagree, then, they do so because they have different senses of what ‘life honestly and 
deeply means.’
31 For an argument that fails to accord with one’s sense of what life 
‘deeply means’ is difficult to accept, even if it has great technical merit. ‘He [the 
philosopher] feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with the world’s character, 
and in his heart considers them incompetent and ‘not in it,’ in the philosophic business, 
even tho they may far excel him in dialectical ability.’
32 
  James argues that failure to acknowledge the influence of our ‘dumb sense’ of 
what life means on formal philosophical debate renders the latter disingenuous. ‘There 
arises thus a certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions: the potentest of all our 
premises is never mentioned.’
33 And not only do philosophers fail to mention their non-
formal commitments, but they also disguise the fact that those commitments motivate 
their arguments. 
 
‘Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries when philosophising 
to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognised 
reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions.’
34 
 
 However, both denying and disguising the influence of ‘dumb sense’ or temperament 
on formal philosophical debate is equally undesirable. For it remains the case that 
informal philosophy does profoundly influence which philosophical doctrines we are 
prepared to accept. Consequently it is better to acknowledge this fact and to accept that 
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whatever one proposes as a philosopher it will only meet with general approval if it 
somehow strikes a chord with the informal philosophies of common folk.  
 
‘We philosophers have to reckon with such feelings on your [the general public’s] part. 
In the last resort, I repeat, it will be by them that all our philosophies shall ultimately be 
judged. The finally victorious way of looking at things will be the most completely 
impressive way to the normal run of minds.’
35 
 
3) Comparison of Kierkegaard and James 
With this account of James’s position in mind we can ask whether his notion of ‘dumb 
sense’ has anything in common with Kierkegaard’s notion of a life-view. There are, I 
think, two kinds of similarity that we can point to. Firstly, Kierkegaard’s notion of a 
life-view, like James’s notion of ‘dumb sense’ does have to do with one’s sense of what 
‘life honestly and deeply means.’ As I noted above, Kierkegaard argues that a life-view 
is a perspective from which one makes judgements about the value and meaning of all 
of life’s experiences. Consequently a life-view is neither a fleeting impression of the 
value and meaning of life, nor a perspective on just some of one’s experiences. Rather, a 
life-view is an enduring perspective on all of one’s experiences. And for this reason 
there doesn’t seem anything objectionable about saying that a life-view is a standpoint 
on what ‘life honestly and deeply means.’ Furthermore, James’s notion of ‘dumb sense’ 
and Kierkegaard’s notion of a life-view are similar insofar as neither is a theory. For 
James, one’s ‘dumb sense’ has a profound influence on what kinds of theoretical 
arguments one finds acceptable; but one’s dumb sense is not itself a theory. Similarly, 
and as I noted above, Kierkegaard does not think that a life-view is a theory. 
However, I don’t think we can put too much weight on either of the parallels 
that I have just sketched between James’s position and Kierkegaard’s. Although it is 
true that neither James’s ‘dumb sense’ nor a life-view is a theory, this does not imply 
that they have anything profound in common. Dashiell Hammet’s novel The Thin Man 
is not a theory, and neither is my local telephone directory; but clearly it would be a 
mistake to think that because neither is a theory they must be deeply alike. Moreover, 
although on the face of it there doesn’t seem anything objectionable about claiming that 
a life-view has to do with what ‘life honestly and deeply means’ this is only on the 
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grounds that we do not enquire too deeply into what James actually means by this 
phrase. James engages this idea suggestively, rather than fleshing it out in any detail. 
For this reason any bridge that we construct between Kierkegaard and James on the 
basis of this expression must also be suggestive rather than precise. 
  There are at least three further reasons for doubting whether James and 
Kierkegaard have something similar in mind in their respective notions of ‘dumb sense’ 
and life-views. The first reason is that James seems to allow that one’s ‘dumb sense’ 
can change repeatedly over time. Discussing the connection between ‘dumb sense’ and 
philosophy James notes the following: ‘And so forth – your ordinary philosophic 
layman never being a radical, never straightening out his system, but living vaguely in 
one plausible compartment of it or another to suit the temptations of successive 
hours.’
36 James’s point here is that people who are not professional philosophers never 
work out coherent systems, but instead field a collection of varied philosophical views. 
For our purposes it is important to note that, for James, the reason that such people do 
not work out systems is that their ‘dumb sense’ is not constant but changes ‘by 
successive hours.’ But, as I discussed above, for Kierkegaard, one’s life-view does not 
change according to the ‘temptations of successive hours.’ Rather, it is one’s life-view 
that yokes one’s experiences of ‘successive hours’ into a single, coherent whole. 
  The second reason to think that Kierkegaard and James are not offering similar 
arguments hinges on the observation that for Kierkegaard a life-view is not simply a 
perspective that one always already has. Rather, it is a standpoint that must be attained. 
This is made clear by Kierkegaard’s claim that Christianity is a life-view that must be 
actualised in existence. Actualising Christianity in existence is a subjective task. 
Furthermore this task is never finished so long as one wishes to be a Christian. But for 
James having ‘dumb sense’ is not something that one has to achieve. One simply has it.  
Finally, Kierkegaard would not, I think, accept James’s proposal that one’s 
‘dumb sense’ can and should have a profound influence over the kinds of philosophical 
argument that one is prepared to accept. As I argued above, although Kierkegaard 
situates many of his arguments within the context of his indirect communication, this 
does not imply that those arguments should not be judged on philosophical grounds. In 
other words Kierkegaard is not suggesting that his arguments concerning proofs, or 
concerning Hegel’s logic, for example, are only attractive or compelling to those people 
                                                 
36 Pragmatism, ibid., 5.   146 
who have a particular life-view. However, Kierkegaard does think that the notion of a 
life-view does have some important consequences for philosophical discourse, and I 
shall return to this in section 5, below. 
 
4) James on Sick and Healthy Souls 
I noted above that Gilmartin has tabled the notion that Kierkegaard’s notion of a life-
view has significant parallels with certain of James’s philosophical views. Gilmartin’s 
view hinges on the observation that both Kierkegaard and James discuss melancholy in 
similar ways. Gilmartin explains his point in the following way:    
 
‘The two men [Kierkegaard and James] made searching diagnoses of the self in disarray 
[…] drew up a description of health, and searched for the means to attain it. The means 
they hit upon, freedom, choice, ethical effort and faith, are identical and even their 
formulations regarding the means bear resemblances’
37 
 
For Gilmartin, the cure for melancholy that both Kierkegaard and James propose is the 
attainment of a life-view. This is, I think, an extremely interesting proposal. In this 
section I set out an account of James’s remarks on melancholy. In the following section 
I discuss Gilmartin’s proposal that James’s position is similar to Kierkegaard’s. 
In Varieties James makes the interesting suggestion that the cure for certain 
kinds of melancholy is for the afflicted person to adopt a religious outlook or 
perspective on life. In this section I give an overview of James’s argument, before 
drawing some comparisons with Kierkegaard in the following section. The kind of 
melancholy that James has in mind is that which characterises what he call the sick soul. 
For this reason I shall by discussing what James means by a sick soul, before passing on 
to the religious cure that he proposes for it. 
James’s distinction between healthy souls and sick souls corresponds to his 
distinction between those who are ‘once born’ and those who are ‘twice born’. Healthy 
souls are happy and at ease with the world. A sick soul, by contrast, is profoundly 
unhappy and ill at ease with life. In order to overcome their unhappiness and unease, 
sick souls must undergo some kind of radical spiritual conversion. That is to say that in 
addition to their physical birth they must be ‘born again’ spiritually. In this respect they 
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are different to healthy souls, who have the good fortune to be naturally happy and at 
ease, and who therefore have no need of spiritual rebirth. In order to be happy, then, 
sick souls must be twice born – once physically and once spiritually – whereas healthy 
souls need only be born once. The reason that sick souls are unhappy is that they have 
what James calls a ‘divided self’. Spiritual or ‘second’ birth brings happiness by uniting 
the divided self. 
  James describes the divided self of the sick soul in the following way. ‘The 
psychological basis of the twice-born character seems to be a certain discordancy or 
heterogeneity in the native temperament of the subject, an incompletely unified moral 
and intellectual constitution.’
38 That is to say that the sick soul is a collection of 
competing interests, drives, judgements and so on. Consequently, such a person lacks 
fundamental continuity in his or her life. ‘There are persons whose existence is little 
more than a series of zig zags, as now one tendency and now another gets the upper 
hand.’
39 James argues that we are all in this - rather rocky - boat during our formative 
years. However, we typically reach a more happy state in which the competition 
between our interests, drives, judgements and so on dies out, or is at least less fierce.  
 
‘Now in all of us, however constituted, but to a degree the greater in proportion as we 
are intense and sensitive and subject to diversified temptations, and to the greatest 
possible degree if we are decidedly psychopathic, does the normal evolution of 
character chiefly consist in the straightening out and unifying of the inner self. The 
higher and the lower feelings, the useful and the erring impulses, begin by being a 
comparative chaos within us – they must end by forming a stable system of functions in 
right subordination. Unhappiness is apt to characterize the period of order-making and 
struggle.’
40 
 
Those with happy souls need hardly labour to attain its ‘straightened out’ and unified 
state. But for sick souls the process of ‘straightening out and unifying of the inner self’ 
is much more arduous, and, consequently, their unhappiness is much more enduring. 
  James asserts that if a sick soul has a religious upbringing then his or her 
unhappiness may take the form of specifically religious melancholy, a diagnosis that he 
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applies to the youthful depression of Saint Augustine. However, not all sick souls are 
religiously inclined depressives. And, similarly, whilst some sick souls may be cured by 
religious conversion, some find other kinds of solutions. However, as we would expect, 
in the context of Varieties James is mostly concerned to set out his account of how it is 
that religious conversion unifies the sick soul. 
James observes that it is normal for people to be more or less preoccupied by 
certain ideas at different times of their lives. ‘As life goes on, there is a constant change 
of place in our systems of ideas, from more central to more peripheral, and from more 
peripheral to more central parts of consciousness.’
41 Religious conversion is the process 
by which religious ideas, so to speak, come to occupy centre stage in a person’s 
consciousness. As James puts it: ‘To say that a man is ‘converted’ means, in these 
terms, that religious ideas, previously peripheral in his consciousness, now take a 
central place, and that religious aims form the habitual centre of his energy.’
42 James 
does not think that the process by which this occurs is one that can be adequately 
explained by psychologists. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, there are a great 
many important differences between particular cases of religious conversion. And, 
secondly, it is difficult to account for the role of the unconscious in bringing religious 
ideas to the centre of a person’s consciousness. For these two reasons James thinks that 
only a general account of the process of conversion can be given. 
  Following Starbuck, James distinguishes between conversion that is brought 
about in a voluntary fashion and conversion that is the outcome of unconscious 
processes.
43 In cases of volitional conversion the sick soul consciously strives to bring 
religious ideas permanently to the centre of his or her concern, relegating non-religious 
ideas to the periphery. ‘In the volitional type the regenerative change is usually gradual, 
and consists in the building up, piece by piece, of a new set of moral and spiritual 
habits.’
44 In this way the sick soul purposely sets out to achieve a religious point of 
view. And in this regard voluntary conversion is quite different to that brought about by 
the unconscious. For in the latter case a religious point of view is not something that is 
purposely sought. On the contrary, in cases of involuntary conversion the preoccupation 
with religious ideas is not something that one strives for, but, rather, it is something that 
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happens to a person. ‘To state it in terms of our own symbolism: When the new centre 
of personal energy has been subconsciously incubated so long as to be just ready to 
open into flower, ‘hands off’ is the only word for us, it must burst forth unaided!’
45 
  James recognises that on the face of it the notion that conversion can be the 
outcome of subconscious processes does not sit well with Christian theology. For if 
conversion is indeed a function of subconscious processes this would seem to exclude 
the Christian view that conversion is brought about by God’s intervention in a person’s 
life.
46 But James’s doesn’t accept that the Christian account of conversion and the 
psychological account that he is proposing need be mutually exclusive. ‘But if you, 
being orthodox Christians, ask me as a psychologist whether the reference of a 
phenomenon to a subliminal self does not exclude the notion of the direct presence of 
the Deity altogether, I have to say frankly that as a psychologist I do not see why it 
necessarily should.’
47 
  James reconciles the Christian and psychological accounts of conversion by 
arguing that the subconscious processes by which religious ideas come to dominate a 
person’s attention may be the instruments of God.  ‘If there be higher powers able to 
impress us, they may get access to us only through the subliminal door.’
48 In other 
words it may be the case that one comes to a Christian point of view by virtue of one’s 
unconscious, but one’s unconscious is itself directed by God. Furthermore, it may only 
be by virtue of having an unconscious that we may have any meaningful interaction 
with God at all. For one’s unconscious may be fitted to communicate with God in a way 
that consciousness is not. As James explains:  
 
‘But just as our primary wide-awake consciousness throws open our senses to the touch 
of things material, so it is logically conceivable that if there be higher spiritual agencies 
that can directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so might be our 
possession of a subconscious region which alone should yield access to them. The 
hubbub of the waking life might close a door which in the dreamy Subliminal might 
remain ajar or open.’
49 
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5) Comparison of James and Kierkegaard on Sick Souls and Life-views 
Gilmartin’s claim that there is something comparable about James’s account of Sick 
souls and Kierkegaard’s notion of life-views rests on two observations. Firstly, that both 
men tie the notion of melancholy to the notion of a ‘divided self’. And, secondly, that 
Kierkegaard and James propose similar cures for the divided melancholic self: the 
attainment of a life-view. 
  With regard to the first of these points it is true, that, like James, Kierkegaard 
sometimes associates melancholy with a ‘divided self’ of some kind. This is one of the 
themes that the Pseudonym Anti Climacus develops in The Sickness Unto Death. And, 
rather differently, the Judge who pens part two of Either Or thinks that the melancholy 
suffered by aesthetes has to do with their refusal to become a ‘self.’ But I am not going 
to pursue these observations here. Rather, I think a more direct approach to assessing 
Gilmartin’s claim is to ask whether James’s account of the recovery of the sick soul 
actually does feature a concept of a life-view comparable to Kierkegaard’s. And in order 
to do this I am going to briefly look at the relationship between life-views and 
philosophical authorship. 
Interestingly, both Kierkegaard and James connect their respective discussions 
of life-views and sick souls with the issue of authorship. I noted above that Kierkegaard 
held the view that Andersen did not have a life-view. And Andersen’s lack of a life-
view has important consequences for his writing, a point that Kierkegaard makes in the 
following way:  
 
‘Moreover in Andersen’s novels, on the one hand one misses the consolidating total 
survey (life-view), and on the other one encounters again and again situations, 
comments etc. that are indeed undeniably poetic but in Andersen remain undigested and 
poetically (not commercially) unused, unappropriated, unfiltered.’
50 
 
Quite what Kierkegaard means by claiming that Andersen leaves his material 
‘undigested’ is a point that I shall return to below. But, for the moment, I shall examine 
James’s account of the relation between the sick soul and authorship.  
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James’s discussion focuses not on Andersen but on Tolstoy. For James, Tolstoy 
is an example of a sick soul or divided self that was not cured by sudden conversion. 
Rather, in Tolstoy we have an example of ‘the gradual way in which inner unification 
may occur.’
51 As James notes, ‘His [Tolstoy’s] crisis was the getting of his soul in 
order, the discovery of its genuine habitat and vocation, the escape from falsehoods into 
what for him were ways of truth. It was a case of heterogeneous personality tardily and 
slowly finding its unity and level.’
52 Moreover, Tolstoy’s divided self and slow 
recovery has a profound effect on his reflections and his writing. Prior to his recovery 
Tolstoy engaged in ‘unending questioning’ and ‘seemed to come to one insight after 
another.’
53 James does not claim that following his recovery Tolstoy somehow ceased to 
question or to have insights. But the important point here is that James thinks that the 
significance of Tolstoy’s recovery is that it lead him to express new views.  
  We can begin to get to grips with Kierkegaard’s rather different views on the 
relationship between life-views and authorship if we return to his observation that 
Andersen leaves his material ‘undigested.’ Kierkegaard expands on this complaint in 
the following way: 
 
‘If we now look and see how things are with Andersen in this respect, we find the 
relationship to be just as we expected. On the one hand single propositions stick out like 
hieroglyphs that at times are the object of a pious veneration. On the other he dwells on 
the individual phenomena coming from his own existence, which at times are further 
elevated to propositions and are then to be subsumed under the previous class, and at 
times are brought out more as something experienced, without one’s therefore being 
rightly able, as long as these remain in their bachelor state, to draw any further 
conclusions from them.’
54 
 
This is still rather difficult to understand. But the important point here, I think, is that 
Andersen doesn’t have proper command of his material. And, furthermore, this is, I 
think, linked to Kierkegaard’s complaint that Andersen does not have a life-view.  
Andersen’s failure to have a life-view means that he has no fundamental view by which 
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to understand himself and his life. Consequently, he understands himself first one way, 
then another, and this is reflected in the multiplicity of his interests and the 
disorganisation of his work. However, the important point here is that, for Kierkegaard, 
authors who are in possession of a life-view do organise their work in accordance with 
that view. And it is for this reason that Kierkegaard’s remarks on life-views and 
philosophical authorship do not come down to the same thing as James’s. For James 
only argues that Tolstoy’s recovery led him to develop new ideas. But for Kierkegaard, 
to write from a life-view is not only to develop new ideas, but it is also to present them 
in accordance with that life-view. 
 
8) Conclusion 
As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, Gilmartin has argued that there are certain 
similarities between Kierkegaard’s notion of a religious life-view and James’s notion 
that adopting a religious point of view can salve the sick soul’s melancholy. For 
Gilmartin these similarities are both suggested and explained by profound similarities in 
the lives of Kierkegaard and James. I do not accept Gilmartin’s argument from 
biography. However, in this chapter I have investigated whether on non-biographical 
grounds a case can be made for profound similarities between Kierkegaard’s position 
and James’s. To this end I have set out an account of Kierkegaard’s notion of a life-
view. I have also set out accounts of James’s notion of ‘dumb sense’ and of the sick 
soul. I have argued that there is only a superficial similarity between James’s notion of 
informal philosophy and Kierkegaard’s notion of a life-view. James’s discussion of the 
sick soul does come somewhat nearer to Kierkegaard’s discussion of life-views. 
However, we must certainly stop short of claiming that there are any profound 
similarities between the two. 
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Conclusion 
 
As I noted in the Introduction to this thesis, anybody looking to make a comparative 
study of Kierkegaard and James will face two difficulties. The first is that the two men 
did not know each other’s works. And the second is that there is little extant literature 
on the subject. In this thesis I hope to have addressed both of these issues. In relation to 
the first, I argued that whatever James did know of Kierkegaard he probably learnt from 
Harald Høffding. This is, no doubt, a modest claim. But nonetheless it does contribute 
to our understanding of the relationship between Kierkegaard and James. I also argued 
that the fact that Kierkegaard and James did not know each other’s works need not 
prevent us from comparing their arguments. And it was by comparing their arguments 
that I sought to address the second problem. I take it that part of the significance of my 
research is that it contributes to an area that has received little attention. 
  In the course of this thesis I have made three kinds of comparison between 
Kierkegaard and James. Firstly, where it has been claimed that Kierkegaard and James 
are making fundamentally similar arguments, I have investigated to see whether this 
really is the case. Secondly, I have identified arguments in Kierkegaard and James 
which, on the face of it, look similar. I have investigated whether such arguments really 
are similar. And, thirdly, where Kierkegaard and James are addressing similar issues I 
have evaluated who has the better case.  
  Finally, then, I shall summarize the results of my comparative research in the 
order in which I have presented it. In Chapter One I examined the claim that 
Kierkegaard proposes a pragmatist account of faith of the kind that James sets out in his 
essay The Will To Believe. I argued that this argument hinges on saddling Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus with the view that to believe in God is to risk believing 
something that is objectively false. I further argued that Climacus makes no such claim. 
In the following chapter I discussed James’s and Kierkegaard’s views on formal proofs 
for the existence of God. Both philosophers reject the notion that faith can be based on 
such proofs. However, their positions are not the same. Kierkegaard’s view is based on 
an analysis of what it means to demonstrate existence. James’s view is based on the 
observation that, as a matter of fact, formal proofs for the existence of God do not 
persuade people that God exists. I argued against James’s case, and in support of  
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Kierkegaard’s. In the third chapter I compared Kierkegaard’s and James’s accounts of 
religious experience. James views religious experiences as a special kind of evidence 
for the existence of God. For Kierkegaard it is a mistake to view religious experiences 
as evidence. Such experiences should be understood in relation to the concept of 
religious authority. I argued in favour of Kierkegaard’s position. In the final chapter I 
examined Kierkegaard’s conception of faith as a life-view. I argued that for Kierkegaard 
a life-view is a fundamental perspective on one’s existence. I compared this conception 
with James’s argument that we have a ‘dumb sense’ of what life ‘honestly means’, and 
with his discussion of the sick soul. I argued that Kierkegaard’s conception is different 
to both of James’s. 
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